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Detlev Mehlis Report
Detlev Mehlis Report
REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION COMMISSION
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 1595 (2005)
Detlev Mehlis Beirut
Commissioner 19 October 2005
UNIIIC
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. The Security Council, by its resolution 1595 of 7
April 2005, decided to
establish an international independent investigation
Commission based in Lebanon to assist the Lebanese authorities in their
investigation of all aspects of the terrorist attack which took place on 14
February 2005 in Beirut that killed former Lebanese Prime
Minister Rafik Hariri and others, including to help
identify its perpetrators, sponsors, organizers and accomplices.
2. The Secretary-General notified the Council that the
Commission began its full operations with effect from 16 June 2005. The
Commission was granted an extension to the initial period of investigation
mandated by the Council, until 26 October 2005.
3. During the course of its investigation, the
Commission received extensive
support from the Government of Lebanon and benefited
from expert inputs from a number of national and international entities.
4. The main lines of investigation of the Commission
focused on the crime scene, technical aspects of the crime, analysis of
telephone intercepts, the testimony of more than 500 witnesses and sources, as
well as the institutional context in which the crime took place.
5. The full case file of the investigation was
transmitted to the Lebanese
authorities during October 2005.
6. The present report sets out the main lines of enquiry
of the investigation
conducted by the Commission, its observations thereon,
and its conclusions, for the consideration of the Security Council. It also
identifies those matters on which further investigation may be necessary.
7. It is the Commission’s view that the assassination
of 14 February 2005 was carried out by a group with an extensive organization
and considerable resources and capabilities. The crime had been prepared over
the course of several months. For this purpose, the timing and location of Mr.
Rafik Hariri’s movements had been monitored and the itineraries of his
convoy recorded in detail.
8. Building on the findings of the Commission and
Lebanese investigations to date and on the basis of the material and
documentary evidence collected, and the leads pursued until now, there is
converging evidence pointing at both Lebanese and Syrian involvement in this
terrorist act. It is a well known fact that Syrian Military Intelligence had a
pervasive presence in Lebanon at the least until the withdrawal of the Syrian
forces pursuant to resolution 1559. The former senior security officials of
Lebanon were their appointees. Given the infiltration of Lebanese institutions
and society by the Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services working in
tandem, it would be difficult to
envisage a scenario whereby such a complex assassination
plot could have been carried out without their knowledge.
9. It is the Commission’s conclusion that the
continuing investigation should be carried forward by the appropriate Lebanese
judicial and security authorities, who have proved during the investigation
that with international assistance and support, they can move ahead and at
times take the lead in an effective and professional manner. At the same time,
the Lebanese authorities should look into all the case’s ramifications
including bank transactions. The 14 February explosion needs to be assessed
clearly
against the sequence of explosions which preceded and
followed it, since there could be links between some, if not all, of them.
10. The Commission is therefore of the view that a
sustained effort on the part of the international community to establish an
assistance and cooperation platform together with the Lebanese authorities in
the field of security and justice is essential. This will considerably boost
the trust of the Lebanese people in their security system, while building
self-confidence in their capabilities.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Para Page
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS; MID 2004 – SEPTEMBER 2005 ……
i -ii
I. PREFACE
…………………………………………………….. 1-22 1-5
II. BACKGROUND
……………………………………. 23-35 5-10
III. THE CRIME
………………………………………………….. 36-38 10
IV. THE LEBANESE INVESTIGATION
……………………………….. 39-86 11-26
V. THE COMMISSION’S INVESTIGATION
………………………….. 87-202 26-52
VI. CONCLUSIONS ………………………….. 203-211
52-53
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS, MID 2004 – SEPTEMBER 2005
2004
. 26 August 2004, Rafik Hariri meets in Damascus with
Syrian President Bashar Assad to discuss the extension of the term of
President Lahoud.
. 2 September 2004, the United Nations Security Council
adopts resolution 1559 concerning the situation in the Middle East, calling
for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.
. 3 September 2004, the Rafik Hariri bloc approves the
extension law for President Lahoud.
. 3 September 2004, the Lebanese parliament adopts the
extension law for
President Lahoud and forwards it to the Lebanese
government for execution.
. 7 September 2004, Economy Minister Marwan Hamadeh,
Culture Minister Ghazi Aridi, Minister of Refugee Affairs Abdullah Farhat and
Environment Minister Fares Boueiz, resigned from the cabinet in protest at the
constitutional amendment.
. 9 September 2004, Prime Minister Rafik Hariri
indicates to journalists that he will resign.
. 1 October 2004, Assassination attempt on Marwan
Hamadeh, in Beirut, Lebanon.
. 4 October 2004, Rafik Hariri resigns as prime minister.
. 11 October 2004, Syrian President Bashar Assad
delivers a speech condemning his critics within Lebanon and the United Nations.
. 19 October 2004, United Nations Security Council
expresses concern that
resolution 1559 has not been implemented.
. 20 October 2004, President Lahoud accepts Hariri’s
resignation and names Omar Karame to form the new government.
2005
. 14 February 2005, Rafik Hariri and 22 other
individuals are killed in a massive
blast in a seafront area of central Beirut.
. 25 February 2005, the United Nations Fact-Finding
Mission arrives in Lebanon.
. 8 March 2005, Hezbollah organizes a one million strong
“pro-Syrian” march.
. 14 March 2005, a Christian/Sunni-led counter
demonstration demands the
withdrawal of Syrian troops and the arrest of the chief
of the security and
intelligence services.
. 19 March 2005, a bomb explodes in Jdeideh, a northern
suburb of Beirut,
wounding 11 people.
. 23 March 2005, three people are killed and three
others wounded in an explosion in the Kaslik shopping centre, north of Beirut.
. 25 March 2005, the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission
issues its report in New York.
. 26 March 2005, a suitcase bomb explodes in an
industrial zone in northeast
Beirut, injuring six.
i
. 1 April 2005, nine people are injured in an
underground garage in an empty
commercial and residential building in Broumana.
. 7 April 2005, the Security Council forms the United
Nations International
Independent Investigation Commission into the
assassination of Rafik Hariri and 22 others on 14 February 2005.
. 19 April 2005, Lebanon's Prime Minister Najib Mikati
announces that
parliamentary elections will be held on 30 May 2005.
. 22 April 2005, General Jamil Al-Sayyed, head of the
Internal Security Forces and General Ali Al-Hajj, head of the Sûreté Générale,
decide to put their functions at the disposal of Prime Minister Najib al
Makati.
. 26 April 2005, the last Syrian troops leave Lebanon
ending a 29 year military
presence.
. 26 April 2005, the United Nations Verification Mission
starts its mission to verify the complete withdrawal of Syrian military and
intelligence agents from Lebanon and its full compliance with the resolution
1559.
. 6 May 2005, a bomb explodes in Jounieh north of Beirut
injuring 29 people.
. 7 May 2005, Parliament convenes to adopt the proposed
changes to the electoral law of 2000.
. 30 May 2005, the first round of the elections was held.
The Rafik Hariri Martyr List, a coalition of Saad Hariri's Future Movement,
the Progressive Socialist Party and the Qornet Shehwan Gathering, won the
majority of the seats in Parliament.
. 2 June 2005, journalist Samir Kassir is killed when
his car explodes in east Beirut.
. 21 June 2005, former Lebanese Communist Party leader
George Hawi is killed
when his car explodes close to his home in Wata
Musaytbeh.
. 30 June 2005, Fouad Siniora, former finance minister
under Rafik Hariri, forms the new government composed of 23 ministers.
. 12 July 2005, Defence Minister Elias Murr is wounded
and two other people are killed in a car bomb attack in Beirut.
. 22 July 2005, at least three people are wounded near
rue Monot when a bomb explodes in the Ashrafieh quarter.
. 22 August 2005, three persons are injured in an
explosion in a garage near the Promenade Hotel in the Al-Zalqa area north of
Beirut.
. 16 September 2005, one person is killed and ten others
wounded by a bomb near a bank in Ashrafieh.
. 19 September 2005, one person is killed and two
wounded in a small explosion at the Kuwaiti information office in Beirut.
. 25 September 2005, a car bomb injures prominent news
anchor, May Chidiac, in north Beirut.
ii
I. PREFACE
1. The present report details progress
made in the implementation of Security
Council resolution 1595. In that resolution, adopted on
7 April 2005, the Security Council, condemning the 14 February 2005 terrorist
attack in Beirut, Lebanon, that killed former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and
twenty two others, reiterating its call for the strict respect of Lebanon’s
independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity, and noting the
conclusions reached by an earlier fact-finding mission (S/2005/203), decided
to
establish an international independent investigation
Commission (hereafter called UNIIIC or the Commission) to assist the Lebanese
authorities in their investigation of all aspects of this terrorist act, in
order to, among other things, help identify its perpetrators, sponsors,
organizers and accomplices.
2. Prior to the adoption of resolution 1595, the
Security Council had examined the report of the fact-finding mission to
Lebanon on the same subject, submitted on 24 March 2005. The report reflected
the outcome of a three-week enquiry, including a set of recommendations. The
fact-finding mission was of the opinion that, since the credibility of the
Lebanese authorities conducting the investigation was questioned, an
international independent investigation should be set up to establish the
truth. For this purpose, a team with executive authority needed to be created,
covering all the fields of expertise needed for such an investigation.
Notwithstanding the limited time and manpower the fact finding mission was
granted, its conclusions and recommendations have been of considerable value
to the Commission.
3. In a letter dated 29 March 2005 (S/2005/208), the
Government of Lebanon expressed its approval of the Security Council’s
decision to establish an international commission of inquiry as well as its
readiness to cooperate with the commission within the framework of Lebanese
sovereignty and of its legal system.
4. Following the adoption of resolution 1595, intensive
consultations took place regarding the establishment of UNIIIC, its staffing
and its logistical support. On 26 May 2005, a small advance team headed by
Commissioner Detlev Mehlis arrived in Beirut. Mindful of the urgency of the
matter, from a temporary headquarters, the team endeavored to create the
support platform for its future work.
5. On 13 June 2005, after extensive discussions with the
Lebanese judicial
authorities, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was
signed between the
Government of Lebanon and the Commission. The MOU
detailed the modalities of cooperation between the two parties. Of particular
importance to the Commission was the agreement that “the Government of
Lebanon shall guarantee that the Commission is free from interference in the
conduct of its investigation, and is provided with all necessary assistance to
fulfill its mandate.” The Commission was to determine its own procedures,
collect evidence, both documentary and physical, meet and interview any
civilians or/and officials it deemed necessary and have unrestricted access to
all premises throughout the Lebanese territory, taking into account Lebanese
law and judicial procedures. The Lebanese authorities, for their part, were to
assist the Commission in its work by providing all documentary and material
evidence in their possession and by locating witnesses as requested by the
Commission.
6. On 16 June 2005, the Secretary-General declared the
Commission operational. On 17 June 2005, a press conference was held by the
Commissioner to solicit publicly the assistance of the Lebanese authorities
and to invite the Lebanese people to help the Commission by relaying any
information which might be of interest to the investigation. Two hotlines were
set up for this purpose, operated by the Lebanese authorities.
7. Shortly after the signing of the MOU, the Lebanese
authorities transmitted to the Commission an 8000 page case docket containing
all the information and evidence collected since 14 February 2005. Henceforth,
the Commission conducted a thorough criminal and judicial investigation in
close cooperation with the relevant Lebanese judicial (State General
Prosecutor of the Republic of Lebanon) and police (Internal Security Forces)
authorities, in order to avoid duplication, overlapping or contradictory
measures.
8. The Commission established close links with the
Lebanese security and judicial authorities. Regular discussions were held,
particularly with the judicial authorities, to exchange updated information
and files, share results and plan for the emerging phases of the investigation.
Most of the witnesses interviewed by the Commission were summoned through the
Lebanese judicial and security authorities. A case in point was the 30 August
2005 operation, in which Lebanese security forces and UNIIIC investigators
closely coordinated the house raid and search of former senior security
officials, prior to their transfer under close escort to the Commission’s
Main Operating Base (MOB) for interviewing.
9. The Lebanese authorities were of great assistance in
establishing the MOB, as well as a Forward Operating Base (FOB) for the work
of the Commission. Lebanese security teams (police and military) worked hand
in hand with the Commission’s security team to ensure the safety and
security of the staff and premises.
10. Although resolution 1595 gave the Commission
executive authority, the
Commission to a large extent was supported by the
Lebanese judicial and security authorities during search and raid operations.
Moreover, although the Commission was qualified to make proposals to the
Lebanese authorities regarding the arrest of persons allegedly involved in the
assassination, it remained the autonomous decision of the Lebanese authorities
to proceed with such actions.
11. From a two-track investigation, one Lebanese, one
United Nations, has emerged a complementary and unified investigation carried
forward in tandem by the Commission and the Lebanese authorities. The Lebanese
authorities have steadily shown the capacity to take increasing responsibility
in pursuing the case. This was demonstrated by the fact that they took the
initiative of arresting suspects, organizing raids and searches.
12. Given a deep mistrust that has prevailed among the
Lebanese people towards their security and judicial authorities, UNIIIC has
become a source of great expectation and hope for change, as well as an
“interface” between the Lebanese people and their authorities. The two
press conferences, particularly the first one, in addition to the interview of
the first suspect, and the arrest of the former senior security officials at
the Commission’s suggestion, had a catalytic effect. All of this was proof
that in the eyes of
the Commission, no one was above the law. This boosted
Lebanese confidence. More witnesses came forward as the work of the Commission
progressed. However, a number of people insisted that their identity not be
disclosed to the Lebanese authorities.
13. There are other points worth highlighting. First, a
number of witnesses were fearful that they would be harmed if it were known
publicly that they were cooperating with the Commission. For this reason, the
Commission took great care to ensure thatwitness interviews were conducted in
a confidential manner. Because the Commission credits the concern that these
individuals have for their safety, this report will not reveal the identity of
those interviewed. Second, as is true in any investigation, witnesses often
provide information beyond the scope of the
investigation being conducted. The Commission has and will continue to forward
to Lebanese authorities all information related to any criminal matter beyond
the scope of the Commission’s investigation. Finally, the Commission
interviewed people whose agenda was to point the Commission not in the
direction to where the evidence would lead it, but in the direction the
particular individual(s) wanted the Commission to go. The Commission dealt
with these individuals and situations by remaining focused on its single
mission – to follow the evidence wherever it might lead and not to follow
the agenda of any particular person or entity.
14. Lebanese public opinion reflects a widespread view
that, once UNIIIC has
delivered its report and closed down, Lebanon will be
“left alone”. A prevailing fear is that, in the aftermath of the
completion of UNIIIC’s work, and sooner rather than later, the Syrian
security and intelligence services will be back, orchestrating a “revenge
campaign” in a society which remains “infiltrated” by pro-Syrian
elements. Recent bombings, assassinations, and assassination attempts have
been carried out with impunity; deliberate rumors and prophetic media analyses
have sustained this state of mind and have deterred potential witnesses from
contacting UNIIIC. 15. Notwithstanding fears and reluctance to volunteer
information as the Commission’s completion of its work seemed imminent (25
October), it is fair to say that the Lebanese people in general terms have
been eager to come forward to help the Commission carry out its work.
16. The Commission could not operate in a media vacuum,
particularly in Lebanon. It has been the Commission’s steadfast policy not
to be drawn directly into a dialogue in the Lebanese media, avoiding any
escalation and staying above any challenging or provocative statements. Both
press conferences were aimed at countering such speculation and clarifying the
status of the investigation. Inevitably, their effect was short-lived.
17. To enhance transparency and broader cooperation,
working with the judicial authorities entailed keeping the highest political
authorities abreast of developments in the investigation, to the extent that
such action did not call into question the independent nature of the
Commission nor have a direct impact on the course of the investigation per se.
18. During the course of its investigation, the
Commission had to face major
logistical challenges. In this regard, the extensive
support and assistance of sister organizations of the United Nations system
and Interpol were invaluable in the daily work of the Commission.
19. The international community, for its part, was
always prompt, when asked, in coming forward with expertise. This assistance
greatly facilitated the work of the Commission and gave added value to its
work. However, although resolution 1595 called on all States to provide the
Commission with any relevant information pertaining to the Hariri case, it is
to be regretted that no Member State relayed useable information to the
Commission. A number of contacts led to mere exchanges of views and/or
statements of
facts. It is the Commission’s reading of the
resolution that the pertinent information envisaged by the Security Council
would have included among other things, intelligence information that could
have been submitted without any prior request from the Commission.
20. Despite the human, technical and financial
capacities mobilized for the purpose of the investigation, and although
considerable progress has been made and significant results achieved in the
time allotted, the investigation of such a terrorist act with multifaceted
international dimensions and their ramifications normally needs months (if not
years) to be completed so as to be able to establish firm ground for a
potential trial of any accused individuals. It is of the utmost importance to
continue to pursue the trail both
within and outside Lebanon. The Commission’s work is
only part of a broader process. Even as this report is being written a
significant arrest was made just a few days ago; witness interviews are
continuing and complex evidence continues to be reviewed.
21. The Commission has established facts and identified
suspects on the basis of evidence gathered or available to it. The Commission
has checked and examined this evidence to the best of its knowledge. Until the
investigation is completed, all new leads and evidence are fully analyzed, and
an independent and impartial prosecution mechanism is set up, one cannot know
the complete story of what happened, how it happened and who is responsible
for the assassination of Rafik Hariri and the murder of
22 other innocent people. Therefore, the presumption of
innocence stands.
22. In producing this report the Commission has
endeavored to ensure that nothing it does or says undermines the ongoing
criminal investigation and any trials that may follow. The Commission, at this
juncture cannot disclose all the detailed elements and facts it has in its
possession, beyond sharing them with the Lebanese authorities. The Commission
has tried to set forth the facts and to present the analysis of those facts in
a way that most accurately explains what happened, how it happened and who is
responsible.
II. BACKGROUND
23. Syria has long had a powerful influence in Lebanon.
During the Ottoman Empire,
the area that became Lebanon was part of an overall
administrative territory governed
from Damascus. When the countries were established in
the aftermath of the First World
War, Lebanon was created from what many Arab
nationalists considered to be rightfully
part of Syria. Indeed, since the countries became
independent, they have never had
formal diplomatic relations.
24. Syrian troops were invited into Lebanon by Lebanese
President Suleiman Franjieh
in May 1976 in the early stages of the latter’s civil
war. In the Taif Agreement, reached
among members of the Lebanese parliament, that ended the
civil war in 1989, inter alia,
Lebanon thanked Syria for its assistance in deploying
its forces in the Lebanon. A
provision of the agreement called for Lebanon and Syria
to determine jointly the future
redeployment of those forces. A later agreement reached
between the two countries in
May of 1991 regarding cooperation, restated that
provision. Syrian forces withdrew in
May 2005 in compliance with Security Council resolution
1559 (2004).
Relations between Mr. Hariri and Syria
25. The Commission’s investigation has confirmed what
many in Lebanon have long
asserted, that senior Syrian intelligence officials had
a powerful day-to-day and overall
strategic influence on the governance of Lebanon. The
apparent growing conflict
between Mr. Hariri and senior Syrian officials,
including Syrian President Bashar Assad,
was a central aspect of the information provided to the
Commission through interviews
and documents. A meeting in Damascus between Mr. Hariri
and President Assad on 26
August 2004 appeared to bring the conflict to a head. In
that meeting, which allegedly
lasted for 10-15 minutes, President Assad informed Mr.
Hariri, who was then Prime
Minister, that President Assad intended that Lebanon
would extend the term in office of
Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, which Mr. Hariri
opposed.
26. Lebanese and Syrian witnesses, and the transcript of
a meeting between Mr.
Hariri and Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Walid
Al-Moallem, provided the Commission
with sharply differing versions of what was said in that
meeting. A number of Lebanese
witnesses – including then former ministers Marwan
Hamadeh and Ghazi Areedi, Druze
leader and head of the Progressive Socialist Party Walid
Joumblat, parliament member
Bassem Sabaa, and Mr. Hariri’s son, Saad – reported
that Mr. Hariri told them that
President Assad brusquely informed him of the decision
to extend President Lahoud’s
term and threatened to “break Lebanon over your [Mr.
Hariri’s] head and Walid
Jumblat’s” if Mr. Hariri (and presumably Mr. Jumblat)
did not agree to support the
extension of President Lahoud’s term. Syrian officials
characterized the meeting
differently. Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk Sharaa and
General Ghazali , head of Syrian
intelligence in Lebanon, described the meeting in
positive terms. General Ghazali told
the Commission that Mr. Hariri told him that President
Assad referred to Mr. Hariri as a
“friend,” and described a cordial, respectful
meeting in which President Assad consulted
Mr. Hariri on the matter.
27. Following are excerpts of interviews conducted by
the Commission regarding the
26 August 2005 meeting, relevant parts of a letter to
the Commission from Mr. Sharaa,
and a portion of the transcript of a taped conversation
between Mr. Hariri and Mr. Al-
Moallem:
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic,
letter to the Commission of 17
August 2005:
“A meeting took place between President Bashar Assad
and late Prime Minister Rafik Al-Hariri in Damascus on August 26, 2004 within
the framework of the ongoing
political consultation between the Syrian and Lebanese
leaders. (…) A general review
was made of the local and regional developments,
including the possible extension of the
mandate of Emile Lahoud, the President of Lebanon, in
view of the troubled regional
conditions and based on the mutual interest in
maintaining stability in Lebanon. Mr. Al-
Hariri requested that in case a consensus regarding the
mandate extension is reached in
the Council of Ministers, Syria should make endeavors to
get President Lahoud to better
cooperate in the forthcoming period. The President
requested Mr. Hariri to consult with
his group and with whom he deems suitable and to take
the appropriate position.”
Rustum Ghazali, undated written statement, submitted to
the Commission by letter of 17
August 2005:
“I had two meetings at Anjar on that date (26 August
2004) with Prime Minister Hariri.
The first was in the morning of August 26, 2004, on his
way to Damascus to meet
President Bashar Assad in Damascus, and the second was
on his return trip from
Damascus to Beirut after meeting with President Bashar
Assad in Damascus. The latter
meeting was also held in our office at Anjar.”
(…)
“We discussed his meeting with President Bashar Assad.
He (Hariri) looked relaxed.
Prime Minister Hariri said that his meeting with
President Bashar Assad was cordial and
brief. According to Prime Minister Hariri, President
Assad told him: Abu Bahaa, we in
Syria have always been dealing with you as a friend and
as the Prime Minister of
Lebanon. Today, I am also dealing with you as a friend
and as the Prime Minister of
Lebanon. Under the difficult circumstances currently
witnessed by this region, with
Lebanon in the midst, we are of the view that it is in
the interest of Lebanon to maintain
the continuity of the regime by extending the term of
office of President Lahoud. As a
friend, we would like you to clarify your position
regarding this matter. We are in no
hurry to know the answer, and you may wish to think
about it at your convenience.”
Marwan Hamadeh, witness statement of 27 June 2005:
“On Wednesday 24 or 25 August, Mr. Hariri, Mr. Jumblat
and Mr. Berri were all invited
to go to Damascus in order to be informed about the
decision to extend Mr. Lahoud’s
mandate. Mr. Jumblat informed R. Ghazali that he would
need to discuss it with
President Assad. R. Ghazali insisted that the answer
should be “yes” before setting up
any appointment. He actually advised Mr. Jumblat to
respond positively because this was
a strategic matter for President Assad. Mr. Jumblat’s
answer was negative. One hour
later, Mr. Jumblat called me and told me that the Syrian
Intelligence had cancelled his
appointment.
In the evening, Mr. Jumblat and myself went to visit Mr.
Hariri. He said that R. Ghazali
insisted that as long as his answer was not positive, he
would not confirm his
appointment either. He was asked to go to Damascus, stay
in his house (…) until further
notice. The following day, he was called in for a short
meeting.”
(…)
“The day Mr. Hariri met with President Assad, I was
meeting at Mr. Jumblat’s residence
in Beirut, with Bassem Sabaa and Ghazi Areedi. We saw
that Mr. Hariri’s motorcade
was back by 1 PM which meant that the meeting in
Damascus was pretty short. We saw
Mr. Hariri who looked tired. He was sweating. He told
the four of us that President
Lahoud was to be reelected or “he will have to pay a
high price”. (…)He reported
President Assad saying to him: I will break Lebanon on
your head and Jumblat’s head.”
Ghazi Areedi, witness statement of 1 July 2005:
“Mr. Hariri reported to us that President Assad told
him: “If Jacques Chirac puts me out
of Lebanon, I will consider different options and will
let you know. Either you are with us
or against us. My choice is Emile Lahoud for President.
I will make sure he is the
President. I will wait for your answer. (…) Tell Walid
Jumblat that if he has Druze
people in Lebanon, I also have a Druze community in
Syria. I am ready to do anything.”
Walid Joumblatt, witness statement of 28 June 2005:
“According to Mr. Hariri, Assad told him:”Lahoud is
me. I want to renew his mandate.
(…) If Chirac wants me out of Lebanon, I will break
Lebanon. (…) During his visit to my
house, Mr. Hariri was extremely tense and disappointed.
He was in a very bad position.”
Jubran Tueni, witness statement of 25 June 2005:
“Later on, in 2004, when the issue of President
Lahoud’s extension came up, Mr. Hariri
also told me, that President Assad had threatened him
directly and told him, that voting
against the extension would be considered as being
directed against Syria. According to
Mr. Hariri, President Assad added that in that case
they, the Syrians, would “blow him
up” and any of his family members and that they would
find them anywhere in the
world.”
Bassem Sabaa, witness statement of 30 June 2005:
“When Mr. Hariri came back from his meeting with
President Assad, I met him at Walid
Jumblat’s house.”
(…)
“He reported to us President Assad’s words who has
put it bluntly: “I am personally
interested in this matter. It is not about Emile Lahoud
but about Bashar Assad”.
We asked him if he had had a chance to discuss the
matter with President Assad. He said
that President Assad told him that the matter was not
open for discussion, that it was
bound to happen or else I will break Lebanon”(…). He
was extremely aggravated. He
told me that for the sake of Lebanon and its interests,
he must think about what he will
do, that we are dealing with a group of lunatics who
could do anything.”
Saad Hariri, witness statement of 9 July 2005:
“I discussed with my father, the late Rafik Hariri,
the extension of President Lahoud’s
term. He told me that President Bashar Assad threatened
him telling him: “This is what I
want. If you think that President Chirac and you are
going to run Lebanon, you are
mistaken. It is not going to happen. President Lahoud is
me. Whatever I tell him, he
follows suit. This extension is to happen or else I will
break Lebanon over your head and
Walid Jumblat’s. (…) So, you either do as you are
told or we will get you and your family
wherever you are.”
Rafik Hariri, taped conversation with Walid Al-Moallem
on 1 February 2005:
“In connection with the extension episode, he
(President Assad) sent for me and met me
for 10 to 15 minutes.”
(…)
“He sent for me and told me: “ You always say that
you are with Syria. Now the time has
come for you to prove whether you meant what you said or
otherwise.” (…) He did not
ask my opinion. He said: “I have decided.” He did
not address me as Prime Minister or
as Rafik or anything of that kind. He just said: “I
have decided.” I was totally flustered,
at a loss. That was the worst day of my life.”
(…)
“He did not tell me that he wished to extend
Lahoud’s mandate. All he said was “I have
decided to do this, don’t answer me, think and come
back to me.””
(…)
“I was not treated as a friend or an acquaintance. No.
I was asked: “Are you with us or
against us?” That was it. When I finished my meeting
with him, I swear to you, my body
guard looked at me and asked why I was pale-faced”
28. In the meeting with Mr. Al-Moallem, Mr. Hariri
complained that he believed that
President Assad was being deliberately misinformed by
the Syrian security services and
Mr. Sharaa about the actions of Mr. Hariri. Translated
excerpts of the meeting include
the following statements by Mr. Hariri:
. “I cannot live under a security regime that is
specialized in interfering with Hariri
and spreading disinformation about Rafik Hariri and
writing reports to Bashar
Assad.”
. “But Lebanon will never be ruled from Syria. This
will no longer happen.”
29. During this discussion, Mr. Al-Moallem told Mr.
Hariri that “we and the
[security] services here have put you into a corner.”
He continued, “Please do not take
things lightly.”
30. The recorded interview clearly contradicts Mr.
Al-Moallem’s witness interview of
20 September 2005 in which he falsely described the 1
February meeting as “friendly and
constructive” and avoided giving direct answers to the
questions put to him.
Syrian cooperation with the Commission
31. The information set forth above, and the evidence
collected by the Commission as
described in the section below entitled Planning of the
Assassination, point to the
possibility that Syrian officials were involved in the
assassination of Mr. Hariri. When
the Commission attempted to get the cooperation of the
Syrian Government in pursuing
these lines of the investigation, the Commission was met
with cooperation in form, not
substance.
32. The initial contact between the Commission and the
Syrian authorities took place
on 11 June 2005 when the Commissioner sent a letter to
the Syrian Foreign Minister,
requesting a meeting with representatives of the Syrian
government. Mr. Sharaa replied
on 11 July, pledging the Syrian Government’s support
for the investigation in general
terms. On 19 July, the Commission asked to interview
several witnesses including the
President of the Syrian Arab Republic. On 26 August, at
the request of the Syrian
government, a meeting took place between the
Commissioner and a representative of the
Syrian Foreign Ministry, in Geneva, Switzerland. At that
meeting, the Commissioner
was given a letter containing written statements of four
witnesses. It was indicated that
President Assad would not be available for any
interview. The Commissioner repeated
his request for direct witness interviews and was told
that the request was under
consideration but that President Assad would not be
available to be interviewed.
33. On 30 August the Commission sent another request to
the Syrian Foreign
Minister, requesting interviews of several additional
witnesses and suspects in Syria. The
letter requested the support of the Syrian government to
search the premises of the
suspects. On 7 September Foreign Minister Sharaa
informed the Commission in writing
that while the Commission’s evidence was based on
false testimony, his Government
agreed that the persons listed in the Commission’s
requests of 19 July and 30 August,
except for President Assad, could be interviewed.
34. On 12 September details of the upcoming interviews
were discussed between the
Commission and a representative of the Syrian Foreign
Ministry. The Commission
expressed its wish that the interviews should be held in
a third country, neither Lebanon
nor Syria, which was refused. The Syrian authorities
insisted that the interviews take
place in Syria with the participation of Syrian
officials. The interviews took place
between 20 and 23 September. Each interview was
conducted in the presence of the
Legal Advisor to the Syrian Foreign Affairs Ministry or
another representative of the
Foreign Ministry, one interpreter, two note takers, and
at times, an additional person
whose affiliation was not identified. At the end of the
interview process, it was apparent
that the interviewees had given uniform answers to
questions. Many of those answers
were contradicted by the weight of evidence collected by
the UNIIIC from a variety of
other sources. The Commission has not had the
opportunity to follow up on these
interviews or pursue its investigation regarding a
possible Syrian involvement in the
crime.
35. The Commission has concluded that the Government of
Syria’s lack of
substantive cooperation with the Commission has impeded
the investigation and made it
difficult to follow leads established by the evidence
collected from a variety of sources.
If the investigation is to be completed, it is essential
that the Government of Syria fully
cooperate with the investigating authorities, including
by allowing for interviews to be
held outside Syria and for interviewees not to be
accompanied by Syrian officials.
III. THE CRIME
36. On 14 February 2005 at approximately 1250 hrs, the
former Lebanese Prime
Minister Rafik Hariri left the Nejmeh Square in Beirut
going back to the Kuraytem
Palace. He traveled in a motorcade comprising of 6 cars,
together with his security detail
and Member of Parliament, Bassel Fleyhan.
37. When the motorcade passed the St. George Hotel at
Minae Al-Hosn Street a huge
explosion occurred and resulted in the death of Mr.
Hariri and others.
38. Shortly after the blast, the Director of Al-Jazeera
TV in Beirut received a
telephone call from a man who stated that the Nasra and
Jihad Group in Greater Syria
claimed responsibility for the assassination of Mr.
Hariri. This message was broadcast
shortly thereafter.
IV. THE LEBANESE INVESTIGATION
Initial Measures
39. To resolve a crime of this magnitude requires strong
management capacity, clear
roles, coordination and access to sufficient competency,
manpower, equipment and
means of assistance. The following brief outline reviews
measures undertaken by the
Lebanese authorities in the period from the execution of
the crime until UNIIIC was
established.
Investigative Judge
40. Primary Military Investigative Judge Rasheed Mezher
was responsible for the
crime investigation during the period from 14 to 21
February 2005. On the latter date, a
decision was taken by the Lebanese Government that the
crime was a terrorist act
targeting the Republic, which led to the case being
transferred to a new competent court
of jurisdiction, the highest Criminal Court in Lebanon,
the Justice Council. A
consequence of this decision was that a new
investigative judge was appointed to lead the
investigation, Judge Michel Abou Arraj, the
representative of the Prosecutor General’s
Office.
41. Judge Mezher arrived at the crime scene less than an
hour after the blast,
accompanied by Judge Jean Fahd from the Prosecutor
General’s Office. He has
described the situation at the crime scene as a chaos.
His first decisions were to appoint
the Assistant Chief of Beirut Police, General Naji
Mulaeb, as the person in charge of the
scene and to assign him the task of removing all dead
bodies and wounded people from
the scene, extinguish fires and, thereafter, to withdraw
all people from the scene and
close it off (witness statement) .
42. At 1700 hrs, Judge Mezher summoned a meeting with
all the involved bodies,
both from the Internal Security Forces and the Military,
comprising in total 10 officers.
During the meeting Judge Mezher distributed tasks for
the different bodies and gave
further directions for the course of the investigation
(witness statement) .
43. The representatives from the Internal Security
Forces during the meeting were:
General Aouar as the acting Commander of the Judicial
Police and Head of the Forensic
Unit, General Mulaeb as acting Commander of the Beirut
Police Force, General Salah
Eid as the responsible person for the blast site and
Lieutenant Colonel Fouad Othman in
the capacity of the Head of the Information Division
(witness statement) .
44. After the meeting, at approximately 1900 hrs, Judge
Mezher returned to the crime
scene for a second time. He was not satisfied with his
observations at the crime scene,
but hoped it should be better the next day since
responsibilities had been distributed at the
earlier meeting. The shortcomings consisted mainly of
lack of equipment, means of
assistance and experience. In addition, there was a lack
of communication between the
various bodies involved, the directions from the
Investigative Judge were not followed
and he did not receive proper feed-back concerning the
progress in the investigation
(witness statement)
.
45. During the period of his functions as Investigative
Judge, Judge Mezher
summoned approximately 10 people to his office for
interrogations, comprising staff
from the St. George Hotel, Mr. Hariri’s close
protection officers, the father and mother of
Mr. Abu Adass and some eyewitnesses. He also, in
consultation with Judge Jean Fahd,
took the decision to request assistance from Switzerland
regarding a forensic expert team
to assist the Lebanese authorities in the investigation.
When Judge Mezher left the
function of Investigative Judge, 21 February 2005, no
sustainable results had been
achieved in the investigation.
46. The file was handed over to the new Investigative
Judge, Judge Abou Arraj.
Judge Abou Arraj was Investigative Judge for the
investigation from 22 February to 23
March 2005. He was appointed by First Judge Tanios
Khoury, at the Supreme Council,
and the file was registered at Abou Arraj’s office on
22 February 2005 (witness statement) . His
first opinions when reviewing the file, were that the
crime had been a terrorist attack that
would require a long period of time and extensive
investigative measures to be
undertaken, in addition to the application of
substantial resources. In his opinion, all the
initial investigative measures had been performed in a
professional and accurate way. He
was surprised at the removal of the motorcade cars. He
did not meet with Judge Mezher,
but telephoned him whenever clarifications were needed
(witness statement) .
47. During the period of Judge Abou Arraj’s tenure as
the Investigative Judge, the
following measures were undertaken (compiled notes case
file) .
Date Measures Affected persons
22 February • Recording of the lawsuit
24 February • Second Beirut Regional Detachment
Record
• Inspection of St George’s
• A summary of all military writs
• Signing writs: Sûreté Générale ,
Internal Security Forces, State Security,
Intelligence
25 February • The writ of the of the Special Criminal
Investigation Section
• Investigations about the diggings in St
George’s area
• The writ of the Special Criminal • Tayssir Abu
Adass and
Investigation Section: Notifications. First Adjutant
Maher
Daouk
26 February • Several reports were received among
them: The inspection report and the
report about moving the cars to Helou
Barracks + interrogating the guards
28 February • Interrogation • Tayssir Abu Adass
• Statements of witnesses •
Maher Daouk, Hassan
Mohamed Ajuz and
Amer Khaled
Shehadeh
28 February • Subpoenaing • Rashid Hammud (at
the hospital),
Mohamed Queiny
(former Prime Minister
Rafik Hariri’s
bodyguards) and
• Forensic Evidence Department: Asking Tamer Lahib.
for the assistance of foreign experts.
1 March • Giving the Head of the Fact finding
mission to Lebanon FitzGerald the
permission to look into the
investigations.
2 March • Interrogations of two witnesses • Tamer
Lahib and
Mohamed Queiny.
3 March • The reports of Mitsubishi Company were
received + the catalogue of the
Mitsubishi pick-ups + a list of the names
of the parts and pieces found at the
explosion site + a map showing
(unclear).
• Doctor Kawas report regarding the
examination of Abdel-Hameed Ghalayini
cadaver. • Hussam Ali Mohsen,
• A report was received from the Army Ahmad Ammoura
and
Intelligence about interrogations. Nabil Ghsoub
(unclear) regarding
there relations with
suspect Ahmad Abu
Adass (Note: they
• The report of Doctor Hussein Chahrour were not
arrested).
regarding the examination of Abdel-
Hameed Ghalayini cadaver.
5 March • Subpoenaing witnesses (the first three •
Engineer Makram
were to be interrogated the 8th of March Aouar, Hamad
2005. The others on the 9th of March Mulaeb, Hussam Ali
2005. Mohsen, Mahmoud
Baydoun (officer in
the Sûreté Générale
), Afifi Abdallah Al-
Hershi (unclear),
Ghassan Ben Jeddou
(Al-Jazeera Channel).
7 March • Inspection of the contents of the
cardboard boxes (Dalal Dargham)
• Brigadier General Imad Kakour came
and informed us about the
investigations and took a copy of the investigation
report, Ziad Ramadan was
with him.
8 March • We received: The DNA results and the
maps of the crime scene.
10 March • The report of Al-Bourj Squad regarding
the search for Abdel Hameed Ghalayini
cadaver.
11 March • The discussion of Lieutenant General
Ziad Nasr + Captain Mitri Namar.
• Convocation of Hussam Mohsen
• Convocation of the Palestinian Marwan
Abdel-Wahhab Kattan (unclear),
14/3/2005
14 March • Urging the heads of the services not to
remove rubbles.
• Statements of witnesses. • Jack Chalitta, Ali
Amhaz and Marwan
Koubtan.
• Letter of the international Mission
regarding the completion of its work.
48. On 23 March 2005, Judge Abou Arraj stepped down from
the post of
Investigative Judge. The reason for this was the tense
political atmosphere at this
particular time: a lot of mistrust was being directed
towards the Lebanese judiciary and
criticism being leveled at the manner of the
investigation. In addition, while in charge of
the Hariri investigation, he also had to discharge his
normal functions. The case was
contaminated with political issues and during
demonstrations in Beirut on 14 March
2005, he heard people mentioning his name in a critical
manner (witness statement) .
49. At the time he left the post of Investigative Judge,
the only achievement in the
investigation was the Mr. Abu Adass lead, despite
attempts to focus on the modus
operandi of the explosion and to get all experts
involved to come up with one consensus
opinion (witness statement) .
50. Judge Abou Arraj was replaced by Investigative Judge
Elias Eid, who as of
October 2005, is still in charge of the investigation.
Internal Security Forces
51. On 14 February 2005, General Ali Al-Hajj was the
Head of the Internal Security
Forces (ISF). He was promoted to the post in November
2004, allegedly appointed by
the Syrians, he stepped down from the post during spring
2005 in the aftermath of the
blast that killed Mr. Hariri. According to his
statement, he was at his office when he was
alerted about the blast. He immediately went to the
crime scene by car. During the ride he
called General Shahid Al-Khoury, Chief of the Services
and Operations Division within
ISF, who told him that it was a huge blast. General
Al-Hajj then ordered Mr. Khoury to
send all responsible units to the scene. The units
comprised the Forensic Unit under the
command of General Hisham Aouar, the Explosives Unit
under the command of General
Abdel-Badie Al-Soussi and the Investigation Unit under
the command of Lieutenant
Colonel Fouad Othman. This was his only responsibility,
to provide sufficient resources.
After the arrival of the Investigative Judge, all ISF
staff was under the command of the
Judge and General Ali Al-Hajj could not interfere in the
investigation (witness statement) .
52. In his opinion, the problems at the scene were
related to the presence of too many
different agencies, such as the Army, ISF, State
Security and Public Security.
53. Later that afternoon, General Al-Hajj joined a
meeting with the Higher Defence
Council at the Presidential Palace. The meeting was
chaired by the President. Other
participants were the Minister of the Interior, the
Minister of Defence, the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Justice, the Minister
of Economy, the Deputy Prime
Minister, the Minister of Public works, the Governor of
Beirut and Commanders from the
various security agencies. The meeting discussed the
subject matter of the crime, its
referral to the Judicial Council, and the ramifications
of the crime.
54. After the meeting General Al-Hajj returned to his
office: soon thereafter the Al-
Jazeera TV channel broadcast a videotape, where Ahmad
Abu Adass claimed
responsibility for the blast and the killing of Mr.
Hariri. From that time all available ISF
resources, except those occupied with the crime scene
work, were focused on the Abu
Adass track.
Military Intelligence
55. On 14 February 2005, General Raymond Azar was the
Head of Military
Intelligence. He was promoted to the post in December
1998 and stepped down during
spring 2005 in the aftermath of the blast that killed
Mr. Hariri. According to his
statement, he was alerted about the blast by Colonel
Mohamed Fehmi, Head of the
Military Security Branch. He did not go to the crime
scene, but followed the case in
detail from his office, together with Colonel Albert
Karam, the Chief of Beirut
Intelligence Branch. He informed President Lahoud and
General Ghazali about the blast
at the time of its occurrence (witness statement) .
56. Personnel from Military Intelligence (mainly
specialists in the field of explosives)
visited the crime scene and conducted their part of the
examination. They confirmed that
the type of explosives used were TNT and the estimated
amount to be some 300
kilograms. All concrete evidence found on the site was
handed over later to the ISF
(General Hisham Aouar) and to General Azar’s knowledge
there were some metal
fragments and a gun. His opinion was that basically ISF,
but also the Prosecutor
General’s Office and the Investigative Judge, had the
overall responsibility for the crime
investigation.
57. In the afternoon of 14 February 2005, General Azar
attended the meeting at the
Higher Defence Council. At the meeting, a presentation
was made about the
assassination of Mr. Hariri, with all the details that
were available at that time. Each
participant presented his own point of view.
58. At a later stage, his Directorate was assigned to
focus on three elements:
. The videotape of Ahmad Abu Adass
. The cellular communications that took place in the
area of the explosion
. The type and amount of explosives used.
Sûreté Générale
59. On 14 February 2005, Brigadier General Jamil
Al-Sayyed was the Head of the
Sûreté Générale. He was promoted to the post in
December 1998 and stepped down
during spring 2005 in the aftermath of the blast that
killed Mr. Hariri. According to his
statement, he was at his office when he heard the blast,
but thought that the noise was a
result of Israeli air fighters passing through the sound
barrier. Somewhere between 1315
and 1330 hrs, Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Al-Assir informed
him of the blast and that Mr.
Hariri’s motorcade had been the target. He stayed at
his office and no one from the Sûreté
Générale was sent to the scene. He called the
President, the Minister of the Interior and
General Ghazali.
60. Later that afternoon, General Al-Sayyed attended the
meeting at the Higher
Defence Council. The meeting was focused on the
consequences in the near future on the
ground. The suggestions were submitted to the
Government, which had a meeting later
the same evening.
61. On Tuesday morning, 15 February 2005, he got a phone
call from a journalist
from Al-Jazeera who told him nobody had yet picked-up
the Abu Adass videotape. The
tape was brought to him 16 February 2005. He made a copy
and sent the original to the
Investigative Judge Abou Arraj.
Crime Scene Investigation
ISF Report
62. As with any similar criminal case, prompt
examination of the crime scene and its
surroundings is of paramount importance for the outcome
of the investigation. The
officer in charge of the crime scene, General Naji
Mulaeb of the ISF, arrived at the scene
at 1305 hrs on 14 February 2005. He has issued a report
dated 3 March 2005, on the
crime scene examination conducted by the Lebanese
authorities (General Directorate of
Internal Security Forces, Beirut Police Unit, Ref. No.:
95) stating the following:
“On implementation of investigation order issued by
the first investigating judge of the military court in
Beirut regarding the investigations and anything that
can throw light on the enquiry into the explosion
which caused the death of former Prime Minister Hariri
and others.
Record: Investigation order issued by the first
investigating judge of the military court in Beirut
No23/2005 dated 14 February 2005.
Order from the General Department of Referrals No
207/1181 dated 15 February 2005.
On 14 February 2005 at about 1250 hours, an explosion
took place in Beirut which the operations room
reported as being close to the St. George Hotel. All
patrols were ordered to go to the scene. I proceeded
there and arrived within a few minutes. Cars on both
sides of the road in the vicinity were ablaze and there
was a lot of smoke. Civil defense, fire brigade and Red
Cross vehicles hastened to the area and took action
to put out the fire, gather the corpses and take the
wounded to hospital. The scene was chaotic, and security
and military personnel were mixed with civilians,
firemen and first aid personnel and civilians, newspaper
journalists and the media were all eager to get to the
scene. I ordered all the officers and police officers and
patrols to do everything necessary to maintain security
corridors and to take the requisite measures to
safeguard the scene of the crime and keep away onlookers
and made the commander of the second Beirut
regional secretariat responsible for implementation.
The preliminary indications are that the explosion took
place in the motorcade of Prime Minister Hariri but
the outcome is not yet know.
Specialists in gathering evidence and explosives experts
began their work.
In addition to political and security officers, there
came to the scene a Government commissioner from the
Military Court with some support staff; and Rasheed
Mezher, the first investigating judge from the Military
Court in Beirut, who orally delegated me, in my capacity
as officer in charge of the police during the
absence from 12 February 2005 of the Police Commander on
a mission abroad, or whoever I should see fit,
to undertake the investigations and anything that could
throw light on that explosion and to duly inform
him. The oral authorization would be followed up in
writing.
As soon as the General Director of Internal Security
arrived at the scene, I informed him of all the above.
In accordance with the above-mentioned oral delegation
of authority, I ordered Major Salah Eid to
undertake the necessary investigative procedures in his
capacity as the commander of the second Beirut
regional secretariat, within the remit of which the
explosion took place, and to keep me informed.
The work of retrieving the corpses and taking the
wounded to hospital continued, as did the work of
personnel from the Central Office of Accidents and the
explosive experts. A complete sweep was made of
the scene and the surroundings. A team of engineers from
the Lebanese Army came and took samples from
the scene in order to carry out tests thereupon. An army
detachment carried out a search of the site and
buildings and assisted in imposing a security cordon.
In view of the urgency of the investigation, we sent
telegram No. 2065 dated 14 February 2005 to the
leadership of the regional police unit and to police
unit commanders in which we asked that all the
necessary investigations should be carried out within
the remit of each unit with respect to the corpses that
had been taken to the hospitals in each area, in order
to permit their relatives to identify them and duly
inform me, thereby enabling me to gain the approval of
the relevant authorities for the return to their
relatives of those corpses. Depositions were to be taken
from the wounded and a copy deposited in the file
of the overall investigation, through the Al-Burj squad.
Further to our telegram No. 2077 dated 14 February 2005,
sent to unit departments regarding the isolation
of the scene of the crime and establishment of a
security cordon around it, we ordered the commander of
the second Beirut regional secretariat to use whatever
personnel were necessary to perform those tasks and
to place metal barricades and yellow tape around the
scene and, in coordination with the commander of the
traffic secretariat, to ensure the flow of traffic.
Major Eid kept me informed of the progress of the
investigation and its outcome, and I duly informed the
first investigating judge from the Military Court. The
corpses were handed over to their relatives in
accordance with legal principles.
On the instructions of the first investigating judge of
the Military Court, and with the approval of the
General Director of Internal Security Forces, the cars
from the Hariri motorcade were taken to the Helou
barracks, once they had been photographed in situ and a
video recording had been made in the presence of
the commander of the second Beirut regional secretariat,
the commander of the second Beirut traffic squad,
the commander of the Al-Burj detachment and a squad of
criminal investigators, and using the lights
provided by the civil defense, in accordance with report
No. 144/302 dated 14 February 2005. They were
deposited in the Helou barracks.
In our telegram No. 2122 dated 15 February addressed to
the commander of the emergency services, we
requested that they should be safeguarded and that
no-one should be allowed to touch them.
At 1500 hours on 15 February 2005, Major Omar Makkawi,
the commander of the Beirut police unit,
reported and assumed his command. He informed me of all
the procedures that had been taken and all
incidents that had occurred, and we followed up the
process of the investigation being undertaken by Major
Salah Eid. We then duly informed the first investigating
judge of the Military Court of the same.
Pursuant to warrant No. 2F206/dated 17 February 2005,
the unit commander transferred to us the written
delegation of authority issued by the first
investigating judge of the Military Court Ref 23/2005 dated 14
February 2005 concerning the explosion, which was
transmitted to us for implementation by the General
Directorate as No. 2SH207/1181 dated 15 February 2005.
Similarly, the unit command gave us, pursuant to warrant
No. 206/1735 dated 18 February 2005, written
authorization from that party Ref. 36/2005 dated 18
February 2005, which included an order to keep the
cars from the Hariri motorcade inside the barracks,
cover them with tents and place them under guard,
which was done.
In accordance with warrant No. 2F206/1736 dated 18
February 2005, The first investigating judge of the
Military Court have us written authorization Ref.
36/2005 dated 18 February 2005, which included an order
to contact the Governor of Beirut, who should supply us
with the names of those recently working at a
workshop at the site of the explosion. The
aforementioned authority was carried out by means of a
document of 14 pages which is attached.
Pursuant to the first delegation of authority referred
to above; on the basis of the order to the commander of
the second Beirut regional secretariat to carry out the
investigation; and as a result of the first report, No.
302/143 dated 14 February 2005 and all the
investigations arranged by the units in the police unit and the
regional police unit, we hereby submit the following:
Table No. 1 has been prepared concerning the corpses
that have been returned to their relatives.
Table No. 2 has been prepared concerning the persons
injured by this explosion.
Table No. 3 contains the depositions that were made
concerning the explosion.
A table has been prepared showing the measures that were
taken: an examination of the scene of the crime;
articles impounded; damaged cars; the loss of one person
at the site of the explosion and the failure to find
him.
All those procedures have been verified in report No.
302/1 dated 14 February 2005”.
Swiss Forensic Report
63. The Lebanese experts involved in the crime scene
examination, representing a
variety of different agencies, came up with different
opinions on the findings and results
of the examination. As a result, they were summoned to a
meeting at the Military Court
in the presence of the Prosecutor General (witness
statement). The meeting led to a request from
the Lebanese authorities for foreign assistance in
examining the crime scene, which was
directed to the Government of Switzerland. A Swiss
forensic expert team visited Lebanon
in March 2005 and conducted a forensic investigation.
The team’s final report stated
(excerpt):
“Our conclusions about an explosion above or under
ground are based upon the following examinations:
. Interpretations based on dispersion of fragments, size
and shape of fragments
. Interpretations based on size and shape of crater
. Ballistic interpretations
. Interpretations of damages on buildings (structure,
glass)
After interpretation and analysis of the dispersion of
fragments, we can’t give clear evidence whether there
was an explosion above or under ground. Our analysis and
research concerning the shape and form of the
crater also gives no clear evidence whether there was an
explosion above or under ground.
On the other hand, the form and shape of the crater
gives some information about the possible amount of
the charge (above or under ground):
. As mentioned in our report it is expected that an
amount of about 1000 kg above ground will
create a crater like the one on the scene
(…)
Concerning the fact that the charge was possibly placed
in a car, it must have been of larger size. If such a
vehicle has been used we expect some big fragments (e.g.
from the frame) of the vehicle close to the center
of the explosion.
The grade of damage of the metal fragments which were
shown to us by the police (said to be originated of
a Mitsubishi Canter) is consistent with fragments we
would expect if such a vehicle was located in the
center of the explosion.
(…)
After having conducted all the analysis and discussions
of the facts we have collected, we came to the
conclusion that it was most likely an explosion above
ground.
According to this finding we estimate an amount of
1000kg of high explosive.
The unconfirmed and preliminary results of the analysis
of a soil sample of the crater showed
Trinitrotoleune (TNT) as explosive charge”.
Rifi Report
64. In March 2005, the present Head of the ISF, General
Ashraf Rifi, prepared a
report on the initial measures undertaken by the
competent Lebanese authorities on the
scene of the crime, which was submitted to the UN Fact
Finding Mission. The report
concluded (excerpt):
“
II. Measures taken:
The importance of this tragic event that led to the
assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri had
an effect on all subsequent measures and actions taken.
A. Rescue and evacuation operations and find of bodies:
In the immediate aftermath of the explosion, security,
military and civil defense organs as well as the Red
Cross rushed to the crime scene to perform their duties.
In spite of all the measures taken, these were,
unfortunately, not up to the level that would save the
face of these organs. These measures were flawed.
Therefore, the Minister of Interior and Municipalities
issued a memorandum 137/(sad)2, dated 25 February
2005, instructing the General Inspectorate of the
Internal Security Forces to investigate the deeds and
actions. Based on the results, he suggested the
dismissal of both the General, Chief of Beirut Police and the
General, Chief of the Judicial Police.
B. Preservation of the crime scene:
Immediately after the explosion happened, the military
investigating judge was put in charge of the
investigation. Al the security and judicial police
personnel were put at his disposal. He gave rogatory
commissions and stipulated the kind of measures to be
carried out, especially the preservation of the crime
scene. However, the measures taken were below the
required level and contrary to the obvious
fundamental basis upon which crimes as serious as this
one or even less serious crimes are investigated, in
which case, strict measures ought to be taken in order
to prevent any tampering with the crime scene or any
clues that could be used as criminal evidence to help in
the investigation and uncover the truth. This could
have been carried out without neglecting the
humanitarian aspect of the tasks to be implemented, i.e. giving
priority to finding the victims and the injured,
providing the latter with the first aid in order to save them.
Serious mistakes were recorded in this regard:
a) There was a state of chaos in the crime scene not
only during the first few hours following the
explosion, during which much focus is on extinguishing
the fire, saving the injured and looking
for the missing, but regrettably and unnecessarily for a
much longer time.
b) There was no coordination between all the security
organs present on the crime scene.
c) Looking for the missing persons was done in an
irresponsible, unprofessional and careless way.
Some were later found by accident or by their families.
The following controversial elements
were recorded:
. The body of Zahi Abu Rujaili, a Lebanese citizen, was
found on 15 March 2005.
According to the medical examiner, the victim had
survived the explosion for
approximately 12 hours.
. The body of one of the victims was found by
coincidence 8 days after the explosion.
. The body of Abdel-Hameed Ghalayeeni, a Lebanese
citizen, was found 16 days after the
explosion by his family and not the judicial or civil
defense officers.
. The fate of Farhan Ahmad Al-Issa is still unknown, he
is still missing. It is feared that
finding his body would constitute yet another scandal.
d) A few hours after the explosion took place, around
2300 hrs, major evidence was removed from
the crime scene. The convoy cars of the late former
Prime Minister were transferred to Helou
Barracks under the pretext of preserving them although
what was left of the cars did not justify
their preservation except for their value as criminal
evidence because they were the target of the
explosion. This was not the only instance bearing proof
of the tampering with the crime scene. A
BMW car that was not part of the convoy was also removed
whereas focus should have been on
not removing any cars and maintaining them the way they
rested after the explosion in order to
determine how the crime was committed.
e) A bulldozer was introduced into the crime scene on
the day of the explosion, 14 February 2005, in
the evening for no justifiable reason. As soon as the
Minister of Interior and Municipalities got
knowledge of it, he gave orders to retrieve it and
preserve the crime scene as it was.
C. The conduct of the investigation, its conditions and
the determination of how the crime was
committed:
a) It is common knowledge that major mistakes were made
in the course of conducting the
investigation, among which the leaking of information
that created confusion. This in turn
compromised the trustworthiness of the local
investigation.
(….)
III. Responsibilities
a) Responsibility for a tragic crime such as the one we
are dealing with cannot be limited to one
aspect. As mentioned above, it encompasses the
political, judicial and security aspects.
(….)
Decision to remove motorcade vehicles
65. The decision to fill the crater at the crime scene,
to remove the motorcade
vehicles and to re-open the street on the day after the
blast, is confusing, assuming that
there was a collective will to perform a professional
crime scene examination in order to
track down the perpetrators and bring them to justice.
The confusion, reflected in the
variety of statements from the officials most closely
involved, speaks for itself.
Investigative Judge Mezher
66. At 2230 hrs on 14 February, Judge Mezher was at his
home, when he got a phone
call from General Naji Mulaeb, who informed the Judge
that the representatives from the
various agencies at the crime scene had started
collecting pieces of metal from the
motorcade vehicles in order to perform their own further
forensic examinations. There
was nothing General Mulaeb could do to stop them. He
suggested that the motorcade
vehicles be removed to a safe place and proposed the
Helou barracks in Beirut. Judge
Mezher agreed to the proposal under the following
conditions. The vehicles should be
filmed on the spot, they should be marked and numbered:
they should also be filmed
during the transportation and again upon arrival at the
Helou barracks, where they should
be covered and guarded around the clock in order to
avoid any tampering with evidence.
Judge Mezher had no information about a decision to fill
the crater and reopen the street
(witness statement)
. The vehicles were moved from the crime scene during
the night of 14
February.
General Jamil Al-Sayyed
67. On the morning of 15 February 2005, General
Al-Sayyed read in the newspaper
about the removal of the motorcade vehicles. At 0800
hrs, he called General Ali Al-
Hajj, the Head of the ISF and asked what was going on.
General Al-Hajj replied that
two teams were working on clearing the road which would
be reopened at 1000 hrs. In
response to a direct question, General Al-Hajj stated
that the orders came from Mustapha
Hamdan, the Commander of the Presidential Guard (witness
statement) .
General Ali Al-Hajj
68. On 14 February 2005 at 2230 hrs, Mr.
Saddik received a telephone call at his
office, (where he was with General Hisham Aouar) from
the Director General of the
Public Works Ministry, Mr. Fadi Nammar. Mr. Nammar told
him that a decision had
been taken to re-open the road the next day and that his
staff were ready to start working
at sunrise the next morning. The call was on the
landline and was overheard by General
Aouar. He claimed to be surprised about the telephone
call because Mr. Nammar had no
jurisdiction in the matter. It was publicly recognized
that Fadi Nammar was very close to
the Republican Palace, which meant that he was taking
his orders from there. Mr.
Nammar alleged that he had cleared the matter with the
Investigative Judge. He called
the acting Chief of Beirut Police, General Naji Mulaeb,
and informed him about the call
from Mr. Nammar and asked him to check with Judge Mezher
whether he was aware of
this decision. General Mulaeb called Judge Mezher, who
was aware of the decision to reopen the road and had no objection. General
Mulaeb then asked what should be done
with the vehicles. Judge Mezher replied that they should
be brought to a secure place and
proposed the Helou Barracks (witness statement) .
69. The next morning, 15 February 2005, Mr. Nammar met
with the Governor of
Beirut, Mr. Yacoub Sarraf, in order to arrange for the
re-opening of the Minae Al-Hosn
Street. Sarraf is very close to the Republican Palace
and he was also aware of the
decision (witness statement) .
General Hisham Aouar
70. With regard to the removal of the motorcade, General
Aouar indicated that he did
not know who gave the order. He was asked to assist in
the filming of the removal of the
motorcade on 14 February 2005 during the meeting with
the Investigative Judge, but
nothing else was mentioned about the removal of the
motorcade vehicles from the crime
scene. On that same evening, between 2230 and 2300 hrs,
he was at the office of the ISF
General Director, General Ali Al-Hajj, and he told him
that the cars were going to be
removed. He also told him that the ISF had to provide
assistance by marking the locations
of the vehicles and their filming (witness statement) .
Director General Fadi Nammar
71. Mr. Nammar did not remember whether General Al-Hajj
telephoned him on 14
February 2005, but he remembered his calling General
Al-Hajj the next day, as he
always did in similar situations. At the time of the
telephone call, he was at the office of
the Governor of Beirut. He told General Al-Hajj that
they were prepared, if needed, to
offer help. General Al-Hajj passed him on to a General
working for ISF, who told him
that there was a survey going on at the crime scene. The
General stated he would come
back to Mr. Nammar in due course. Mr. Nammar did not
recall the name of the General,
but he was with Al-Hajj. He had no authority to decide
to open roads in Beirut and he did
not give any orders to remove the motorcade vehicles. He
also denied any contacts to the
Republican Palace(witness statement)
.
72. Subsequently, it was confirmed (by telephone lists)
that General Ali Al-Hajj
made the telephone call from his landline to Mr.
Nammar’s mobile phone on the evening
of 14 February 2005. It was also confirmed that Mr.
Nammar made the telephone call to
General Al-Hajj the following day (witness statement) .
The Governor of Beirut, Mr. Yacoob Sarraf
73. According to his statement he did not give any
instructions. The Army and the
Police took over. He had telephone contact with Mr. Fadi
Nammar on 14 February 2005.
Acting Commander of Beirut Police, General Naji Mulaeb
74. Between 2030 and 2200 hrs on 14 February 2005,
General Mulaeb received a
telephone call at his office from General Ali Al-Hajj
who ordered General Mulaeb to
transfer the convoy vehicles from the crime scene and
secure them in a safe place, on the
understanding that within two days the road would be
re-opened. If experts wanted to
come and inspect the vehicles, they would be available.
General Mulaeb was surprised
by this order and did not accept it. He told General
Al-Hajj that he had nothing to do
with the crime scene, since the site was under the
authority of Judge Mezher. General
Al-Hajj told General Mulaeb to contact the Judge, which
he did. The Judge was also
surprised and asked the reason for the hurry. General
Mulaeb told him that he received
his orders from General Al-Hajj and that he was
surprised as well. The Judge told him to
give him some time and that he would call back. After a
while, between 10 and 30
minutes, the Judge called back and said that the cars
could be transferred (witness statement) .
General Mustapha Hamdan
75. After the blast on 14 February 2005, General Hamdan
took all necessary
measures to protect the President and the Presidential
areas. He did not recall any details,
but he did not go to the scene of the blast. He did not
issue any orders or directives
regarding the activities at the crime scene, since it
did not fall within his responsibilities.
Thus, he had nothing to do with any orders to clean the
street, to fill the crater or to
remove the motorcade vehicles (witness statement) .
Head of Internal Security Forces, General Ashraf Rifi
76. In a meeting with UNIIIC on 1 June 2005, General
Rifi stated that the person who
gave the order to get a bulldozer or bulldozers to the
crime scene to fill the hole caused
by the explosion etc. was General Mustapha Hamdan, who
at the time of the incident was
the Commander of President Lahoud’s security detail
and therefore by Lebanese law had
nothing to do with issues related to crime scene
investigation (witness statement) .
Lebanese Investigation: Ahmad Abu Adass
77. At approximately 1411 hrs on 14 February 2005,
barely an hour after the
explosion, Leila Bassam of Reuters received an anonymous
telephone call from a man
with an accent that was not Lebanese but which she could
not identify. According to Ms.
Bassam, as soon as she answered the call, the man
directed her to “[w]rite this down,”
told her to be quiet, and then read the following
statement in classical Arabic:
“We, al nasra wal-jihad fee bilad Al-Sham, declare
that we have meted out due
punishment to the infidel Rafik Hariri so that he may be
an example to others.”
The caller concluded with an Islamic religious saying
and then hung up.
78. Mr. Ghassan Ben Jeddou, the Beirut Bureau chief of
Al-Jazeera, recalls receiving
four telephone calls that day related to the same claim
of responsibility. In the first
telephone call, a man whom Mr. Ben Jeddou described as
speaking poor Arabic in an
African, Afghan or Pakistani accent, claimed that
Al-Nasra wal Jihad was responsible for
Mr. Hariri’s execution by a suicide bomb. Shortly
thereafter, Al-Jazeera informed the
public about this claim of responsibility.1 Al-Jazeera
next received a call from another
anonymous person claiming to be from the same group,
this time a fluent Arabic speaker,
who explained where Ben Jeddou and his colleagues could
locate a videocassette
containing further information about the assassination
--namely, in a tree near the
ESCWA building in downtown Beirut --and directing them
to fetch the tape within 15
minutes. Mr. Ben Jeddou sent a colleague to locate the
videocassette. Eventually, a
white envelope containing a type-written detailed
statement and a videocassette was
found. After more calls from the same group asking why
the tape had not yet been aired,
Al-Jazeera aired the footage later that afternoon.
79. The letter accompanying the tape, purporting to be
from the Nasra and Jihad
Group of Greater Syria, states in part:
“Praise be to God for the banner of Nasra and Jihad is
victorious in Greater
Syria, and with God’s blessings the agent of the
infidels in Mecca and Medina,
Rafik Hariri, has been meted out his due punishment
through a suicide operation
executed by the Mujahid Ahmad Abu Adass bearing the
banner of Nasra and
Jihad in Greater Syria on Monday, 14 February 2005, the
5of Muhurram 1426
according to the Islamic Calendar, in Beirut. ….
Attached is film recording of the
martyr Ahmad Abu Adass, executor of the operation.”
In the tape, an individual identifying himself as Mr.
Abu Adass, uses similar
phraseology.
80. Soon after the airing of the tape, the Lebanese
authorities had acquired extensive
information about Mr. Abu Adass’s background and began
questioning his family and
associates. Much of this information apparently came
from Sheikh Ahmed Abdel-Al, of
Al-Ahbash, an Islamic group active in the area of the
Palestinian camps where Mr. Abu
Adass had reportedly lived. Sheikh Abdel-Al stated to
UNIIIC that he received a
telephone call from the presidential palace shortly
after the airing of the Abu Adass
video, enquiring whether Abdel-Al had any information
about Mr. Abu Adass.
According to Mr. Abdel-Al, he obtained information about
Mr. Abu Adass’s background,
including his address, the fact that he often went to
Ein al Helwa, that he was a Wahabi,
that he was well-educated, had probably studied computer
science, and that he visited
Abu Obeida (deputy to the leader of Jund al Sham).
Sheikh Abdel-Al also obtained the
names of Mr. Abu Adass’ family and friends: he sent
this information by facsimile to
Mr. Benjeddou recalls that Al-Jazeera received four
telephone calls that afternoon, the first around 13:40
and the last around 1600 hrs. However, telephone records
show only three telephone calls to Al-Jazeera
that afternoon, at 1419 hrs, 1527 hrs, and 1704 hrs.
President Lahoud, Ali Hajj, Albert Karam, Jamea Jamea,
and Maher al Toufeily.
Sheikhh Abdel-Al reportedly also met with Syrian
intelligence official, Jamea Jamea, on
the evening of 14 February 2005 and gave him the
information about Mr. Abu Adass,
which Jamea Jamea subsequently relayed to the ISF.
81. The ISF visited Abu Abass’ house, accompanied by a
member of Al-Ahbash, and
seized a computer, as well as a number of compact disks
which were primarily of a
fundamentalist Islamic nature. Although the report on
the search noted that most of the
documents stored on the computer were downloaded from
the internet, there was no
indication that Mr. Abu Adass’ home had internet
access. Many of Mr. Abu Adass’
friends and relatives were interviewed extensively by
the authorities (including by the
ISF and military intelligence) in the days immediately
following the explosion. Mr. Abu
Adass himself, however, could not be located. On the day
of the explosion 10 people
were questioned and over the course of next two months
approximately 40 people were
interviewed. The Lebanese investigation further revealed
that Mr. Abu Adass had been
employed at a computer shop in the summer of 2004, which
was owned in part by Sheikh
Ahmed Al-Sani, who was a member of the Ahmed Miqati and
Ismaíl Al-Khatib network.
82. In a report dated 17 February 2005, from General
Sayyed to Judge Mezher,
General Sayyed concluded that the videotape was
authentic and “Ahmad Abu Addas,
who appears on the tape, was . . . clearly a definite
participant in the assassination.” The
only basis provided for this conclusion was the
statement that “[t]he way in which he
delivers the statement and shows himself without any
covering over his face is the
manner adopted by suicide bombers in similar cases. The
fact that he did not conceal his
face while making the statement indicates that he must
have been personally responsible
for setting off the explosion.” (Information About
Facts Relating to the Broadcast on Al-
Jazeera of a Videotape Claiming Responsibility, No.
606/A’A, 17 February 2005)
Australian Investigation
83. On 15 February 2005, a request was forwarded to the
Australian Federal Police
from the Prosecutor General requesting that six
individuals be arrested as suspects for
participating in the Hariri assassination. The
responsible ISF official at Beirut
International Airport, informed ISF General Al-Hajj
about these six individuals. General
Al-Hajj transmitted this information directly to
Prosecutor General, Judge Rabia
Kaddoura, who contacted the Australian authorities. The
Australian investigation
absolved these six suspects of any involvement in this
crime, a position with which the
Lebanese authorities in charge of the investigation
agreed.
84. The records indicate that the Lebanese authorities
based their suspicion on the
following factors:
a) The six persons of interest departed from Beirut
International Airport one and a
half hours after the bombing occurred;
b) The six persons had no luggage; and
c) One of the six persons bore a resemblance to Mr. Abu
Adass, who was depicted
in a video of an extremist group that had claimed
responsibility for the bombing.
85. The Australian authorities executed an extensive
investigation to assist the
Lebanese authorities. The investigation included raising
airport alerts, interviews of the
six individuals and other members of the group,
explosive residual swabbing (including
the individuals, their airplane seating, and their
luggage), and examining the aircraft for
possible explosives. Although it was reported that the
six persons identified as
“suspects” were without luggage, they in fact were
carrying luggage. Three of the six
suspects subject to a forensic examination.
86. The finding |
