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Detlev Mehlis Report
Detlev Mehlis Report
REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION COMMISSION
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 1595 (2005)
Detlev Mehlis Beirut
Commissioner 19 October 2005
UNIIIC
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. The Security Council, by its resolution 1595 of 7
April 2005, decided to
establish an international independent investigation
Commission based in Lebanon to assist the Lebanese authorities in their
investigation of all aspects of the terrorist attack which took place on 14
February 2005 in Beirut that killed former Lebanese Prime
Minister Rafik Hariri and others, including to help
identify its perpetrators, sponsors, organizers and accomplices.
2. The Secretary-General notified the Council that the
Commission began its full operations with effect from 16 June 2005. The
Commission was granted an extension to the initial period of investigation
mandated by the Council, until 26 October 2005.
3. During the course of its investigation, the
Commission received extensive
support from the Government of Lebanon and benefited
from expert inputs from a number of national and international entities.
4. The main lines of investigation of the Commission
focused on the crime scene, technical aspects of the crime, analysis of
telephone intercepts, the testimony of more than 500 witnesses and sources, as
well as the institutional context in which the crime took place.
5. The full case file of the investigation was
transmitted to the Lebanese
authorities during October 2005.
6. The present report sets out the main lines of enquiry
of the investigation
conducted by the Commission, its observations thereon,
and its conclusions, for the consideration of the Security Council. It also
identifies those matters on which further investigation may be necessary.
7. It is the Commission’s view that the assassination
of 14 February 2005 was carried out by a group with an extensive organization
and considerable resources and capabilities. The crime had been prepared over
the course of several months. For this purpose, the timing and location of Mr.
Rafik Hariri’s movements had been monitored and the itineraries of his
convoy recorded in detail.
8. Building on the findings of the Commission and
Lebanese investigations to date and on the basis of the material and
documentary evidence collected, and the leads pursued until now, there is
converging evidence pointing at both Lebanese and Syrian involvement in this
terrorist act. It is a well known fact that Syrian Military Intelligence had a
pervasive presence in Lebanon at the least until the withdrawal of the Syrian
forces pursuant to resolution 1559. The former senior security officials of
Lebanon were their appointees. Given the infiltration of Lebanese institutions
and society by the Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services working in
tandem, it would be difficult to
envisage a scenario whereby such a complex assassination
plot could have been carried out without their knowledge.
9. It is the Commission’s conclusion that the
continuing investigation should be carried forward by the appropriate Lebanese
judicial and security authorities, who have proved during the investigation
that with international assistance and support, they can move ahead and at
times take the lead in an effective and professional manner. At the same time,
the Lebanese authorities should look into all the case’s ramifications
including bank transactions. The 14 February explosion needs to be assessed
clearly
against the sequence of explosions which preceded and
followed it, since there could be links between some, if not all, of them.
10. The Commission is therefore of the view that a
sustained effort on the part of the international community to establish an
assistance and cooperation platform together with the Lebanese authorities in
the field of security and justice is essential. This will considerably boost
the trust of the Lebanese people in their security system, while building
self-confidence in their capabilities.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Para Page
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS; MID 2004 – SEPTEMBER 2005 ……
i -ii
I. PREFACE
…………………………………………………….. 1-22 1-5
II. BACKGROUND
……………………………………. 23-35 5-10
III. THE CRIME
………………………………………………….. 36-38 10
IV. THE LEBANESE INVESTIGATION
……………………………….. 39-86 11-26
V. THE COMMISSION’S INVESTIGATION
………………………….. 87-202 26-52
VI. CONCLUSIONS ………………………….. 203-211
52-53
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS, MID 2004 – SEPTEMBER 2005
2004
. 26 August 2004, Rafik Hariri meets in Damascus with
Syrian President Bashar Assad to discuss the extension of the term of
President Lahoud.
. 2 September 2004, the United Nations Security Council
adopts resolution 1559 concerning the situation in the Middle East, calling
for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.
. 3 September 2004, the Rafik Hariri bloc approves the
extension law for President Lahoud.
. 3 September 2004, the Lebanese parliament adopts the
extension law for
President Lahoud and forwards it to the Lebanese
government for execution.
. 7 September 2004, Economy Minister Marwan Hamadeh,
Culture Minister Ghazi Aridi, Minister of Refugee Affairs Abdullah Farhat and
Environment Minister Fares Boueiz, resigned from the cabinet in protest at the
constitutional amendment.
. 9 September 2004, Prime Minister Rafik Hariri
indicates to journalists that he will resign.
. 1 October 2004, Assassination attempt on Marwan
Hamadeh, in Beirut, Lebanon.
. 4 October 2004, Rafik Hariri resigns as prime minister.
. 11 October 2004, Syrian President Bashar Assad
delivers a speech condemning his critics within Lebanon and the United Nations.
. 19 October 2004, United Nations Security Council
expresses concern that
resolution 1559 has not been implemented.
. 20 October 2004, President Lahoud accepts Hariri’s
resignation and names Omar Karame to form the new government.
2005
. 14 February 2005, Rafik Hariri and 22 other
individuals are killed in a massive
blast in a seafront area of central Beirut.
. 25 February 2005, the United Nations Fact-Finding
Mission arrives in Lebanon.
. 8 March 2005, Hezbollah organizes a one million strong
“pro-Syrian” march.
. 14 March 2005, a Christian/Sunni-led counter
demonstration demands the
withdrawal of Syrian troops and the arrest of the chief
of the security and
intelligence services.
. 19 March 2005, a bomb explodes in Jdeideh, a northern
suburb of Beirut,
wounding 11 people.
. 23 March 2005, three people are killed and three
others wounded in an explosion in the Kaslik shopping centre, north of Beirut.
. 25 March 2005, the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission
issues its report in New York.
. 26 March 2005, a suitcase bomb explodes in an
industrial zone in northeast
Beirut, injuring six.
i
. 1 April 2005, nine people are injured in an
underground garage in an empty
commercial and residential building in Broumana.
. 7 April 2005, the Security Council forms the United
Nations International
Independent Investigation Commission into the
assassination of Rafik Hariri and 22 others on 14 February 2005.
. 19 April 2005, Lebanon's Prime Minister Najib Mikati
announces that
parliamentary elections will be held on 30 May 2005.
. 22 April 2005, General Jamil Al-Sayyed, head of the
Internal Security Forces and General Ali Al-Hajj, head of the Sûreté Générale,
decide to put their functions at the disposal of Prime Minister Najib al
Makati.
. 26 April 2005, the last Syrian troops leave Lebanon
ending a 29 year military
presence.
. 26 April 2005, the United Nations Verification Mission
starts its mission to verify the complete withdrawal of Syrian military and
intelligence agents from Lebanon and its full compliance with the resolution
1559.
. 6 May 2005, a bomb explodes in Jounieh north of Beirut
injuring 29 people.
. 7 May 2005, Parliament convenes to adopt the proposed
changes to the electoral law of 2000.
. 30 May 2005, the first round of the elections was held.
The Rafik Hariri Martyr List, a coalition of Saad Hariri's Future Movement,
the Progressive Socialist Party and the Qornet Shehwan Gathering, won the
majority of the seats in Parliament.
. 2 June 2005, journalist Samir Kassir is killed when
his car explodes in east Beirut.
. 21 June 2005, former Lebanese Communist Party leader
George Hawi is killed
when his car explodes close to his home in Wata
Musaytbeh.
. 30 June 2005, Fouad Siniora, former finance minister
under Rafik Hariri, forms the new government composed of 23 ministers.
. 12 July 2005, Defence Minister Elias Murr is wounded
and two other people are killed in a car bomb attack in Beirut.
. 22 July 2005, at least three people are wounded near
rue Monot when a bomb explodes in the Ashrafieh quarter.
. 22 August 2005, three persons are injured in an
explosion in a garage near the Promenade Hotel in the Al-Zalqa area north of
Beirut.
. 16 September 2005, one person is killed and ten others
wounded by a bomb near a bank in Ashrafieh.
. 19 September 2005, one person is killed and two
wounded in a small explosion at the Kuwaiti information office in Beirut.
. 25 September 2005, a car bomb injures prominent news
anchor, May Chidiac, in north Beirut.
ii
I. PREFACE
1. The present report details progress
made in the implementation of Security
Council resolution 1595. In that resolution, adopted on
7 April 2005, the Security Council, condemning the 14 February 2005 terrorist
attack in Beirut, Lebanon, that killed former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and
twenty two others, reiterating its call for the strict respect of Lebanon’s
independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity, and noting the
conclusions reached by an earlier fact-finding mission (S/2005/203), decided
to
establish an international independent investigation
Commission (hereafter called UNIIIC or the Commission) to assist the Lebanese
authorities in their investigation of all aspects of this terrorist act, in
order to, among other things, help identify its perpetrators, sponsors,
organizers and accomplices.
2. Prior to the adoption of resolution 1595, the
Security Council had examined the report of the fact-finding mission to
Lebanon on the same subject, submitted on 24 March 2005. The report reflected
the outcome of a three-week enquiry, including a set of recommendations. The
fact-finding mission was of the opinion that, since the credibility of the
Lebanese authorities conducting the investigation was questioned, an
international independent investigation should be set up to establish the
truth. For this purpose, a team with executive authority needed to be created,
covering all the fields of expertise needed for such an investigation.
Notwithstanding the limited time and manpower the fact finding mission was
granted, its conclusions and recommendations have been of considerable value
to the Commission.
3. In a letter dated 29 March 2005 (S/2005/208), the
Government of Lebanon expressed its approval of the Security Council’s
decision to establish an international commission of inquiry as well as its
readiness to cooperate with the commission within the framework of Lebanese
sovereignty and of its legal system.
4. Following the adoption of resolution 1595, intensive
consultations took place regarding the establishment of UNIIIC, its staffing
and its logistical support. On 26 May 2005, a small advance team headed by
Commissioner Detlev Mehlis arrived in Beirut. Mindful of the urgency of the
matter, from a temporary headquarters, the team endeavored to create the
support platform for its future work.
5. On 13 June 2005, after extensive discussions with the
Lebanese judicial
authorities, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was
signed between the
Government of Lebanon and the Commission. The MOU
detailed the modalities of cooperation between the two parties. Of particular
importance to the Commission was the agreement that “the Government of
Lebanon shall guarantee that the Commission is free from interference in the
conduct of its investigation, and is provided with all necessary assistance to
fulfill its mandate.” The Commission was to determine its own procedures,
collect evidence, both documentary and physical, meet and interview any
civilians or/and officials it deemed necessary and have unrestricted access to
all premises throughout the Lebanese territory, taking into account Lebanese
law and judicial procedures. The Lebanese authorities, for their part, were to
assist the Commission in its work by providing all documentary and material
evidence in their possession and by locating witnesses as requested by the
Commission.
6. On 16 June 2005, the Secretary-General declared the
Commission operational. On 17 June 2005, a press conference was held by the
Commissioner to solicit publicly the assistance of the Lebanese authorities
and to invite the Lebanese people to help the Commission by relaying any
information which might be of interest to the investigation. Two hotlines were
set up for this purpose, operated by the Lebanese authorities.
7. Shortly after the signing of the MOU, the Lebanese
authorities transmitted to the Commission an 8000 page case docket containing
all the information and evidence collected since 14 February 2005. Henceforth,
the Commission conducted a thorough criminal and judicial investigation in
close cooperation with the relevant Lebanese judicial (State General
Prosecutor of the Republic of Lebanon) and police (Internal Security Forces)
authorities, in order to avoid duplication, overlapping or contradictory
measures.
8. The Commission established close links with the
Lebanese security and judicial authorities. Regular discussions were held,
particularly with the judicial authorities, to exchange updated information
and files, share results and plan for the emerging phases of the investigation.
Most of the witnesses interviewed by the Commission were summoned through the
Lebanese judicial and security authorities. A case in point was the 30 August
2005 operation, in which Lebanese security forces and UNIIIC investigators
closely coordinated the house raid and search of former senior security
officials, prior to their transfer under close escort to the Commission’s
Main Operating Base (MOB) for interviewing.
9. The Lebanese authorities were of great assistance in
establishing the MOB, as well as a Forward Operating Base (FOB) for the work
of the Commission. Lebanese security teams (police and military) worked hand
in hand with the Commission’s security team to ensure the safety and
security of the staff and premises.
10. Although resolution 1595 gave the Commission
executive authority, the
Commission to a large extent was supported by the
Lebanese judicial and security authorities during search and raid operations.
Moreover, although the Commission was qualified to make proposals to the
Lebanese authorities regarding the arrest of persons allegedly involved in the
assassination, it remained the autonomous decision of the Lebanese authorities
to proceed with such actions.
11. From a two-track investigation, one Lebanese, one
United Nations, has emerged a complementary and unified investigation carried
forward in tandem by the Commission and the Lebanese authorities. The Lebanese
authorities have steadily shown the capacity to take increasing responsibility
in pursuing the case. This was demonstrated by the fact that they took the
initiative of arresting suspects, organizing raids and searches.
12. Given a deep mistrust that has prevailed among the
Lebanese people towards their security and judicial authorities, UNIIIC has
become a source of great expectation and hope for change, as well as an
“interface” between the Lebanese people and their authorities. The two
press conferences, particularly the first one, in addition to the interview of
the first suspect, and the arrest of the former senior security officials at
the Commission’s suggestion, had a catalytic effect. All of this was proof
that in the eyes of
the Commission, no one was above the law. This boosted
Lebanese confidence. More witnesses came forward as the work of the Commission
progressed. However, a number of people insisted that their identity not be
disclosed to the Lebanese authorities.
13. There are other points worth highlighting. First, a
number of witnesses were fearful that they would be harmed if it were known
publicly that they were cooperating with the Commission. For this reason, the
Commission took great care to ensure thatwitness interviews were conducted in
a confidential manner. Because the Commission credits the concern that these
individuals have for their safety, this report will not reveal the identity of
those interviewed. Second, as is true in any investigation, witnesses often
provide information beyond the scope of the
investigation being conducted. The Commission has and will continue to forward
to Lebanese authorities all information related to any criminal matter beyond
the scope of the Commission’s investigation. Finally, the Commission
interviewed people whose agenda was to point the Commission not in the
direction to where the evidence would lead it, but in the direction the
particular individual(s) wanted the Commission to go. The Commission dealt
with these individuals and situations by remaining focused on its single
mission – to follow the evidence wherever it might lead and not to follow
the agenda of any particular person or entity.
14. Lebanese public opinion reflects a widespread view
that, once UNIIIC has
delivered its report and closed down, Lebanon will be
“left alone”. A prevailing fear is that, in the aftermath of the
completion of UNIIIC’s work, and sooner rather than later, the Syrian
security and intelligence services will be back, orchestrating a “revenge
campaign” in a society which remains “infiltrated” by pro-Syrian
elements. Recent bombings, assassinations, and assassination attempts have
been carried out with impunity; deliberate rumors and prophetic media analyses
have sustained this state of mind and have deterred potential witnesses from
contacting UNIIIC. 15. Notwithstanding fears and reluctance to volunteer
information as the Commission’s completion of its work seemed imminent (25
October), it is fair to say that the Lebanese people in general terms have
been eager to come forward to help the Commission carry out its work.
16. The Commission could not operate in a media vacuum,
particularly in Lebanon. It has been the Commission’s steadfast policy not
to be drawn directly into a dialogue in the Lebanese media, avoiding any
escalation and staying above any challenging or provocative statements. Both
press conferences were aimed at countering such speculation and clarifying the
status of the investigation. Inevitably, their effect was short-lived.
17. To enhance transparency and broader cooperation,
working with the judicial authorities entailed keeping the highest political
authorities abreast of developments in the investigation, to the extent that
such action did not call into question the independent nature of the
Commission nor have a direct impact on the course of the investigation per se.
18. During the course of its investigation, the
Commission had to face major
logistical challenges. In this regard, the extensive
support and assistance of sister organizations of the United Nations system
and Interpol were invaluable in the daily work of the Commission.
19. The international community, for its part, was
always prompt, when asked, in coming forward with expertise. This assistance
greatly facilitated the work of the Commission and gave added value to its
work. However, although resolution 1595 called on all States to provide the
Commission with any relevant information pertaining to the Hariri case, it is
to be regretted that no Member State relayed useable information to the
Commission. A number of contacts led to mere exchanges of views and/or
statements of
facts. It is the Commission’s reading of the
resolution that the pertinent information envisaged by the Security Council
would have included among other things, intelligence information that could
have been submitted without any prior request from the Commission.
20. Despite the human, technical and financial
capacities mobilized for the purpose of the investigation, and although
considerable progress has been made and significant results achieved in the
time allotted, the investigation of such a terrorist act with multifaceted
international dimensions and their ramifications normally needs months (if not
years) to be completed so as to be able to establish firm ground for a
potential trial of any accused individuals. It is of the utmost importance to
continue to pursue the trail both
within and outside Lebanon. The Commission’s work is
only part of a broader process. Even as this report is being written a
significant arrest was made just a few days ago; witness interviews are
continuing and complex evidence continues to be reviewed.
21. The Commission has established facts and identified
suspects on the basis of evidence gathered or available to it. The Commission
has checked and examined this evidence to the best of its knowledge. Until the
investigation is completed, all new leads and evidence are fully analyzed, and
an independent and impartial prosecution mechanism is set up, one cannot know
the complete story of what happened, how it happened and who is responsible
for the assassination of Rafik Hariri and the murder of
22 other innocent people. Therefore, the presumption of
innocence stands.
22. In producing this report the Commission has
endeavored to ensure that nothing it does or says undermines the ongoing
criminal investigation and any trials that may follow. The Commission, at this
juncture cannot disclose all the detailed elements and facts it has in its
possession, beyond sharing them with the Lebanese authorities. The Commission
has tried to set forth the facts and to present the analysis of those facts in
a way that most accurately explains what happened, how it happened and who is
responsible.
II. BACKGROUND
23. Syria has long had a powerful influence in Lebanon.
During the Ottoman Empire,
the area that became Lebanon was part of an overall
administrative territory governed
from Damascus. When the countries were established in
the aftermath of the First World
War, Lebanon was created from what many Arab
nationalists considered to be rightfully
part of Syria. Indeed, since the countries became
independent, they have never had
formal diplomatic relations.
24. Syrian troops were invited into Lebanon by Lebanese
President Suleiman Franjieh
in May 1976 in the early stages of the latter’s civil
war. In the Taif Agreement, reached
among members of the Lebanese parliament, that ended the
civil war in 1989, inter alia,
Lebanon thanked Syria for its assistance in deploying
its forces in the Lebanon. A
provision of the agreement called for Lebanon and Syria
to determine jointly the future
redeployment of those forces. A later agreement reached
between the two countries in
May of 1991 regarding cooperation, restated that
provision. Syrian forces withdrew in
May 2005 in compliance with Security Council resolution
1559 (2004).
Relations between Mr. Hariri and Syria
25. The Commission’s investigation has confirmed what
many in Lebanon have long
asserted, that senior Syrian intelligence officials had
a powerful day-to-day and overall
strategic influence on the governance of Lebanon. The
apparent growing conflict
between Mr. Hariri and senior Syrian officials,
including Syrian President Bashar Assad,
was a central aspect of the information provided to the
Commission through interviews
and documents. A meeting in Damascus between Mr. Hariri
and President Assad on 26
August 2004 appeared to bring the conflict to a head. In
that meeting, which allegedly
lasted for 10-15 minutes, President Assad informed Mr.
Hariri, who was then Prime
Minister, that President Assad intended that Lebanon
would extend the term in office of
Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, which Mr. Hariri
opposed.
26. Lebanese and Syrian witnesses, and the transcript of
a meeting between Mr.
Hariri and Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Walid
Al-Moallem, provided the Commission
with sharply differing versions of what was said in that
meeting. A number of Lebanese
witnesses – including then former ministers Marwan
Hamadeh and Ghazi Areedi, Druze
leader and head of the Progressive Socialist Party Walid
Joumblat, parliament member
Bassem Sabaa, and Mr. Hariri’s son, Saad – reported
that Mr. Hariri told them that
President Assad brusquely informed him of the decision
to extend President Lahoud’s
term and threatened to “break Lebanon over your [Mr.
Hariri’s] head and Walid
Jumblat’s” if Mr. Hariri (and presumably Mr. Jumblat)
did not agree to support the
extension of President Lahoud’s term. Syrian officials
characterized the meeting
differently. Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk Sharaa and
General Ghazali , head of Syrian
intelligence in Lebanon, described the meeting in
positive terms. General Ghazali told
the Commission that Mr. Hariri told him that President
Assad referred to Mr. Hariri as a
“friend,” and described a cordial, respectful
meeting in which President Assad consulted
Mr. Hariri on the matter.
27. Following are excerpts of interviews conducted by
the Commission regarding the
26 August 2005 meeting, relevant parts of a letter to
the Commission from Mr. Sharaa,
and a portion of the transcript of a taped conversation
between Mr. Hariri and Mr. Al-
Moallem:
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic,
letter to the Commission of 17
August 2005:
“A meeting took place between President Bashar Assad
and late Prime Minister Rafik Al-Hariri in Damascus on August 26, 2004 within
the framework of the ongoing
political consultation between the Syrian and Lebanese
leaders. (…) A general review
was made of the local and regional developments,
including the possible extension of the
mandate of Emile Lahoud, the President of Lebanon, in
view of the troubled regional
conditions and based on the mutual interest in
maintaining stability in Lebanon. Mr. Al-
Hariri requested that in case a consensus regarding the
mandate extension is reached in
the Council of Ministers, Syria should make endeavors to
get President Lahoud to better
cooperate in the forthcoming period. The President
requested Mr. Hariri to consult with
his group and with whom he deems suitable and to take
the appropriate position.”
Rustum Ghazali, undated written statement, submitted to
the Commission by letter of 17
August 2005:
“I had two meetings at Anjar on that date (26 August
2004) with Prime Minister Hariri.
The first was in the morning of August 26, 2004, on his
way to Damascus to meet
President Bashar Assad in Damascus, and the second was
on his return trip from
Damascus to Beirut after meeting with President Bashar
Assad in Damascus. The latter
meeting was also held in our office at Anjar.”
(…)
“We discussed his meeting with President Bashar Assad.
He (Hariri) looked relaxed.
Prime Minister Hariri said that his meeting with
President Bashar Assad was cordial and
brief. According to Prime Minister Hariri, President
Assad told him: Abu Bahaa, we in
Syria have always been dealing with you as a friend and
as the Prime Minister of
Lebanon. Today, I am also dealing with you as a friend
and as the Prime Minister of
Lebanon. Under the difficult circumstances currently
witnessed by this region, with
Lebanon in the midst, we are of the view that it is in
the interest of Lebanon to maintain
the continuity of the regime by extending the term of
office of President Lahoud. As a
friend, we would like you to clarify your position
regarding this matter. We are in no
hurry to know the answer, and you may wish to think
about it at your convenience.”
Marwan Hamadeh, witness statement of 27 June 2005:
“On Wednesday 24 or 25 August, Mr. Hariri, Mr. Jumblat
and Mr. Berri were all invited
to go to Damascus in order to be informed about the
decision to extend Mr. Lahoud’s
mandate. Mr. Jumblat informed R. Ghazali that he would
need to discuss it with
President Assad. R. Ghazali insisted that the answer
should be “yes” before setting up
any appointment. He actually advised Mr. Jumblat to
respond positively because this was
a strategic matter for President Assad. Mr. Jumblat’s
answer was negative. One hour
later, Mr. Jumblat called me and told me that the Syrian
Intelligence had cancelled his
appointment.
In the evening, Mr. Jumblat and myself went to visit Mr.
Hariri. He said that R. Ghazali
insisted that as long as his answer was not positive, he
would not confirm his
appointment either. He was asked to go to Damascus, stay
in his house (…) until further
notice. The following day, he was called in for a short
meeting.”
(…)
“The day Mr. Hariri met with President Assad, I was
meeting at Mr. Jumblat’s residence
in Beirut, with Bassem Sabaa and Ghazi Areedi. We saw
that Mr. Hariri’s motorcade
was back by 1 PM which meant that the meeting in
Damascus was pretty short. We saw
Mr. Hariri who looked tired. He was sweating. He told
the four of us that President
Lahoud was to be reelected or “he will have to pay a
high price”. (…)He reported
President Assad saying to him: I will break Lebanon on
your head and Jumblat’s head.”
Ghazi Areedi, witness statement of 1 July 2005:
“Mr. Hariri reported to us that President Assad told
him: “If Jacques Chirac puts me out
of Lebanon, I will consider different options and will
let you know. Either you are with us
or against us. My choice is Emile Lahoud for President.
I will make sure he is the
President. I will wait for your answer. (…) Tell Walid
Jumblat that if he has Druze
people in Lebanon, I also have a Druze community in
Syria. I am ready to do anything.”
Walid Joumblatt, witness statement of 28 June 2005:
“According to Mr. Hariri, Assad told him:”Lahoud is
me. I want to renew his mandate.
(…) If Chirac wants me out of Lebanon, I will break
Lebanon. (…) During his visit to my
house, Mr. Hariri was extremely tense and disappointed.
He was in a very bad position.”
Jubran Tueni, witness statement of 25 June 2005:
“Later on, in 2004, when the issue of President
Lahoud’s extension came up, Mr. Hariri
also told me, that President Assad had threatened him
directly and told him, that voting
against the extension would be considered as being
directed against Syria. According to
Mr. Hariri, President Assad added that in that case
they, the Syrians, would “blow him
up” and any of his family members and that they would
find them anywhere in the
world.”
Bassem Sabaa, witness statement of 30 June 2005:
“When Mr. Hariri came back from his meeting with
President Assad, I met him at Walid
Jumblat’s house.”
(…)
“He reported to us President Assad’s words who has
put it bluntly: “I am personally
interested in this matter. It is not about Emile Lahoud
but about Bashar Assad”.
We asked him if he had had a chance to discuss the
matter with President Assad. He said
that President Assad told him that the matter was not
open for discussion, that it was
bound to happen or else I will break Lebanon”(…). He
was extremely aggravated. He
told me that for the sake of Lebanon and its interests,
he must think about what he will
do, that we are dealing with a group of lunatics who
could do anything.”
Saad Hariri, witness statement of 9 July 2005:
“I discussed with my father, the late Rafik Hariri,
the extension of President Lahoud’s
term. He told me that President Bashar Assad threatened
him telling him: “This is what I
want. If you think that President Chirac and you are
going to run Lebanon, you are
mistaken. It is not going to happen. President Lahoud is
me. Whatever I tell him, he
follows suit. This extension is to happen or else I will
break Lebanon over your head and
Walid Jumblat’s. (…) So, you either do as you are
told or we will get you and your family
wherever you are.”
Rafik Hariri, taped conversation with Walid Al-Moallem
on 1 February 2005:
“In connection with the extension episode, he
(President Assad) sent for me and met me
for 10 to 15 minutes.”
(…)
“He sent for me and told me: “ You always say that
you are with Syria. Now the time has
come for you to prove whether you meant what you said or
otherwise.” (…) He did not
ask my opinion. He said: “I have decided.” He did
not address me as Prime Minister or
as Rafik or anything of that kind. He just said: “I
have decided.” I was totally flustered,
at a loss. That was the worst day of my life.”
(…)
“He did not tell me that he wished to extend
Lahoud’s mandate. All he said was “I have
decided to do this, don’t answer me, think and come
back to me.””
(…)
“I was not treated as a friend or an acquaintance. No.
I was asked: “Are you with us or
against us?” That was it. When I finished my meeting
with him, I swear to you, my body
guard looked at me and asked why I was pale-faced”
28. In the meeting with Mr. Al-Moallem, Mr. Hariri
complained that he believed that
President Assad was being deliberately misinformed by
the Syrian security services and
Mr. Sharaa about the actions of Mr. Hariri. Translated
excerpts of the meeting include
the following statements by Mr. Hariri:
. “I cannot live under a security regime that is
specialized in interfering with Hariri
and spreading disinformation about Rafik Hariri and
writing reports to Bashar
Assad.”
. “But Lebanon will never be ruled from Syria. This
will no longer happen.”
29. During this discussion, Mr. Al-Moallem told Mr.
Hariri that “we and the
[security] services here have put you into a corner.”
He continued, “Please do not take
things lightly.”
30. The recorded interview clearly contradicts Mr.
Al-Moallem’s witness interview of
20 September 2005 in which he falsely described the 1
February meeting as “friendly and
constructive” and avoided giving direct answers to the
questions put to him.
Syrian cooperation with the Commission
31. The information set forth above, and the evidence
collected by the Commission as
described in the section below entitled Planning of the
Assassination, point to the
possibility that Syrian officials were involved in the
assassination of Mr. Hariri. When
the Commission attempted to get the cooperation of the
Syrian Government in pursuing
these lines of the investigation, the Commission was met
with cooperation in form, not
substance.
32. The initial contact between the Commission and the
Syrian authorities took place
on 11 June 2005 when the Commissioner sent a letter to
the Syrian Foreign Minister,
requesting a meeting with representatives of the Syrian
government. Mr. Sharaa replied
on 11 July, pledging the Syrian Government’s support
for the investigation in general
terms. On 19 July, the Commission asked to interview
several witnesses including the
President of the Syrian Arab Republic. On 26 August, at
the request of the Syrian
government, a meeting took place between the
Commissioner and a representative of the
Syrian Foreign Ministry, in Geneva, Switzerland. At that
meeting, the Commissioner
was given a letter containing written statements of four
witnesses. It was indicated that
President Assad would not be available for any
interview. The Commissioner repeated
his request for direct witness interviews and was told
that the request was under
consideration but that President Assad would not be
available to be interviewed.
33. On 30 August the Commission sent another request to
the Syrian Foreign
Minister, requesting interviews of several additional
witnesses and suspects in Syria. The
letter requested the support of the Syrian government to
search the premises of the
suspects. On 7 September Foreign Minister Sharaa
informed the Commission in writing
that while the Commission’s evidence was based on
false testimony, his Government
agreed that the persons listed in the Commission’s
requests of 19 July and 30 August,
except for President Assad, could be interviewed.
34. On 12 September details of the upcoming interviews
were discussed between the
Commission and a representative of the Syrian Foreign
Ministry. The Commission
expressed its wish that the interviews should be held in
a third country, neither Lebanon
nor Syria, which was refused. The Syrian authorities
insisted that the interviews take
place in Syria with the participation of Syrian
officials. The interviews took place
between 20 and 23 September. Each interview was
conducted in the presence of the
Legal Advisor to the Syrian Foreign Affairs Ministry or
another representative of the
Foreign Ministry, one interpreter, two note takers, and
at times, an additional person
whose affiliation was not identified. At the end of the
interview process, it was apparent
that the interviewees had given uniform answers to
questions. Many of those answers
were contradicted by the weight of evidence collected by
the UNIIIC from a variety of
other sources. The Commission has not had the
opportunity to follow up on these
interviews or pursue its investigation regarding a
possible Syrian involvement in the
crime.
35. The Commission has concluded that the Government of
Syria’s lack of
substantive cooperation with the Commission has impeded
the investigation and made it
difficult to follow leads established by the evidence
collected from a variety of sources.
If the investigation is to be completed, it is essential
that the Government of Syria fully
cooperate with the investigating authorities, including
by allowing for interviews to be
held outside Syria and for interviewees not to be
accompanied by Syrian officials.
III. THE CRIME
36. On 14 February 2005 at approximately 1250 hrs, the
former Lebanese Prime
Minister Rafik Hariri left the Nejmeh Square in Beirut
going back to the Kuraytem
Palace. He traveled in a motorcade comprising of 6 cars,
together with his security detail
and Member of Parliament, Bassel Fleyhan.
37. When the motorcade passed the St. George Hotel at
Minae Al-Hosn Street a huge
explosion occurred and resulted in the death of Mr.
Hariri and others.
38. Shortly after the blast, the Director of Al-Jazeera
TV in Beirut received a
telephone call from a man who stated that the Nasra and
Jihad Group in Greater Syria
claimed responsibility for the assassination of Mr.
Hariri. This message was broadcast
shortly thereafter.
IV. THE LEBANESE INVESTIGATION
Initial Measures
39. To resolve a crime of this magnitude requires strong
management capacity, clear
roles, coordination and access to sufficient competency,
manpower, equipment and
means of assistance. The following brief outline reviews
measures undertaken by the
Lebanese authorities in the period from the execution of
the crime until UNIIIC was
established.
Investigative Judge
40. Primary Military Investigative Judge Rasheed Mezher
was responsible for the
crime investigation during the period from 14 to 21
February 2005. On the latter date, a
decision was taken by the Lebanese Government that the
crime was a terrorist act
targeting the Republic, which led to the case being
transferred to a new competent court
of jurisdiction, the highest Criminal Court in Lebanon,
the Justice Council. A
consequence of this decision was that a new
investigative judge was appointed to lead the
investigation, Judge Michel Abou Arraj, the
representative of the Prosecutor General’s
Office.
41. Judge Mezher arrived at the crime scene less than an
hour after the blast,
accompanied by Judge Jean Fahd from the Prosecutor
General’s Office. He has
described the situation at the crime scene as a chaos.
His first decisions were to appoint
the Assistant Chief of Beirut Police, General Naji
Mulaeb, as the person in charge of the
scene and to assign him the task of removing all dead
bodies and wounded people from
the scene, extinguish fires and, thereafter, to withdraw
all people from the scene and
close it off (witness statement) .
42. At 1700 hrs, Judge Mezher summoned a meeting with
all the involved bodies,
both from the Internal Security Forces and the Military,
comprising in total 10 officers.
During the meeting Judge Mezher distributed tasks for
the different bodies and gave
further directions for the course of the investigation
(witness statement) .
43. The representatives from the Internal Security
Forces during the meeting were:
General Aouar as the acting Commander of the Judicial
Police and Head of the Forensic
Unit, General Mulaeb as acting Commander of the Beirut
Police Force, General Salah
Eid as the responsible person for the blast site and
Lieutenant Colonel Fouad Othman in
the capacity of the Head of the Information Division
(witness statement) .
44. After the meeting, at approximately 1900 hrs, Judge
Mezher returned to the crime
scene for a second time. He was not satisfied with his
observations at the crime scene,
but hoped it should be better the next day since
responsibilities had been distributed at the
earlier meeting. The shortcomings consisted mainly of
lack of equipment, means of
assistance and experience. In addition, there was a lack
of communication between the
various bodies involved, the directions from the
Investigative Judge were not followed
and he did not receive proper feed-back concerning the
progress in the investigation
(witness statement)
.
45. During the period of his functions as Investigative
Judge, Judge Mezher
summoned approximately 10 people to his office for
interrogations, comprising staff
from the St. George Hotel, Mr. Hariri’s close
protection officers, the father and mother of
Mr. Abu Adass and some eyewitnesses. He also, in
consultation with Judge Jean Fahd,
took the decision to request assistance from Switzerland
regarding a forensic expert team
to assist the Lebanese authorities in the investigation.
When Judge Mezher left the
function of Investigative Judge, 21 February 2005, no
sustainable results had been
achieved in the investigation.
46. The file was handed over to the new Investigative
Judge, Judge Abou Arraj.
Judge Abou Arraj was Investigative Judge for the
investigation from 22 February to 23
March 2005. He was appointed by First Judge Tanios
Khoury, at the Supreme Council,
and the file was registered at Abou Arraj’s office on
22 February 2005 (witness statement) . His
first opinions when reviewing the file, were that the
crime had been a terrorist attack that
would require a long period of time and extensive
investigative measures to be
undertaken, in addition to the application of
substantial resources. In his opinion, all the
initial investigative measures had been performed in a
professional and accurate way. He
was surprised at the removal of the motorcade cars. He
did not meet with Judge Mezher,
but telephoned him whenever clarifications were needed
(witness statement) .
47. During the period of Judge Abou Arraj’s tenure as
the Investigative Judge, the
following measures were undertaken (compiled notes case
file) .
Date Measures Affected persons
22 February • Recording of the lawsuit
24 February • Second Beirut Regional Detachment
Record
• Inspection of St George’s
• A summary of all military writs
• Signing writs: Sûreté Générale ,
Internal Security Forces, State Security,
Intelligence
25 February • The writ of the of the Special Criminal
Investigation Section
• Investigations about the diggings in St
George’s area
• The writ of the Special Criminal • Tayssir Abu
Adass and
Investigation Section: Notifications. First Adjutant
Maher
Daouk
26 February • Several reports were received among
them: The inspection report and the
report about moving the cars to Helou
Barracks + interrogating the guards
28 February • Interrogation • Tayssir Abu Adass
• Statements of witnesses •
Maher Daouk, Hassan
Mohamed Ajuz and
Amer Khaled
Shehadeh
28 February • Subpoenaing • Rashid Hammud (at
the hospital),
Mohamed Queiny
(former Prime Minister
Rafik Hariri’s
bodyguards) and
• Forensic Evidence Department: Asking Tamer Lahib.
for the assistance of foreign experts.
1 March • Giving the Head of the Fact finding
mission to Lebanon FitzGerald the
permission to look into the
investigations.
2 March • Interrogations of two witnesses • Tamer
Lahib and
Mohamed Queiny.
3 March • The reports of Mitsubishi Company were
received + the catalogue of the
Mitsubishi pick-ups + a list of the names
of the parts and pieces found at the
explosion site + a map showing
(unclear).
• Doctor Kawas report regarding the
examination of Abdel-Hameed Ghalayini
cadaver. • Hussam Ali Mohsen,
• A report was received from the Army Ahmad Ammoura
and
Intelligence about interrogations. Nabil Ghsoub
(unclear) regarding
there relations with
suspect Ahmad Abu
Adass (Note: they
• The report of Doctor Hussein Chahrour were not
arrested).
regarding the examination of Abdel-
Hameed Ghalayini cadaver.
5 March • Subpoenaing witnesses (the first three •
Engineer Makram
were to be interrogated the 8th of March Aouar, Hamad
2005. The others on the 9th of March Mulaeb, Hussam Ali
2005. Mohsen, Mahmoud
Baydoun (officer in
the Sûreté Générale
), Afifi Abdallah Al-
Hershi (unclear),
Ghassan Ben Jeddou
(Al-Jazeera Channel).
7 March • Inspection of the contents of the
cardboard boxes (Dalal Dargham)
• Brigadier General Imad Kakour came
and informed us about the
investigations and took a copy of the investigation
report, Ziad Ramadan was
with him.
8 March • We received: The DNA results and the
maps of the crime scene.
10 March • The report of Al-Bourj Squad regarding
the search for Abdel Hameed Ghalayini
cadaver.
11 March • The discussion of Lieutenant General
Ziad Nasr + Captain Mitri Namar.
• Convocation of Hussam Mohsen
• Convocation of the Palestinian Marwan
Abdel-Wahhab Kattan (unclear),
14/3/2005
14 March • Urging the heads of the services not to
remove rubbles.
• Statements of witnesses. • Jack Chalitta, Ali
Amhaz and Marwan
Koubtan.
• Letter of the international Mission
regarding the completion of its work.
48. On 23 March 2005, Judge Abou Arraj stepped down from
the post of
Investigative Judge. The reason for this was the tense
political atmosphere at this
particular time: a lot of mistrust was being directed
towards the Lebanese judiciary and
criticism being leveled at the manner of the
investigation. In addition, while in charge of
the Hariri investigation, he also had to discharge his
normal functions. The case was
contaminated with political issues and during
demonstrations in Beirut on 14 March
2005, he heard people mentioning his name in a critical
manner (witness statement) .
49. At the time he left the post of Investigative Judge,
the only achievement in the
investigation was the Mr. Abu Adass lead, despite
attempts to focus on the modus
operandi of the explosion and to get all experts
involved to come up with one consensus
opinion (witness statement) .
50. Judge Abou Arraj was replaced by Investigative Judge
Elias Eid, who as of
October 2005, is still in charge of the investigation.
Internal Security Forces
51. On 14 February 2005, General Ali Al-Hajj was the
Head of the Internal Security
Forces (ISF). He was promoted to the post in November
2004, allegedly appointed by
the Syrians, he stepped down from the post during spring
2005 in the aftermath of the
blast that killed Mr. Hariri. According to his
statement, he was at his office when he was
alerted about the blast. He immediately went to the
crime scene by car. During the ride he
called General Shahid Al-Khoury, Chief of the Services
and Operations Division within
ISF, who told him that it was a huge blast. General
Al-Hajj then ordered Mr. Khoury to
send all responsible units to the scene. The units
comprised the Forensic Unit under the
command of General Hisham Aouar, the Explosives Unit
under the command of General
Abdel-Badie Al-Soussi and the Investigation Unit under
the command of Lieutenant
Colonel Fouad Othman. This was his only responsibility,
to provide sufficient resources.
After the arrival of the Investigative Judge, all ISF
staff was under the command of the
Judge and General Ali Al-Hajj could not interfere in the
investigation (witness statement) .
52. In his opinion, the problems at the scene were
related to the presence of too many
different agencies, such as the Army, ISF, State
Security and Public Security.
53. Later that afternoon, General Al-Hajj joined a
meeting with the Higher Defence
Council at the Presidential Palace. The meeting was
chaired by the President. Other
participants were the Minister of the Interior, the
Minister of Defence, the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Justice, the Minister
of Economy, the Deputy Prime
Minister, the Minister of Public works, the Governor of
Beirut and Commanders from the
various security agencies. The meeting discussed the
subject matter of the crime, its
referral to the Judicial Council, and the ramifications
of the crime.
54. After the meeting General Al-Hajj returned to his
office: soon thereafter the Al-
Jazeera TV channel broadcast a videotape, where Ahmad
Abu Adass claimed
responsibility for the blast and the killing of Mr.
Hariri. From that time all available ISF
resources, except those occupied with the crime scene
work, were focused on the Abu
Adass track.
Military Intelligence
55. On 14 February 2005, General Raymond Azar was the
Head of Military
Intelligence. He was promoted to the post in December
1998 and stepped down during
spring 2005 in the aftermath of the blast that killed
Mr. Hariri. According to his
statement, he was alerted about the blast by Colonel
Mohamed Fehmi, Head of the
Military Security Branch. He did not go to the crime
scene, but followed the case in
detail from his office, together with Colonel Albert
Karam, the Chief of Beirut
Intelligence Branch. He informed President Lahoud and
General Ghazali about the blast
at the time of its occurrence (witness statement) .
56. Personnel from Military Intelligence (mainly
specialists in the field of explosives)
visited the crime scene and conducted their part of the
examination. They confirmed that
the type of explosives used were TNT and the estimated
amount to be some 300
kilograms. All concrete evidence found on the site was
handed over later to the ISF
(General Hisham Aouar) and to General Azar’s knowledge
there were some metal
fragments and a gun. His opinion was that basically ISF,
but also the Prosecutor
General’s Office and the Investigative Judge, had the
overall responsibility for the crime
investigation.
57. In the afternoon of 14 February 2005, General Azar
attended the meeting at the
Higher Defence Council. At the meeting, a presentation
was made about the
assassination of Mr. Hariri, with all the details that
were available at that time. Each
participant presented his own point of view.
58. At a later stage, his Directorate was assigned to
focus on three elements:
. The videotape of Ahmad Abu Adass
. The cellular communications that took place in the
area of the explosion
. The type and amount of explosives used.
Sûreté Générale
59. On 14 February 2005, Brigadier General Jamil
Al-Sayyed was the Head of the
Sûreté Générale. He was promoted to the post in
December 1998 and stepped down
during spring 2005 in the aftermath of the blast that
killed Mr. Hariri. According to his
statement, he was at his office when he heard the blast,
but thought that the noise was a
result of Israeli air fighters passing through the sound
barrier. Somewhere between 1315
and 1330 hrs, Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Al-Assir informed
him of the blast and that Mr.
Hariri’s motorcade had been the target. He stayed at
his office and no one from the Sûreté
Générale was sent to the scene. He called the
President, the Minister of the Interior and
General Ghazali.
60. Later that afternoon, General Al-Sayyed attended the
meeting at the Higher
Defence Council. The meeting was focused on the
consequences in the near future on the
ground. The suggestions were submitted to the
Government, which had a meeting later
the same evening.
61. On Tuesday morning, 15 February 2005, he got a phone
call from a journalist
from Al-Jazeera who told him nobody had yet picked-up
the Abu Adass videotape. The
tape was brought to him 16 February 2005. He made a copy
and sent the original to the
Investigative Judge Abou Arraj.
Crime Scene Investigation
ISF Report
62. As with any similar criminal case, prompt
examination of the crime scene and its
surroundings is of paramount importance for the outcome
of the investigation. The
officer in charge of the crime scene, General Naji
Mulaeb of the ISF, arrived at the scene
at 1305 hrs on 14 February 2005. He has issued a report
dated 3 March 2005, on the
crime scene examination conducted by the Lebanese
authorities (General Directorate of
Internal Security Forces, Beirut Police Unit, Ref. No.:
95) stating the following:
“On implementation of investigation order issued by
the first investigating judge of the military court in
Beirut regarding the investigations and anything that
can throw light on the enquiry into the explosion
which caused the death of former Prime Minister Hariri
and others.
Record: Investigation order issued by the first
investigating judge of the military court in Beirut
No23/2005 dated 14 February 2005.
Order from the General Department of Referrals No
207/1181 dated 15 February 2005.
On 14 February 2005 at about 1250 hours, an explosion
took place in Beirut which the operations room
reported as being close to the St. George Hotel. All
patrols were ordered to go to the scene. I proceeded
there and arrived within a few minutes. Cars on both
sides of the road in the vicinity were ablaze and there
was a lot of smoke. Civil defense, fire brigade and Red
Cross vehicles hastened to the area and took action
to put out the fire, gather the corpses and take the
wounded to hospital. The scene was chaotic, and security
and military personnel were mixed with civilians,
firemen and first aid personnel and civilians, newspaper
journalists and the media were all eager to get to the
scene. I ordered all the officers and police officers and
patrols to do everything necessary to maintain security
corridors and to take the requisite measures to
safeguard the scene of the crime and keep away onlookers
and made the commander of the second Beirut
regional secretariat responsible for implementation.
The preliminary indications are that the explosion took
place in the motorcade of Prime Minister Hariri but
the outcome is not yet know.
Specialists in gathering evidence and explosives experts
began their work.
In addition to political and security officers, there
came to the scene a Government commissioner from the
Military Court with some support staff; and Rasheed
Mezher, the first investigating judge from the Military
Court in Beirut, who orally delegated me, in my capacity
as officer in charge of the police during the
absence from 12 February 2005 of the Police Commander on
a mission abroad, or whoever I should see fit,
to undertake the investigations and anything that could
throw light on that explosion and to duly inform
him. The oral authorization would be followed up in
writing.
As soon as the General Director of Internal Security
arrived at the scene, I informed him of all the above.
In accordance with the above-mentioned oral delegation
of authority, I ordered Major Salah Eid to
undertake the necessary investigative procedures in his
capacity as the commander of the second Beirut
regional secretariat, within the remit of which the
explosion took place, and to keep me informed.
The work of retrieving the corpses and taking the
wounded to hospital continued, as did the work of
personnel from the Central Office of Accidents and the
explosive experts. A complete sweep was made of
the scene and the surroundings. A team of engineers from
the Lebanese Army came and took samples from
the scene in order to carry out tests thereupon. An army
detachment carried out a search of the site and
buildings and assisted in imposing a security cordon.
In view of the urgency of the investigation, we sent
telegram No. 2065 dated 14 February 2005 to the
leadership of the regional police unit and to police
unit commanders in which we asked that all the
necessary investigations should be carried out within
the remit of each unit with respect to the corpses that
had been taken to the hospitals in each area, in order
to permit their relatives to identify them and duly
inform me, thereby enabling me to gain the approval of
the relevant authorities for the return to their
relatives of those corpses. Depositions were to be taken
from the wounded and a copy deposited in the file
of the overall investigation, through the Al-Burj squad.
Further to our telegram No. 2077 dated 14 February 2005,
sent to unit departments regarding the isolation
of the scene of the crime and establishment of a
security cordon around it, we ordered the commander of
the second Beirut regional secretariat to use whatever
personnel were necessary to perform those tasks and
to place metal barricades and yellow tape around the
scene and, in coordination with the commander of the
traffic secretariat, to ensure the flow of traffic.
Major Eid kept me informed of the progress of the
investigation and its outcome, and I duly informed the
first investigating judge from the Military Court. The
corpses were handed over to their relatives in
accordance with legal principles.
On the instructions of the first investigating judge of
the Military Court, and with the approval of the
General Director of Internal Security Forces, the cars
from the Hariri motorcade were taken to the Helou
barracks, once they had been photographed in situ and a
video recording had been made in the presence of
the commander of the second Beirut regional secretariat,
the commander of the second Beirut traffic squad,
the commander of the Al-Burj detachment and a squad of
criminal investigators, and using the lights
provided by the civil defense, in accordance with report
No. 144/302 dated 14 February 2005. They were
deposited in the Helou barracks.
In our telegram No. 2122 dated 15 February addressed to
the commander of the emergency services, we
requested that they should be safeguarded and that
no-one should be allowed to touch them.
At 1500 hours on 15 February 2005, Major Omar Makkawi,
the commander of the Beirut police unit,
reported and assumed his command. He informed me of all
the procedures that had been taken and all
incidents that had occurred, and we followed up the
process of the investigation being undertaken by Major
Salah Eid. We then duly informed the first investigating
judge of the Military Court of the same.
Pursuant to warrant No. 2F206/dated 17 February 2005,
the unit commander transferred to us the written
delegation of authority issued by the first
investigating judge of the Military Court Ref 23/2005 dated 14
February 2005 concerning the explosion, which was
transmitted to us for implementation by the General
Directorate as No. 2SH207/1181 dated 15 February 2005.
Similarly, the unit command gave us, pursuant to warrant
No. 206/1735 dated 18 February 2005, written
authorization from that party Ref. 36/2005 dated 18
February 2005, which included an order to keep the
cars from the Hariri motorcade inside the barracks,
cover them with tents and place them under guard,
which was done.
In accordance with warrant No. 2F206/1736 dated 18
February 2005, The first investigating judge of the
Military Court have us written authorization Ref.
36/2005 dated 18 February 2005, which included an order
to contact the Governor of Beirut, who should supply us
with the names of those recently working at a
workshop at the site of the explosion. The
aforementioned authority was carried out by means of a
document of 14 pages which is attached.
Pursuant to the first delegation of authority referred
to above; on the basis of the order to the commander of
the second Beirut regional secretariat to carry out the
investigation; and as a result of the first report, No.
302/143 dated 14 February 2005 and all the
investigations arranged by the units in the police unit and the
regional police unit, we hereby submit the following:
Table No. 1 has been prepared concerning the corpses
that have been returned to their relatives.
Table No. 2 has been prepared concerning the persons
injured by this explosion.
Table No. 3 contains the depositions that were made
concerning the explosion.
A table has been prepared showing the measures that were
taken: an examination of the scene of the crime;
articles impounded; damaged cars; the loss of one person
at the site of the explosion and the failure to find
him.
All those procedures have been verified in report No.
302/1 dated 14 February 2005”.
Swiss Forensic Report
63. The Lebanese experts involved in the crime scene
examination, representing a
variety of different agencies, came up with different
opinions on the findings and results
of the examination. As a result, they were summoned to a
meeting at the Military Court
in the presence of the Prosecutor General (witness
statement). The meeting led to a request from
the Lebanese authorities for foreign assistance in
examining the crime scene, which was
directed to the Government of Switzerland. A Swiss
forensic expert team visited Lebanon
in March 2005 and conducted a forensic investigation.
The team’s final report stated
(excerpt):
“Our conclusions about an explosion above or under
ground are based upon the following examinations:
. Interpretations based on dispersion of fragments, size
and shape of fragments
. Interpretations based on size and shape of crater
. Ballistic interpretations
. Interpretations of damages on buildings (structure,
glass)
After interpretation and analysis of the dispersion of
fragments, we can’t give clear evidence whether there
was an explosion above or under ground. Our analysis and
research concerning the shape and form of the
crater also gives no clear evidence whether there was an
explosion above or under ground.
On the other hand, the form and shape of the crater
gives some information about the possible amount of
the charge (above or under ground):
. As mentioned in our report it is expected that an
amount of about 1000 kg above ground will
create a crater like the one on the scene
(…)
Concerning the fact that the charge was possibly placed
in a car, it must have been of larger size. If such a
vehicle has been used we expect some big fragments (e.g.
from the frame) of the vehicle close to the center
of the explosion.
The grade of damage of the metal fragments which were
shown to us by the police (said to be originated of
a Mitsubishi Canter) is consistent with fragments we
would expect if such a vehicle was located in the
center of the explosion.
(…)
After having conducted all the analysis and discussions
of the facts we have collected, we came to the
conclusion that it was most likely an explosion above
ground.
According to this finding we estimate an amount of
1000kg of high explosive.
The unconfirmed and preliminary results of the analysis
of a soil sample of the crater showed
Trinitrotoleune (TNT) as explosive charge”.
Rifi Report
64. In March 2005, the present Head of the ISF, General
Ashraf Rifi, prepared a
report on the initial measures undertaken by the
competent Lebanese authorities on the
scene of the crime, which was submitted to the UN Fact
Finding Mission. The report
concluded (excerpt):
“
II. Measures taken:
The importance of this tragic event that led to the
assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri had
an effect on all subsequent measures and actions taken.
A. Rescue and evacuation operations and find of bodies:
In the immediate aftermath of the explosion, security,
military and civil defense organs as well as the Red
Cross rushed to the crime scene to perform their duties.
In spite of all the measures taken, these were,
unfortunately, not up to the level that would save the
face of these organs. These measures were flawed.
Therefore, the Minister of Interior and Municipalities
issued a memorandum 137/(sad)2, dated 25 February
2005, instructing the General Inspectorate of the
Internal Security Forces to investigate the deeds and
actions. Based on the results, he suggested the
dismissal of both the General, Chief of Beirut Police and the
General, Chief of the Judicial Police.
B. Preservation of the crime scene:
Immediately after the explosion happened, the military
investigating judge was put in charge of the
investigation. Al the security and judicial police
personnel were put at his disposal. He gave rogatory
commissions and stipulated the kind of measures to be
carried out, especially the preservation of the crime
scene. However, the measures taken were below the
required level and contrary to the obvious
fundamental basis upon which crimes as serious as this
one or even less serious crimes are investigated, in
which case, strict measures ought to be taken in order
to prevent any tampering with the crime scene or any
clues that could be used as criminal evidence to help in
the investigation and uncover the truth. This could
have been carried out without neglecting the
humanitarian aspect of the tasks to be implemented, i.e. giving
priority to finding the victims and the injured,
providing the latter with the first aid in order to save them.
Serious mistakes were recorded in this regard:
a) There was a state of chaos in the crime scene not
only during the first few hours following the
explosion, during which much focus is on extinguishing
the fire, saving the injured and looking
for the missing, but regrettably and unnecessarily for a
much longer time.
b) There was no coordination between all the security
organs present on the crime scene.
c) Looking for the missing persons was done in an
irresponsible, unprofessional and careless way.
Some were later found by accident or by their families.
The following controversial elements
were recorded:
. The body of Zahi Abu Rujaili, a Lebanese citizen, was
found on 15 March 2005.
According to the medical examiner, the victim had
survived the explosion for
approximately 12 hours.
. The body of one of the victims was found by
coincidence 8 days after the explosion.
. The body of Abdel-Hameed Ghalayeeni, a Lebanese
citizen, was found 16 days after the
explosion by his family and not the judicial or civil
defense officers.
. The fate of Farhan Ahmad Al-Issa is still unknown, he
is still missing. It is feared that
finding his body would constitute yet another scandal.
d) A few hours after the explosion took place, around
2300 hrs, major evidence was removed from
the crime scene. The convoy cars of the late former
Prime Minister were transferred to Helou
Barracks under the pretext of preserving them although
what was left of the cars did not justify
their preservation except for their value as criminal
evidence because they were the target of the
explosion. This was not the only instance bearing proof
of the tampering with the crime scene. A
BMW car that was not part of the convoy was also removed
whereas focus should have been on
not removing any cars and maintaining them the way they
rested after the explosion in order to
determine how the crime was committed.
e) A bulldozer was introduced into the crime scene on
the day of the explosion, 14 February 2005, in
the evening for no justifiable reason. As soon as the
Minister of Interior and Municipalities got
knowledge of it, he gave orders to retrieve it and
preserve the crime scene as it was.
C. The conduct of the investigation, its conditions and
the determination of how the crime was
committed:
a) It is common knowledge that major mistakes were made
in the course of conducting the
investigation, among which the leaking of information
that created confusion. This in turn
compromised the trustworthiness of the local
investigation.
(….)
III. Responsibilities
a) Responsibility for a tragic crime such as the one we
are dealing with cannot be limited to one
aspect. As mentioned above, it encompasses the
political, judicial and security aspects.
(….)
Decision to remove motorcade vehicles
65. The decision to fill the crater at the crime scene,
to remove the motorcade
vehicles and to re-open the street on the day after the
blast, is confusing, assuming that
there was a collective will to perform a professional
crime scene examination in order to
track down the perpetrators and bring them to justice.
The confusion, reflected in the
variety of statements from the officials most closely
involved, speaks for itself.
Investigative Judge Mezher
66. At 2230 hrs on 14 February, Judge Mezher was at his
home, when he got a phone
call from General Naji Mulaeb, who informed the Judge
that the representatives from the
various agencies at the crime scene had started
collecting pieces of metal from the
motorcade vehicles in order to perform their own further
forensic examinations. There
was nothing General Mulaeb could do to stop them. He
suggested that the motorcade
vehicles be removed to a safe place and proposed the
Helou barracks in Beirut. Judge
Mezher agreed to the proposal under the following
conditions. The vehicles should be
filmed on the spot, they should be marked and numbered:
they should also be filmed
during the transportation and again upon arrival at the
Helou barracks, where they should
be covered and guarded around the clock in order to
avoid any tampering with evidence.
Judge Mezher had no information about a decision to fill
the crater and reopen the street
(witness statement)
. The vehicles were moved from the crime scene during
the night of 14
February.
General Jamil Al-Sayyed
67. On the morning of 15 February 2005, General
Al-Sayyed read in the newspaper
about the removal of the motorcade vehicles. At 0800
hrs, he called General Ali Al-
Hajj, the Head of the ISF and asked what was going on.
General Al-Hajj replied that
two teams were working on clearing the road which would
be reopened at 1000 hrs. In
response to a direct question, General Al-Hajj stated
that the orders came from Mustapha
Hamdan, the Commander of the Presidential Guard (witness
statement) .
General Ali Al-Hajj
68. On 14 February 2005 at 2230 hrs, Mr.
Saddik received a telephone call at his
office, (where he was with General Hisham Aouar) from
the Director General of the
Public Works Ministry, Mr. Fadi Nammar. Mr. Nammar told
him that a decision had
been taken to re-open the road the next day and that his
staff were ready to start working
at sunrise the next morning. The call was on the
landline and was overheard by General
Aouar. He claimed to be surprised about the telephone
call because Mr. Nammar had no
jurisdiction in the matter. It was publicly recognized
that Fadi Nammar was very close to
the Republican Palace, which meant that he was taking
his orders from there. Mr.
Nammar alleged that he had cleared the matter with the
Investigative Judge. He called
the acting Chief of Beirut Police, General Naji Mulaeb,
and informed him about the call
from Mr. Nammar and asked him to check with Judge Mezher
whether he was aware of
this decision. General Mulaeb called Judge Mezher, who
was aware of the decision to reopen the road and had no objection. General
Mulaeb then asked what should be done
with the vehicles. Judge Mezher replied that they should
be brought to a secure place and
proposed the Helou Barracks (witness statement) .
69. The next morning, 15 February 2005, Mr. Nammar met
with the Governor of
Beirut, Mr. Yacoub Sarraf, in order to arrange for the
re-opening of the Minae Al-Hosn
Street. Sarraf is very close to the Republican Palace
and he was also aware of the
decision (witness statement) .
General Hisham Aouar
70. With regard to the removal of the motorcade, General
Aouar indicated that he did
not know who gave the order. He was asked to assist in
the filming of the removal of the
motorcade on 14 February 2005 during the meeting with
the Investigative Judge, but
nothing else was mentioned about the removal of the
motorcade vehicles from the crime
scene. On that same evening, between 2230 and 2300 hrs,
he was at the office of the ISF
General Director, General Ali Al-Hajj, and he told him
that the cars were going to be
removed. He also told him that the ISF had to provide
assistance by marking the locations
of the vehicles and their filming (witness statement) .
Director General Fadi Nammar
71. Mr. Nammar did not remember whether General Al-Hajj
telephoned him on 14
February 2005, but he remembered his calling General
Al-Hajj the next day, as he
always did in similar situations. At the time of the
telephone call, he was at the office of
the Governor of Beirut. He told General Al-Hajj that
they were prepared, if needed, to
offer help. General Al-Hajj passed him on to a General
working for ISF, who told him
that there was a survey going on at the crime scene. The
General stated he would come
back to Mr. Nammar in due course. Mr. Nammar did not
recall the name of the General,
but he was with Al-Hajj. He had no authority to decide
to open roads in Beirut and he did
not give any orders to remove the motorcade vehicles. He
also denied any contacts to the
Republican Palace(witness statement)
.
72. Subsequently, it was confirmed (by telephone lists)
that General Ali Al-Hajj
made the telephone call from his landline to Mr.
Nammar’s mobile phone on the evening
of 14 February 2005. It was also confirmed that Mr.
Nammar made the telephone call to
General Al-Hajj the following day (witness statement) .
The Governor of Beirut, Mr. Yacoob Sarraf
73. According to his statement he did not give any
instructions. The Army and the
Police took over. He had telephone contact with Mr. Fadi
Nammar on 14 February 2005.
Acting Commander of Beirut Police, General Naji Mulaeb
74. Between 2030 and 2200 hrs on 14 February 2005,
General Mulaeb received a
telephone call at his office from General Ali Al-Hajj
who ordered General Mulaeb to
transfer the convoy vehicles from the crime scene and
secure them in a safe place, on the
understanding that within two days the road would be
re-opened. If experts wanted to
come and inspect the vehicles, they would be available.
General Mulaeb was surprised
by this order and did not accept it. He told General
Al-Hajj that he had nothing to do
with the crime scene, since the site was under the
authority of Judge Mezher. General
Al-Hajj told General Mulaeb to contact the Judge, which
he did. The Judge was also
surprised and asked the reason for the hurry. General
Mulaeb told him that he received
his orders from General Al-Hajj and that he was
surprised as well. The Judge told him to
give him some time and that he would call back. After a
while, between 10 and 30
minutes, the Judge called back and said that the cars
could be transferred (witness statement) .
General Mustapha Hamdan
75. After the blast on 14 February 2005, General Hamdan
took all necessary
measures to protect the President and the Presidential
areas. He did not recall any details,
but he did not go to the scene of the blast. He did not
issue any orders or directives
regarding the activities at the crime scene, since it
did not fall within his responsibilities.
Thus, he had nothing to do with any orders to clean the
street, to fill the crater or to
remove the motorcade vehicles (witness statement) .
Head of Internal Security Forces, General Ashraf Rifi
76. In a meeting with UNIIIC on 1 June 2005, General
Rifi stated that the person who
gave the order to get a bulldozer or bulldozers to the
crime scene to fill the hole caused
by the explosion etc. was General Mustapha Hamdan, who
at the time of the incident was
the Commander of President Lahoud’s security detail
and therefore by Lebanese law had
nothing to do with issues related to crime scene
investigation (witness statement) .
Lebanese Investigation: Ahmad Abu Adass
77. At approximately 1411 hrs on 14 February 2005,
barely an hour after the
explosion, Leila Bassam of Reuters received an anonymous
telephone call from a man
with an accent that was not Lebanese but which she could
not identify. According to Ms.
Bassam, as soon as she answered the call, the man
directed her to “[w]rite this down,”
told her to be quiet, and then read the following
statement in classical Arabic:
“We, al nasra wal-jihad fee bilad Al-Sham, declare
that we have meted out due
punishment to the infidel Rafik Hariri so that he may be
an example to others.”
The caller concluded with an Islamic religious saying
and then hung up.
78. Mr. Ghassan Ben Jeddou, the Beirut Bureau chief of
Al-Jazeera, recalls receiving
four telephone calls that day related to the same claim
of responsibility. In the first
telephone call, a man whom Mr. Ben Jeddou described as
speaking poor Arabic in an
African, Afghan or Pakistani accent, claimed that
Al-Nasra wal Jihad was responsible for
Mr. Hariri’s execution by a suicide bomb. Shortly
thereafter, Al-Jazeera informed the
public about this claim of responsibility.1 Al-Jazeera
next received a call from another
anonymous person claiming to be from the same group,
this time a fluent Arabic speaker,
who explained where Ben Jeddou and his colleagues could
locate a videocassette
containing further information about the assassination
--namely, in a tree near the
ESCWA building in downtown Beirut --and directing them
to fetch the tape within 15
minutes. Mr. Ben Jeddou sent a colleague to locate the
videocassette. Eventually, a
white envelope containing a type-written detailed
statement and a videocassette was
found. After more calls from the same group asking why
the tape had not yet been aired,
Al-Jazeera aired the footage later that afternoon.
79. The letter accompanying the tape, purporting to be
from the Nasra and Jihad
Group of Greater Syria, states in part:
“Praise be to God for the banner of Nasra and Jihad is
victorious in Greater
Syria, and with God’s blessings the agent of the
infidels in Mecca and Medina,
Rafik Hariri, has been meted out his due punishment
through a suicide operation
executed by the Mujahid Ahmad Abu Adass bearing the
banner of Nasra and
Jihad in Greater Syria on Monday, 14 February 2005, the
5of Muhurram 1426
according to the Islamic Calendar, in Beirut. ….
Attached is film recording of the
martyr Ahmad Abu Adass, executor of the operation.”
In the tape, an individual identifying himself as Mr.
Abu Adass, uses similar
phraseology.
80. Soon after the airing of the tape, the Lebanese
authorities had acquired extensive
information about Mr. Abu Adass’s background and began
questioning his family and
associates. Much of this information apparently came
from Sheikh Ahmed Abdel-Al, of
Al-Ahbash, an Islamic group active in the area of the
Palestinian camps where Mr. Abu
Adass had reportedly lived. Sheikh Abdel-Al stated to
UNIIIC that he received a
telephone call from the presidential palace shortly
after the airing of the Abu Adass
video, enquiring whether Abdel-Al had any information
about Mr. Abu Adass.
According to Mr. Abdel-Al, he obtained information about
Mr. Abu Adass’s background,
including his address, the fact that he often went to
Ein al Helwa, that he was a Wahabi,
that he was well-educated, had probably studied computer
science, and that he visited
Abu Obeida (deputy to the leader of Jund al Sham).
Sheikh Abdel-Al also obtained the
names of Mr. Abu Adass’ family and friends: he sent
this information by facsimile to
Mr. Benjeddou recalls that Al-Jazeera received four
telephone calls that afternoon, the first around 13:40
and the last around 1600 hrs. However, telephone records
show only three telephone calls to Al-Jazeera
that afternoon, at 1419 hrs, 1527 hrs, and 1704 hrs.
President Lahoud, Ali Hajj, Albert Karam, Jamea Jamea,
and Maher al Toufeily.
Sheikhh Abdel-Al reportedly also met with Syrian
intelligence official, Jamea Jamea, on
the evening of 14 February 2005 and gave him the
information about Mr. Abu Adass,
which Jamea Jamea subsequently relayed to the ISF.
81. The ISF visited Abu Abass’ house, accompanied by a
member of Al-Ahbash, and
seized a computer, as well as a number of compact disks
which were primarily of a
fundamentalist Islamic nature. Although the report on
the search noted that most of the
documents stored on the computer were downloaded from
the internet, there was no
indication that Mr. Abu Adass’ home had internet
access. Many of Mr. Abu Adass’
friends and relatives were interviewed extensively by
the authorities (including by the
ISF and military intelligence) in the days immediately
following the explosion. Mr. Abu
Adass himself, however, could not be located. On the day
of the explosion 10 people
were questioned and over the course of next two months
approximately 40 people were
interviewed. The Lebanese investigation further revealed
that Mr. Abu Adass had been
employed at a computer shop in the summer of 2004, which
was owned in part by Sheikh
Ahmed Al-Sani, who was a member of the Ahmed Miqati and
Ismaíl Al-Khatib network.
82. In a report dated 17 February 2005, from General
Sayyed to Judge Mezher,
General Sayyed concluded that the videotape was
authentic and “Ahmad Abu Addas,
who appears on the tape, was . . . clearly a definite
participant in the assassination.” The
only basis provided for this conclusion was the
statement that “[t]he way in which he
delivers the statement and shows himself without any
covering over his face is the
manner adopted by suicide bombers in similar cases. The
fact that he did not conceal his
face while making the statement indicates that he must
have been personally responsible
for setting off the explosion.” (Information About
Facts Relating to the Broadcast on Al-
Jazeera of a Videotape Claiming Responsibility, No.
606/A’A, 17 February 2005)
Australian Investigation
83. On 15 February 2005, a request was forwarded to the
Australian Federal Police
from the Prosecutor General requesting that six
individuals be arrested as suspects for
participating in the Hariri assassination. The
responsible ISF official at Beirut
International Airport, informed ISF General Al-Hajj
about these six individuals. General
Al-Hajj transmitted this information directly to
Prosecutor General, Judge Rabia
Kaddoura, who contacted the Australian authorities. The
Australian investigation
absolved these six suspects of any involvement in this
crime, a position with which the
Lebanese authorities in charge of the investigation
agreed.
84. The records indicate that the Lebanese authorities
based their suspicion on the
following factors:
a) The six persons of interest departed from Beirut
International Airport one and a
half hours after the bombing occurred;
b) The six persons had no luggage; and
c) One of the six persons bore a resemblance to Mr. Abu
Adass, who was depicted
in a video of an extremist group that had claimed
responsibility for the bombing.
85. The Australian authorities executed an extensive
investigation to assist the
Lebanese authorities. The investigation included raising
airport alerts, interviews of the
six individuals and other members of the group,
explosive residual swabbing (including
the individuals, their airplane seating, and their
luggage), and examining the aircraft for
possible explosives. Although it was reported that the
six persons identified as
“suspects” were without luggage, they in fact were
carrying luggage. Three of the six
suspects subject to a forensic examination.
86. The findings of the Australian investigation
revealed: (1) The group was
traveling to Jeddah as part of a religious pilgrimage;
(2) No common organic or inorganic
explosive or post-blast residue was detected in any of
the samples taken; and (3) No
person interviewed by the Australian authorities with
respect to this investigation had any
involvement nor any knowledge about any involvement in
the Hariri assassination.
V. THE COMMISSION’S INVESTIGATION
Overview
87. UNIIIC was declared operational by the Secretary
General on 16 June 2005.
From 16 June to 6 October 2005, 244 witness statements,
293 investigator’s notes and 22
suspect statements have been issued. A number of
searches have been conducted and 453
crime scene exhibits have been seized. A total of 16,711
pages of documents have been
produced. Thirty investigators from 17 different nations
have been involved in the
UNIIIC investigative measures, as well as external
experts.
88. At the outset, the time factor affecting the
Commission has to be emphasized.
UNIIIC was declared operational four months after the
actual crime, which means that
the perpetrators and their accomplices have had plenty
of time to destroy evidence and/or
to collude with each other, the ability to recall of
potential witnesses has been diminished,
and previous omissions and inadvertent or deliberate
loss and destruction of evidence
could not be undone.
89. The first month after the Secretary-General declared
UNIIIC operational was
focused on updating the investigators on the current
status of the investigation, including
an assessment of measures undertaken by the Lebanese
authorities. Much time was spent
on analysis of material handed over to the Commission by
the Prosecutor General,
followed by interviews for clarification with key
witnesses, based on written materials on
the following topics:
. Reconstruction of actions and whereabouts of Mr.
Hariri prior to the blast.
. Findings and results from activities by the Lebanese
authorities
undertaken at the crime scene and adjacent areas.
. Tampering with evidence.
. Road works at the scene prior to the blast.
. The Abu Adass track
. The Mitsubishi Canter van
. Collection and analysis of telephone lists
. Collection and analysis of CCTV-material, videos and
photos collected
from a diversity set of possessors depicting the scene
prior to and after the
blast.
. Financial transactions.
90. These measures in turn led to new witnesses. A
public information “hot line” was
installed on which anybody could approach the Commission
about the case: this measure
resulted in several new interviews and new clues that
needed to be followed up.
91. The compilation and organization of files and
evidence was time-consuming,
involving maintaining and improving the system for
storing and recording evidence,
which includes thousands of pages of documents and
written testimonies, as well as
numerous videos and photographs. Legal issues
highlighted the need for research into
Lebanese criminal law and procedure in order to ensure
the proper protocols for searches,
arrests, suspect interviews, and charging documents. The
Lebanese authorities’ assistance
in these matters was very praiseworthy.
92. The second month was characterized by a change in
investigative directions and
priorities, in the sense that investigators followed up
new clues and tracked down new
witnesses based on their conclusions from previous
measures and professional analysis.
Many different sources approached the Commission and
provided the investigation with
useful information. The vast majority of senior
officials in the involved Lebanese
authorities were interviewed to clarify the allotment of
competencies, chains-ofcommand, and their extent of involvement, as well as
decisions taken (or which were
neglected). During this period of time the support base
of the Commission was
reinforced and new software programmes were installed,
which made the data-base more
operational.
93. During the third month, a full scale crime scene
examination was conducted by a
joint Dutch / British / Japanese expert team at the site
itself and in adjacent areas,
including the sea floor adjacent to the scene of the
blast. The aim of this operation was to
find physical evidence at the crime scene, to
reconstruct the improvised explosive device
(IED) used and to identify the Mitsubishi Canter van.
The operation was accomplished in
situ during September.
Planning of the Assassination
94. During all measures and efforts undertaken by the
UNIIIC, no new hard leads or
traces regarding the motive and reason for assassinating
Mr. Hariri have emerged to
supplement those which can be attributed to events
during the second half of 2004 which
culminated in Mr. Hariri’s decision to step down as
the Prime Minister and the prognosis
of the outcome of the general elections in Lebanon.
Strong indicators on the latter matter
are the massive Future Party election campaign; the
Lebanese authorities’ reaction on the
olive oil affair, in February 2005, where the
distributors were arrested (by the Lebanese
authorities while distributing free olive at the behest
of Mr. Hariri) (investigator notes): and last
but not least the factual outcome of the elections. New
witnesses have approached the
Commission who were reluctant to have any contacts with
the Lebanese authorities due
to lack of confidence, stating that the assassination of
the former Prime Minister could
not have occurred without the knowledge of the Lebanese
authorities and the approval
from Syria.
95. The structure and organization of the Syrian and
Lebanese intelligence services in
Lebanon at the time of the blast, including protocols
for reporting, shows a pervasive
impact on everyday life in Lebanon. Good examples of
this are documents collected
from the former Syrian Intelligence post, Villa Jabr, at
Bologna Forest, Lebanon and an
intercepted telephone conversation between General
Ghazali and a prominent Lebanese
official on 19 July 2004, at 0945 hrs (excerpt):
“Ghazali:I know it is early but I thought we should
keep up you posted. The President of the Republic told
me this morning that they are two to rule the country
the Prime Minister and him. He said that
things cannot continue this way. The Prime Minister is
always irritating him and we are always
shutting him up and yelling at him. He made it clear he
cannot continue this way.
(...)
X: Take it easy on me. Can you appoint a new Government
at this time?
Ghazali: Yes we can appoint one. What could be the
problem? We can name Botros Harb.
(…)
Ghazali: Let me tell you one thing. Let the worker’s
movement take the street on the 20th in Solidere and
Koraytem.
X: Let’s speak it over. Take it easily. I have to take
into consideration the best interests of Syrian and
Lebanon.
Ghazali: We are keen on Syria’s best interest but I am
now talking about Rafik Hariri.
X: So, the decision is taken.
Ghazali: I wish to tell you one thing. Whenever we need
to speak to Hariri we have to suck up to him and
he does not always answer.
X: To hell with him. What do I care about him?
Ghazali: What do I care about him? The President can’t
stand him so why should I?
X: Fine, may he rot in hell …
(…)
Ghazali: No. Let him be the laughing stock and be
pointed at as the person who ruined and indebted the
country. Let the people take the street in Koraytem and
Solidere; let the manifestations continue
until he is forced to resign like a dog.
X: What about another option. I send him a message
saying: Resign God damn it.
Ghazali: No, don’t send him a message or else he will
say they forced me to resign. Let the street … you
know what I mean. Or else he will use this as a
bargaining card with his American and French
masters.
X: So shall we leave things to the street?
Ghazali: This is better.
X: Let’s go for it.”
96. One witness of Syrian origin but resident in
Lebanon, who claims to have worked
for the Syrian intelligence services in Lebanon, has
stated that approximately two weeks
after the adoption of Security Council resolution 1559,
senior Lebanese and Syrian
officials decided to assassinate Rafik Hariri. He
claimed that a senior Lebanese security
official went several times to Syria to plan the crime,
meeting once at the Meridian Hotel
in Damascus and several times at the Presidential Place
and the office of a senior Syrian
security official. The last meeting was held in the
house of the same senior Syrian
security official approximately seven to 10 days before
the assassination and included
another senior Lebanese security official. The witness
had close contact with high ranked
Syrian officers posted in Lebanon.
97. At the beginning of January 2005, one of the high
ranked officers told the witness
that Rafik Hariri was a big problem to Syria.
Approximately a month later the officer told
the witness that there soon would be an “earthquake”
that would re-write the history of
Lebanon.
98. The witness visited several Syrian military bases in
Lebanon. At one such base, in
Hammana, he observed a white Mitsubishi van, with a
white tarpaulin over the flatbed.
The observations were made on 11, 12 and 13 February
2005. The Mitsubishi left the
Military base in Hammana on the morning of 14 February
2005. The Mitsubishi Canter
van, which was used as the bomb carrier, entered Lebanon
from Syria through the Bekaa
border and a military hot lane on 21 January 2005, at
1320 hrs. It was driven by a Syrian
Colonel from the Army Tenth Division.
99. On 13 February 2005, the witness drove one of the
Syrian officers to the St.
George area in Beirut on a reconnaissance exercise, as
he subsequently understood it to
have been after the assassination took place.
100. Regarding Mr. Abu Adass, the witness has stated
that he played no role in the
crime except as a decoy. He was detained in Syria and
forced at gunpoint to record the
video tape. Subsequently, he was killed in Syria. The
videotape was sent to Beirut on the
morning of 14 February 2005, and handed over to Jamil Al
Sayyed. A civilian with a
criminal record and an officer from the Sûreté Générale
were tasked with putting the tape
somewhere in Hamra and then calling Ghassan Ben Jeddo,
an Al-Jazeera TV reporter.
101. General Jamil Al-Sayyed, according to the witness,
cooperated closely with
General Mustapha Hamdan and General Raymond Azar in the
preparation of the
assassination of Mr. Hariri. He also coordinated with
General Ghazali (and, among
others, people from Mr. Ahmad Jibreel in Lebanon).
General Hamdan and General Azar
provided logistical support, providing money,
telephones, cars, walkie-talkies, pagers,
weapons, ID-cards etc. Those who knew of the crime in
advance were among others,
Nasser Kandil and General Ali Al-Hajj.
102. Fifteen minutes before the assassination, the
witness was in the vicinity of the St.
George area. He received a telephone call from one of
the senior Syrian officers, who
asked the witness where he was. When he answered, he got
the advice to leave the area
immediately.
103. Another witness approached the Commission and
stated that he had met with
General Hamdan in the middle of October 2004. General
Hamdan talked very negatively
about Mr. Hariri accusing him of being pro-Israeli.
General Hamdan ended the
conversation by stating: “We are going to send him on
a trip, bye, bye Hariri”. After the
assassination, the witness was strongly reminded not to
discuss this conversation with
anyone.
104. Another “witness” who later became a suspect,
Zuhir Ibn Mohamed Said Saddik,
has given detailed information to the Commission about
the crime, in particular insofar as
the planning phase is concerned. Paragraphs 105 to 110
set out the main points of Mr.
Saddik’s statement.
105. One of the main issues raised in Mr. Saddik’s
statement was a report that he said
was drafted by Nasser Kandil. This report stated that
Mr. Hariri and Marwan Hamadeh
had a meeting in Sardinia. At the end of the report
Kandil stated that a decision should be
taken to eliminate Mr. Hariri. Nasser Kandil was tasked
to plan and implement a
campaign aiming at ruining Mr. Hariri’s reputation on
religious and media level. The
Baath Party in Lebanon decided that they should get rid
of Mr. Hariri by any possible
means and isolate him since President Lahoud’s attempt
to remove him from the political
scene failed.
106. Mr. Saddik stated that the decision to assassinate
Mr. Hariri had been taken in
Syria, followed by clandestine meetings in Lebanon
between senior Lebanese and Syrian
officers, who had been designated to plan and pave the
way for the execution of the
assault. These meetings started in July 2004 and lasted
until December 2004. The seven
senior Syrian officials and four senior Lebanese
officials were alleged to have been
involved in the plot.
107. Planning meetings started in Mr. Saddik’s
apartment in Khaldeh and were
subsequently moved to an apartment in Al-Dahiyye, a
district of Beirut. Some of these
individuals visited the area around the St. George Hotel
under different guises and at
different times for planning and preparation purposes of
the assassination.
108. Mr. Saddik also gave information about the
Mitsubishi itself and that the driver
eventually assigned had been an Iraqi individual who had
been led to believe that the target was Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi (who
happened to be in Beirut prior to the
assassination).
109. Mr. Saddik had been informed that TNT and some
special explosives had been
used in order to direct suspicions towards extremist
Islamic groups, as these kinds of
explosive had only been used in operations in Iraq.
110. A trip by Mr. Saddik with Abdel-Kareem Abbas led to
a camp in Zabadane. Al-
Saddik claimed to have seen the Mitsubishi Canter van in
this camp: mechanics were
working on it and emptying the sides. The sides of the
car’s flatbed, as well as the doors
of the Mitsubishi had been widened and filled with
explosives, which had also been put
underneath the driver’s seat. In the camp he had seen
a young man whom he had been
able to identify as Mr. Abu Adass after seeing the video
on TV on 14 February 2005.
111. On 30 August 2005, the Commission sent an official
letter to Syria with questions
regarding the Zabadane camp. The answer was handed over
personally to the
Commissioner in New York, confirming the existence of
the camp but denying it to be
used for any other purposes than juvenile educational
activities. However, from other
information given to the Commission, there are strong
indications of activities within the
camp during the period, 5-9 September 2005, geared
towards changing the features and
operations within the premises. Satellite pictures also
show high walls and watch towers
in the area.
112. On 26 September 2005, investigators of UNIIIC had a
meeting with Mr. Saddik.
On 27 September, Mr. Saddik confessed in a handwritten
document that he had
participated in the immediate planning phase before the
assassination (January and
February 2005) and that he was acting as a driver for
several of the above-mentioned
suspects during the entire day of 14 February.
113. Consequently, on 13 October 2005, on the suggestion
of the Commission, the
Lebanese Prosecutor-General issued an arrest warrant
concerning Mr. Saddik, which led
to his arrest on 16 October.
114. At the present stage of investigation, a certain
amount of information given by
Mr. Saddik cannot be confirmed through other evidence.
115. The wife of Mr. Saddik has confirmed that, during
the period July to December
2004, her husband met a huge group of people on several
occasions in their home in
Khaldeh as at other locations. He did not want her to be
present, since these people
wished not to be identified. She has also confirmed
visits at their home by and Dhafer
Al-Yussef, in the company of three other men unknown to
her.
116. The fact that Mr. Saddik implicates himself in the
assassination, which ultimately
led to his arrest, adds to his credibility.
117. Other witnesses have informed the Commission that
the day before the
assassination of Mr. Hariri, the late chief of Mr.
Hariri’s close protection (Mr. Yehya Al-
Arab alias Abu Tareq) had a meeting with General
Ghazali. It seemed that Mr. Al-Arab
was badly shaken up by that meeting. Instead of
reporting immediately to Mr. Hariri as
usual, he went to his house, turned off his phone and
stayed there for a few hours. The
version given by General Ghazali of this meeting is not
compatible with the information
given by other witnesses to the Commission.
Other elements to be considered
118. Some other circumstances to be kept in mind
regarding the planning phase of the
crime are the surveillance measures targeting Mr. Hariri
undertaken by the ISF and the
wiretapping of Mr. Hariri’s telephones by the Military
Intelligence (see section
Surveillance and telephone wiretapping of Mr. Hariri).
119. One of the first measures General Al-Hajj undertook
after being appointed to the
post as the Head of the Internal Security Forces was to
reduce the number of state
security personnel around Mr. Hariri from a level of 40
down to eight in November 2004.
The reason was asserted to be a letter from the Lebanese
President and the Prime
Minister that Lebanese law should be applied on all
levels and in all matters. According
to a decree (3509 of 1993), the number of security staff
for a person in the Hariri category
should be eight. Whether anyone else was affected by the
same decree, the Commission
has not been able to ascertain.
120. There are still some activities on the Minae
Al-Hosn Street in Beirut prior to the
blast that have to be further investigated, which could
elucidate details from the planning
phase and as such lead to the perpetrators.
121. The investigation shows that eight telephone
numbers and 10 mobile telephones
were used to organize surveillance on Mr. Hariri and to
carry out the assassination. The
lines were put into circulation on 4 January 2005 in the
northern part of Lebanon,
between Terbol and Menyeh. The lines were used on
individual days to observe Mr.
Hariri’s habits, mostly in the area of Beirut city.
122. On 14 February 2005, six of the telephone were used
in the area stretching from
Parliament Square to the St. George Hotel and the axes
of Zqaq el Blat and Al Bachoura.
The calls occurred at 1100 hrs. They covered all routes
linking the Parliament to
Kuraytem Palace. The telephone located at the Parliament
made four calls to the other
telephones at 1253 hrs, the time when the Hariri
motorcade left Nejmeh Square. The
telephones have been inactive since the blast at 1256
hrs. The lines were only used to
make calls with each other for the entire period from
early January to 14 February 2005.
123. With all these circumstances in mind, including the
previously described
conversation of 26 August 2004, there is little
probability that a third party would
undertake surveillance and monitoring measures against
Mr. Hariri for more than a
month prior to the blast and maintain the resources,
logistics and capacity needed to
initiate, plan and commit a crime of this magnitude,
without the knowledge of the
competent Lebanese authorities. This includes the
procurement, handling and
maintenance of a large quantity of highly aggressive
explosive, a stolen Mitsubishi
Canter van, the recruitment of the related human
resources, as well as a base station for
necessary preparations.
Conclusion:
There is probable cause to believe that the decision to
assassinate former Prime
Minister, Rafik Hariri, could not have been taken
without the approval of topranked
Syrian security official and could not have been further
organized without
the collusion of their counterparts in the Lebanese
security services.
Hariri telephone wire-tapping
124. Accroding to a witness, ISF personnel were ordered
to keep Mr. Hariri under
surveillance at the end of January and beginning of
February 2005. No documentation
on this topic has been found during UNIIIC investigative
measures.
125. Colonel Ghassan Tufayli was responsible in the
Lebanese Military Intelligence
Service for the technical department. It included the
telecommunication -and the wire
tapping -service. The department tapped political,
military and suspect people. His
superior was the head of the Military Intelligence
Service, General Raymond Azar.
Colonel Tufayli received his orders from his superior in
oral rather than written form.
Several important people such as former presidents,
prime ministers and deputies were
permanently wiretapped. Although Mr. Hariri was no
longer Prime Minister in early
2005, he was a very important political and economic
figure in Lebanon and the Middle
East. Therefore he was under permanent wiretapping. The
technical department
monitored and recorded conversations. Staff from the
Lebanese Sûreté Générale
supported Tufayli’s army unit. The protocols were
forwarded on a daily basis to General
Raymond Azar and to the head of the army, General Michel
Suleyman. The head of the
Lebanese Sûreté Générale , Jamil Al-Sayyed, was also
provided with the results.
According to Colonel Tufayli’s statement, General
Raymond Azar sent the protocols to
the Lebanese President and to General Ghazali, the head
of the Syrian Military
Intelligence Service in Lebanon.
126. Colonel Tufaily mentioned that the Republican Guard
Brigade also had an
internal wiretapping service.
Conclusion:
Through the constant wire-tapping of Mr. Hariri’s
telephone lines, the Syrian and
Lebanese security and intelligence services were kept
informed of his movements
and contacts.
Roadworks
127. The Commission also investigated whether there was
excavation work in the road
in front of the St. George Hotel in the period before
the assassination. There have been
suggestions that unusual road works – including the
installation of wires and open
manholes – occurred in the road in front of the St.
George Hotel shortly before the
assassination, implying that individuals involved in the
assassination may possibly have
had an opportunity to install a bomb or a remote bomb
device underneath the road, thus
causing the explosion.
128. Municipal records show that the last work permits
for work in the area near the
crime scene, granted prior to the blast were provided in
January 2005. For example,
from 3 to 8 January 2005, the Beirut Water authorities
were provided permits to dig for a
water pipe and to excavate the main roads around the St.
George Hotel. Ogero, the
telecommunications company, was granted a permit to
install a telecommunications cable
between 13 and 20 January 2005. However, some witnesses
have stated that there may in
fact have been road works conducted in the area in front
of St. George closer to the day
of the explosion, including the night before. For
example, a taxi driver reported that he
dropped two passengers at the Phoenicia Hotel on 12
February 2005 at approximately
0615 hrs in the morning. As he turned left onto Minet El
Hosn, he realized that the street
was closed just in front of the St. George Hotel facing
the HSBC bank and that some road
works were being conducted, including two open manholes
in front of the St. George,
and that workers and military personnel were present at
the location. Another witness, a
marina worker, noted that while the installation of the
telephone wires had started at the
marina, they were not in use as they had not been
connected to an external wire and no
cables were connected for the television or computers.
Another individual reported that
on Sunday afternoon, the day before the assassination,
as he and his wife approached the
site of the explosion, they saw three people working in
the middle of the street and
lowering into a hole in the ground near the St. George
Hotel what appeared to be a pallet
and also observed two black cables with about half inch
in diameter running from the
hole to the St. George Hotel. By contrast, other
witnesses were certain that there were no
road works in the vicinity in the days prior to the
explosion.
Conclusion:
The issue of whether there was excavation in front of
the St. George Hotel remains
an open question that the Commission has not been able
to resolve beyond certain
witnesses’ recollections which have not been
independently substantiated.
Municipal records do appear to make clear, however, that
excavation close to the
time of the crime was not carried out pursuant to city
permits.
Execution of the Bombing
129. A branch of the HSBC bank is located close to the
scene of the explosion. The
bank operated its own CCTV security system which
recorded the movements of the
Hariri motorcade immediately prior to the explosion, but
did not record the scene of the
blast itself. On close scrutiny, the recorded footage
showed a white Mitsubishi Canter van
entering the area of the explosion shortly before Mr.
Hariri’s convoy.
130. The recording clearly showed that this Mitsubishi
Canter was moving
approximately six times slower than all other vehicles
traversing the same stretch of
roadway. A time series analysis showed that for the
approximately 50 meters of road
covered by the camera, a normal car took 3-4 seconds to
cover the distance, while a large
truck took 5-6 seconds to travel the distance. The
Mitsubishi Canter took approximately
22 seconds to travel the distance and entered the area
one minute and 49 seconds before
the Hariri convoy.
131. Collected samples from the crime scene and further
forensic examinations, have
succeeded in identifying the Mitsubishi Canter van.
Through a part of the engine block,
found and collected at the crime scene, it has been
concluded that the engine comes from
a Mitsubishi vehicle stolen on 12 October 2004 in
Sagamihara City, Japan.
132. The Commission has interviewed all the survivors
who were involved in the
Hariri motorcade, eyewitnesses on the spot and in
adjacent areas as well as shop owners,
employees, vendors, residents etc in the neighborhood of
the crime scene.
133. None of the people interviewed has made any unusual
observations on 14
February 2005, at Minae Al-Hosn Street or in adjacent
areas of activity different from the
normal situation at these locations.
134. One of the main issues for the Commission was to
determine how it was known
that Mr. Hariri would take the Maritime route on his way
back to the Kuraytem Palace
from the meeting at the Parliament.
135. It was a common knowledge that Mr. Hariri would
attend the pre-election
meeting at the Parliament this particular morning. It
was also known that he would return
to the Kuraytem Palace after the meeting, since he had
invited more than twenty people
for lunch at the Palace.
136. From the Nejmeh Square back to Kuraytem there were
three options of routes.
The decision to take the Maritime road was made just
before departure by a senior staff
member in Mr. Hariri’s private security detail and
communicated to the lead car, but it
was already envisaged in the morning that if the
motorcade was able to return to the
Palace before 1400 they would have chosen the Maritime
road. If not, another road would
have been taken. The motorcade left the Nejmeh Square
area and drove along Ahdab
Street and Foch Street. At the junction of Foch Street
and the Seaport Street the convoy
was delayed for several minutes due to some traffic
hindrance. At the mentioned junction
the convoy turned left and took the Maritime road
towards Ain Mreisa and the St. George
Hotel.
137. The motorcade was composed of six cars. The first
car, a Toyota Land Cruiser,
was manned with four officers from the Internal Security
Forces, the second was a
Mercedes 500 S manned by three persons from Mr.
Hariri’s private security team. The
third car was an armored Mercedes driven by Mr. Hariri
and with Mr. Fleyhan as
passenger. The fourth and the fifth cars were Mercedes
500 S, each manned by three
security officers from Mr. Hariri’s private security
team and positioned in the convoy on
the flanks of the third car. The last car in the convoy
was a Chevrolet, fully equipped as
an ambulance and manned by three Hariri staff members,
two of whom were paramedics.
The second, fourth and fifth cars were equipped with
jamming devices, which were
switched on and functional.
138. When the motorcade passed the St. George Hotel at
Minae Al-Hosn Street, at
1256 hours, a huge explosion occurred, which resulted in
the death of Mr. Hariri and 21
others. In addition, more than 220 persons were injured
and the damage to surrounding
buildings and vehicles was severe. Mr. Hariri was taken
to the American University
Hospital, where his body was identified and the cause of
death concluded to be
immediate brain injury resulting in cardiac arrest.
139. An Opel which followed the motorcade from Nejmeh
Square to the junction of
Foch Street and Seaport Street has not been identified.
It should be noted that because the
motorcade was delayed at a T-junction, for a short while
it went against the traffic on a
one-way street from Nejmeh Square to Foch Street,
followed by the Opel. The
Commission has not succeeded in elucidating the reason
for the delay of the motorcade at
the T-junction.
140. The FitzGerald report concluded that Mr. Hariri
during the last three months
prior to the blast had taken the Maritime Road at six
different occasions, but it should be
kept in mind that, during the same period of time, he
only appeared in public in the Beirut
area fewer than 10 times.
141. The Commission has not found any indication that
there were leaks from, or
accomplices, within Mr. Hariri’s close staff members.
However, UNIIIC determined that
Mr. Hariri was under surveillance at least one month
prior to the blast, by people
planning the crime (see the phone analysis section
above).
142. The weaknesses in the initial measures taken by the
Lebanese authorities and the
tampering with evidence during the first crime scene
examination have worked against
identifying the type of explosives used in the blast.
The first collected samples of residues
were tested in an “itemizer”, which only gives an
indication of the explosives. In this case
it indicated TNT, but no forensic laboratory
examinations of the samples were
undertaken. This fact has hampered the investigation,
since it has been impossible to
track down the origin of the explosives, which
subsequently could lead to the
perpetrators.
143. In addition, no other CCTV security systems were
seized in the area except those
from the HSBC bank. This negligence could have led to
the loss of important evidence.
Conclusion:
It would not have been difficult for individuals outside
of Hariri’s “inner circle” to
predict the route that his convoy would follow on 14
February 2005. The Mitsubishi
Canter van shown on the HSBC bank CCTV security system
was the carrier of the
explosives. The negligence of the Lebanese authorities
to undertake proper
investigative measures and a full-scale professional
crime scene examination
immediately after the blast has made it difficult to
resolve key questions regarding
the execution of the bombing, such as the type of
explosive used, or may have
resulted in the potential loss of important evidence,
such as useful CCTV videos.
Use of Prepaid Telephone Cards
144. Investigations by both the ISF and Military
Intelligence have led to six pre-paid
calling cards, which telephone records demonstrate were
instrumental in the planning of
the assassination. Beginning at approximately 1100 hrs
on 14 February 2005, cell site
records show that cellular telephones utilizing these
six calling cards were located in the
area stretching from the Nejmeh Square to the St. George
Hotel, within a few-block
radius and made numerous calls with each other and only
with each other. The phones
were situated so that they covered every route linking
the Parliament to Kuraytem Palace:
that is, cellsite records demonstrate that these
telephones were placed to cover any route
that Hariri would have taken that day. One of the
cellphones located near the Parliament
made four calls with the other telephone lines at 1253
hrs ---the time that Mr. Hariri’s
convoy left the Nejmeh Square . The calls ---and all
usage on the cards ---terminated at
1253 hrs on 14 February, a few minutes before the blast.
The lines have all been inactive
since.
145. Further investigation has revealed that these six
lines ---along with two others --
were put into circulation on the 4 January 2005, after
calling number 1456 activated
them. They were all activated at the same location in
northern Lebanon between Terbol
and Menyeh. Since they were first purchased in early
January 2005, until the time of the
explosion, the lines only had calls with each other. In
that time period, until the
assassination, there appears to be a correlation between
their location and Hariri’s
movements, suggesting that they might have been used to
follow Hariri’s movements in
that time period.
146. The Commission, in conjunction with the Lebanese
authorities, continued the
investigation of the origin of these telephone lines.
The six pre-paid cards originated,
along with four others, from the Powergroup Company,
Beirut, a store owned by a
reportedly active member of Al-Ahbash with close ties to
Sheikh Ahmad Abdel-Al.
According to company records, the lines were delivered
to the store’s Tripoli branch.
One of the employees of that Tripoli store reported that
on the 30 December 2004, he
received a telephone call from Raed Fakhreddin, the
owner of another cell shop in Tripoli
and the nephew of Tarek Ismat Fakhreddin, a prominent
businessman and consultant to
former Lebanese prime minister Omar Karame. Raed
Fakhreddin reportedly urgently
wanted to buy 10 prepaid cards; the Tripoli store
employee noted that the inquiry itself
was unusual as Raed Fakhreddin did not customarily buy
lines from the Tripoli store nor
typically have commercial dealings with the Tripoli
store other than mobile handset
purchases. However, the ten calling cards bearing these
particular lines were located, and
Raed Fakhreddin sent a messenger to pick up the calling
cards bearing these lines from
the Tripoli store. That messenger reported to the
Commission that he paid $700 USD in
cash at the Tripoli store to purchase these ten lines
and deliver them to Raed Fakhreddin.
The forms legally required for purchasing cellular lines
were not filled out that day,
however, but rather over two weeks after the lines had
been sold, on 12 January 2005.
The supporting identification required for the purchase,
which was provided by Raed
Fakhreddin, proved to be false. On 14 September 2005,
the ISF arrested Raed
Fakhreddin, along with others involved in the transfer
and sale of these calling cards.
Raed Fakhreddin was subsequently interviewed as a
suspect by the Commission. In that
interview, while he admitted that he purchased the
lines, he denied any knowledge of the
use of six of the lines in connection with the Hariri
assassination.
147. Of the ten mobile phones used in connection with
these ten cellular telephone
cards, five have been traced to a store in Tripoli.
Conclusion:
The investigation of the prepaid telephone cards is one
of the most important leads
in this investigation in terms of who was actually on
the ground executing the
assassination. This is a line of investigation that
needs to be pursued thoroughly.
Jamming Devices
148. Hariri’s convoy included three vehicles equipped
with jamming devices, designed
to disturb the signals of remote-controlled IED.
149. Although UNIIIC received information from one
source that a trusted associate of
Mr. Hariri’s had tampered with the jamming devices
prior to the blast, the Commission
has not been able to corroborate this information.
Indeed, all available evidence indicates
that these jamming devices were operational and in
proper working condition at the time
of the assassination. Those responsible for managing the
jamming devices reported that
they conducted a detailed check of the jammers every
three months, an operation
performed for the last time in early January 2005 when
no problems were observed. In
addition, the jamming system was checked by a member of
Mr. Hariri’s security detail
two days before the explosion and was deemed to be in
good working condition. Of the
three jamming devices, one was completely destroyed by
the blast, another was burned
but was retrieved and is maintained as evidence, and a
third was still operational and,
upon testing, was found to be working properly.
Moreover, the report of the Dutch
forensic explosives experts about the two devices which
survived as evidence further
concluded that the intact jammer had essentially been
operational. Finally, the
telecommunication firms, MTC Touch and ALFA, reported
that their networks were
disrupted on 14 February from about 1200 hrs to 1300 hrs
between Place de l’Etoile and
the St. George Hotel. UNIIIC investigators conducted a
reconstruction on 19 August
2005 in cooperation with MTC and ALFA, by taking three
vehicles similar to those in
Mr. Hariri’s convoy equipped with similar jamming
devices along the same route that the
convoy took from the Place de l’Etoile to the St.
George Hotel. This reconstruction
produced relatively similar results regarding the
temporary disruption of
telecommunications as occurred on 14 February, even
accounting for other factors that
could have affected telecommunications in the area.
Thus, it can be assumed that at least
one of the three jamming devices was operational and
functional at the time of the
explosion.
150. Even though at least one jamming device was
operational, investigation has
revealed that there are ways to overcome, avoid, evade
or use jamming devices.
Different possibilities include a suicide bomber, a
wireless explosion using different
frequencies from those of the jamming devices or using
the frequencies of the jamming
devices , a wireless explosion using the jamming devices
themselves, a wireless
explosion using a satellite phone from Thuraya, the only
telephone company working on
Lebanese territory with satellite links, a wired
explosion using a TNT cable, or a wired
explosion using another kind of installed cable such as
a telephone line as a connecting
wire. Although it appears to the Commission based on its
investigation to date,
specifically, the results of the Dutch forensic
examination of the crime scene, that it is
possible that a suicide bomber caused this explosion,
these other possibilities warrant
further investigation, both as to whether they were
feasible standing alone or in
conjunction with a suicide bomber.
Conclusion:
It appears that the jamming devices in Hariri’s convoy
were operational and
functional on 14 February at the time of the blast.
Further investigation may
provide information about how the IED was activated.
Telecommunications interferences in downtown Beirut
151. UNIIIC received information that there was
interference on 14 February 2005
from 0900 hrs until 1400 hrs of the telecommunications
antenna covering the area of
Riad Solh, which includes the crime scene area. The
matter was investigated with the
Ministry of Telecommunication. This information was
confirmed through information
provided by the telecommunications provider MTC Touch.
Consequently, the mobile
phone callers on the crime scene area could not use this
specific antenna and were
diverted to other antennas. No evidence has been found
to date which would clearly
point to internal manipulation at MTC Touch, although
such internal manipulation cannot
yet be completely discounted. It remains equally
possible that an outside individual,
criminal organization, company or authority would also
have been able to generate such
interferences, for example with a mobile appliance.
Moreover, a direct connection
between these interferences and the assassination cannot
be excluded.
Conclusion:
It appears that there was interference with a
telecommunications antenna in the
crime scene area during the time of the crime. This is a
line of enquiry that should
be thoroughly pursued.
Crime Scene
152. Until the establishment of UNIIIC, the Lebanese
authorities had not carried out a
thorough crime scene examination. Since this constitutes
the basis of any criminal
investigation, the Commission deemed it necessary to
seek the assistance of UN member
states to second experts in order to determine
primarily, among other things, whether the
explosion took place aboveground or underground.
The German Forensic Team
153. On 6 July 2005, the German Forensic Team,
comprising four forensic experts,
submitted their report to UNIIIC. 2 Excerpts of the most
important paragraphs conclude:
“The Swiss expert team’s findings and conclusions
can be fully supported. Due to the distribution of the so
far located parts of a Mitsubishi Canter lorry, it can
be assumed that that vehicle played a significant part in
the course of action and was possibly used as carrier of
the bomb.
After the assessment of all facts and estimations an
aboveground explosion is the most feasible possibility.
If we assume such an explosion, the amount of explosive
must have been around 1,000 kg. Highly
aggressive explosive was used. The result of an A-sample
from the crater wall shows that TNT was used.
But this result is not one that has been achieved in the
presence of an expert from the UN Fact Finding
Mission to Lebanon and thus must be regarded as
preliminary and not finally confirmed result. During our
work at the location of the incident we could not detect
any hints with regard to the kind of trigger that has
been used”.
The Dutch Forensic Team
154. During the period 12 August – 25 September 2005,
a Dutch forensic team
conducted an the examination of the prime crime scene
and periphery areas of interest.
The team was composed of seven experts specialized in
post-blast investigations. The
objective for the forensic investigation of the
explosion site was to find physical
evidence to reconstruct the IED which caused the
explosion. To examine a crime scene
nearly half a year after the incident occurred is not a
common practice. Moreover, it was
known that the crime scene was disturbed on several
occasions. This seriously
diminishes the strength of conclusions that can be drawn
from the location where the
exhibits were found. It can never be excluded that the
materials at the crime scene were
manipulated by someone or intentionally put there.
Notwithstanding, it was felt to be
useful to carry out a full crime scene search, mainly
because it was likely that certain
areas of the crime scene had not been contaminated, such
as the upper floors of the
Byblos and St George’s Hotel. The crime scene area was
cordoned off on 15 February
2005, according to ISF, and was guarded 24/7 from this
day on.
155. The Dutch forensic team was assisted by many people
in carrying out the crime
scene investigation, e.g. forensic police officers from
ISF, a team of British divers, a
French expert on explosives, a forensic scientist from
Northern Ireland, a German
electrical engineer specialized on jamming devices, a
team of Japanese crime scene
investigators, a German car expert, a Dutch car expert
and a number of Lebanese
specialists.
156. A coherent and comprehensive report on the findings
and results from the crime
scene investigation has been submitted to the
Commission. The report comprised 87
pages and contained four main conclusions:
1. Detonation of high explosives
The damage inflicted on the buildings, vehicles,
surrounding lamp posts and other
objects in the vicinity of the explosion site
demonstrates that a large amount of high
explosives was activated and detonated to the left side
in front of the main entrance of
the St George’s Hotel on Minae Al-Hosn Street. This
detonation set fire to many
vehicles within the distance of 20 to 30 meters of the
explosion centre. From the damage
pattern it is clear that it was one explosion of a
charge of high explosives.
2. Mitsubishi Canter vehicle
Regarding the physical evidence recovered, the human
remains identified by the
Lebanese forensic specialist, the HSBC security video
and the damage on the vehicles
parked on the road, the most likely scenario is that a
Mitsubishi Canter van containing
the IED was activated when the Hariri convoy of six
vehicles drove by. The engine
number of this Mitsubishi Canter van was found amongst
the debris on the crime scene.
This engine number has led to the vehicle registration
number and the production date.
No remains of the constituents of the IED have been
found amongst the debris, apart
from the vehicle parts of the Mitsubishi Canter in which
the IED was placed. Because of
the size of the explosion and the exploded charge this
is not unexpected. A few damaged
parts of circuit board have been recovered which may be
related to the activation
mechanism. However, these circuit boards should first be
examined by electronics
experts, who might give an indication of the application
of these boards.
3. Location of convoy vehicles and bomb vehicle
When the explosive was activated, the Mitsubishi Canter
was parked almost in line with
the other parked vehicles along the pavement in front of
the St George’s Hotel with the
front of the vehicle facing the west. It was not parked
fully in line judging from the
direction of the explosion force acted on the red Ford
vehicle which was most likely
parked directly in front of the Mitsubishi. This red
Ford vehicle was most severely
damaged from the left rear side which means that the
Mitsubishi could not have been
parked fully in line with the Red Ford vehicle.
Among the six convoy vehicles the black Mercedes
numbered 404 was closest to the
explosion center when the IED detonated. The direction
of the explosive force on this
vehicle was from the right side, meaning it was most
likely located alongside of the
Mitsubishi. From the damage patterns it can be stated
that vehicles 401, 402 and 403, the
latter with Messrs. Hariri and Fleyhan as occupants, had
just passed by the Mitsubishi
when the explosion occurred. Vehicles 405 and 406 were
damaged most severely at the
right front side, meaning that these vehicles had not
yet driven by the Mitsubishi at the
moment of the detonation.
4. Activation mechanism of the IED
Regarding the physical evidence presented in this report
and the fact small human
remains of an unidentified person have been found and no
large body parts such as legs,
feet or lower arms, the most likely scenario for the
activation of the IED is a suicide
bomber. Another only slightly less likely possibility is
that of a remotely-controlled
device. However, no residues of such a device have been
recovered from the crime
scene.
The British Forensic Team
157. On 5 September 2005, the British Forensic Team
submitted their report to the
Commission. The British team was composed of seven
experts. The objective for the
team was to conduct a underwater search of the sea floor
and the Marina adjacent to the
scene of the blast. While performing their duties, the
British team was assisted by
Lebanese divers from the Civil Defense Fire and Rescue
Team. Forty items were
collected and seized during the underwater search, of
which the vast majority were
vehicle parts.
The Japanese Forensic Team
158. On 27 September 2005, the Japanese team submitted
their report to the
Commission. The team comprised of three forensic experts
accompanied by an
interpreter. The objective of the team was to identify
the Mitsubishi Canter van.
159. The Japanese experts examined all the evidence
recovered from the crime scene
and sorted out 69 pieces as suspected Mitsubishi Canter
parts. Of the 69 pieces, 44 items
were identified as Canter parts by the Mitsubishi Fuso
Corporation in Japan.
160. The Mitsubishi Canter Van was finally identified.
The vehicle was stolen in
Sagamihara City, Japan on 12 October 2004.
The Northern Irish and French Experts on IEDs
161. The experts were in agreement with the comments and
conclusions in the Dutch
Forensic Team’s report.
Conclusion:
The explosion that killed Mr. Hariri and 22 others took
place above ground. For
this purpose, an amount of no less than 1000 kilgrams of
military explosives was
used.
AFTER THE CRIME : ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
162. The Commission has undertaken extensive measures to
map Mr. Hariri, his
whereabouts and doings prior to the blast as well as
other occurrences, in order to find the
motive and the reasons behind the crime.
163. Interviews have been conducted with his relatives,
staff members, friends,
associates and colleagues. None of these efforts have
led anywhere else than to the
prelude of Mr. Hariri stepping down from the post as
Prime Minister.
164. This information has reinforced a picture of a
tense relationship between Mr.
Hariri on the one hand and President Lahoud and the
Syrian authorities on the other.
Evidence is also adduced from the phone conversation
between General Ghazali and a
senior Lebanese official on 19 July 2004; the
conversation between President Assad and
Mr. Hariri on 26 August 2004; in Syria, the approach to
Mr. Hariri by Yehya Al-Arab,
Wissam El-Hassan and Salim Diab in October-November 2004
to increase the security
around him due to the political tension and Mr.
Hariri’s response that “they don’t dare to
touch me”; the meeting between General Ghazali and
Yehya Al-Arab on 13 February
2005; and the Lebanese authorities response to the
distribution of olive oil during
February 2005.
165. All the key players amongst the competent Lebanese
authorities have been
interviewed as well as their experts involved in the
initial measures of the investigation.
The early investigation showed a pattern that no one
claimed they had the slightest clue
that something was going on around Mr. Hariri that could
threaten his life. The efforts
undertaken by the Commission during a limited period of
time have come to a
diametrically opposite conclusion. There were a number
of warning signs regarding Mr.
Hariri’s security in his immediate surroundings in the
aftermath of the occurrences during
the second half of 2004, in particular when it comes to
the context of previous Lebanese
experiences of assaults targeting individuals through
bombings.
166. On 30 August 2005, the Lebanese authorities
arrested and detained four high-
level officials of the Lebanese security and
intelligence apparatus, pursuant to arrest
warrants issued by the Lebanese Prosecutor General based
on recommendations from
UNIIIC that there was probable cause to arrest and
detain them for conspiracy to commit
murder in connection with the assassination of Rafik
Hariri. The individuals arrested
were General Jameel Al-Sayyed, former director general
the Sûreté Générale ; General
Ali Al-Hajj, former head of the ISF; General Raymond
Azar, former head of military
intelligence; and General Mustapha Hamdan, Commander of
the Republican Guard
Brigade.
167. The four have been interviewed by UNIIIC in the
presence of counsel. They each
continue to deny any involvement in the planning or
execution of the assassination of
Hariri, any awareness of such a conspiracy beforehand,
and undertaking or ordering any
actions designed to obstruct the investigation
afterwards.
168. As in any investigation, the points of departure
for UNIIC have been the victim of
the crime, the crime scene and witnesses. In addition,
the Commission has focused on
the following 5 sub-investigations.
1. Ahmad Abu Adass
169. UNIIIC’s investigation into the Abu Adass lead
focused on seeking to determine
Mr. Abu Adass’s whereabouts and evaluating the
likelihood that Mr. Abu Adass was
actually the suicide bomber he was purported to be.
170. UNIIIC was unable to interview Mr. Abu Adass’s
father, who had been
interviewed by the Lebanese authorities on 14 February
2005, because he died on 7
March 2005 shortly after being called to appear before
the Investigative Judge.
171. Mr. Abu Adass’s mother, Nehad Moussa, was
interviewed by UNIIIC on 7 July
2005, and had previously been interviewed at least four
times by Lebanese authorities,
the first time on the 14 February 2005. She and Mr. Abu
Adass’s father Tayser Moussa
were illegally detained for approximately 10 days. She
stated that she told the Lebanese
authorities the following: Mr. Abu Adass disappeared on
16 January 2005 and was not
heard from since. According to her, in early January
2005, Mr. Abu Adass explained to
her that he had met an individual whom she knew only as
“Mohammed” who wanted to
convert to Islam from Christianity and Mr. Abu Adass was
helping him. Mr. Abu Adass
reported that Mohammed appeared to be wealthy and he
would occasionally disappear
for a period of a week or so. After one such
disappearance, on the evening of Saturday,
15 January 2005, Mohammed called their home. Mohammed
told Mr. Abu Adass that
he would come to pick Mr. Abu Adass up the next morning,
to show him a surprise.
Mr. Abu Adass left with Mohammed that Sunday, 16 January
2005, promising his mother
he would be out only for a few hours, since she had
requested that he stay to help her
clean a large carpet. Mr. Abu Adass never returned. On
Monday morning, Mr. Abu
Adass’s mother received a call from an individual who
told her not to worry about
Ahmed as he was in Tripoli where their car had broken
down and they were just waiting
to have it fixed. Ms. Moussa understood that this was
the same individual called
“Mohammed” whom she had spoken to on the telephone
two days earlier. She asked to
speak to her son, but was told that her son was waiting
at a house without a phone and the
caller was in the car shop. The caller told Ms. Moussa
that her son would be back in time
to help clean the carpet. At approximately 9 p.m. that
same day, she received another call
from the individual called “Mohammed” who said they
did not have an accident and did
not break down. The caller went on to say that Mr. Abu
Adass wanted to go to Iraq and
would not be coming back. When Ms. Moussa expressed
surprise and stated that Mr.
Abu Adass had never mentioned any such interest before,
the caller said he would try to
get her Mr. Abu Adass’s phone number so she could try
to change his mind. The caller
hung up and never called back. The family filed an
official missing person’s report with
the ISF on 19 January 2005.
172. In a follow-up interview with UNIIIC, Ms. Moussa
added that Mr. Abu Adass’s
best friend was a man by the name of Ziad Ramadan whom
he had met as a colleague at a
computer company approximately two years earlier. The
last contact she had with Mr.
Ramadan was when he called her several days after her
son disappeared to ask if she had
any news from her son. In her interviews with the
Lebanese authorities, Ms. Moussa
stated that she had confirmed that her son did not have
a driver’s license and that there
was no internet connection in their house.
173. UNIIIC was unable to locate Ziad Ramadan to
interview. After being interviewed
by the Lebanese authorities on 14 February 2005, it
appears that Mr. Ramadan returned
to Syria with his family. In his interview with the
Lebanese authorities, Mr. Ramadan
stated that he had known Mr. Abu Adass for approximately
two years, as they worked
together in the same company for two months. Mr. Ramadan
saw Abass last the
Thursday or Friday preceding his disappearance, when
Abass discussed his new
employment decorating book covers.
174. One individual whom neither UNIIIC nor the Lebanese
authorities was able to
interview so far was Khaled Midhat Taha, another
religious associate of Mr. Abu
Adass’s, who is of significant interest, based on the
travel records available for him and
some unusual coincidences. Mr. Taha met Mr. Abu Adass
when they were students at
the Arab University where they used to meet in the
University’s mosque. According to
travel records, Mr. Taha departed from Beirut
International Airport for the United Arab
Emirates on 21 July 2003 and returned to Beirut on 17
October 2003. The next record for
him is an entry into Lebanon coming from Syria by land
on 15 January 2005, the day
before Mr. Abu Adass’s disappearance. The next day,
Mr. Taha left Lebanon by land
towards Syria. The records do not show a departure from
Lebanon prior to 15 January
2005, which indicates that he entered Syria prior to
that date illegally. Further
investigation revealed that three of Mr. Taha’s e-mail
addresses went through Damascus
and the fourth went through Lebanon itself while
purporting to be in Turkey. .
Moreover, the date of his final departure for Syria from
Lebanon ---16 January 2005 --
is the same as the date of Mr. Abu Adass’s
disappearance, suggesting a possible link
between Mr. Taha’s trip to Lebanon and Mr. Abu
Adass’s disappearance. Moreover, as
the Lebanese authorities noted in their report, he was
never arrested for his apparently
illegal entry into Syria prior to 15 January 2005, even
upon his return to Syria on 16
January 2005, an uncommon occurrence, suggesting that
his departure and entry the
following day were facilitated by someone. The Syrian
authorities have recently been
approached by UNIIIC to provide the Commission with
detailed information on Khaled
Taha, especially his travel records into and out of
Syria.
175. As noted above, in the course of their
investigation, the Lebanese interviewees
included Mr. Abu Adass’s friends and associates,
former neighbors, acquaintances from
the mosque, colleagues from former jobs, and classmates.
A number of these individuals
were re-interviewed by UNIIIC. None had ever heard of
Al-Nasra wal Jihad, the group
that Mr. Abu Adass was purportedly a member of according
to the suicide bomb video
message. Many of them reported similar stories of being
taken by the ISF, handcuffed,
blindfolded, and stripped, and detained for a period of
time while being questioned about
Mr. Abu Adass and his affiliations with Islamic groups;
most reported that they shared
with their interrogators their view that Mr. Abu Adass
was a loner and introvert who did
not have the intelligence to be capable of committing
such a crime
176. In response to a request through the Lebanese
authorities, the Syrian government
informed UNIIIC that their computer files showed no
indications that Mr. Abu Adass
either entered or left Syria. Iraqi authorities informed
the Lebanese authorities through
the Iraqi embassy in Beirut that Mr. Abu Adass had not
obtained a visa to Iraq.
177. UNIIIC also submitted a request for details of any
organization within Lebanon
who may have had Mr. Abu Adass under observation between
September 2004 and
January 2005. The files obtained in response to this
request confirmed that no
department within Lebanon had Mr. Abu Adass under any
observation during the
relevant time period.
178. A number of sources, confidential and otherwise,
provided information to UNIIIC
on the role and whereabouts of Mr. Abu Adass. Although
the information provided has
not been independently verified, significantly, none of
this source information supported
the theory that he was a lone suicide bomber acting for
an Islamic fundamentalist group.
Indeed, all of the source information pointed to the
likelihood of Mr. Abu Adass being
used by the Syrian and Lebanese authorities as a
scapegoat for the crime, rather than
being the instigator of crime himself. For example, one
witness claimed to have seen Mr.
Abu Adass in the hallway outside of General Ghazali’s
office in December 2004 in
Anjar. Another witness claimed that Mr. Abu Adass was
currently held in prison in Syria
and will be killed once this investigation is over.
According to him, Mr. Abu Adass had
no role in the assassination except as a decoy, and the
videotape was recorded at gunpoint
approximately 45 days before the assassination. He later
stated that General Assef
Shawkat forced Mr. Abu Adass to record the tape
approximately 15 days before the
assassination in Damascus. He also stated that the tape
was given to Al-Jazeera by a
woman with the nickname “Um Alaa.” Another witness
stated that the day after the
assassination Faysal Al-Rasheed insisted that the case
had been solved and the
perpetrator was Mr. Abu Adass, as a suicide bomb and
that Mr. Abu Adass’s body was
still at the crime scene. Zuhir Saddik stated that in
early February 2005, he had seen
Mr. Abu Adass at the Zabadane training camp in Syria,
and that his information was that
Mr. Abu Adass had initially planned to commit the
assassination but had changed his
mind at the last minute. He said that Mr. Abu Adass was
subsequently killed by the
Syrians, and his body was placed in the vehicle
containing the bomb, and thus was
destroyed in the crime scene.
179. To date, no DNA evidence has been found on the
crime scene that can be linked
to Mr. Abu Adass.
180. Despite months of investigation by both UNIIIC and
the Lebanese authorities,
Mr. Abu Adass remains a mysterious figure. A few
significant points can still be made,
however, in connection with the Abu Adass investigation.
181. Other than the videotape itself which definitely
was of Mr. Abu Adass, there is
little else supporting the idea that he perpetrated this
assassination through a suicide
bomb. There is no evidence, other than the claim on the
video itself, of the existence of a
group called the Nasra and Jihad Group Of Greater Syria.
There is no information about
such a group in any open sources prior to 14 February
2005, for example, and neither the
Lebanese authorities nor Mr. Abu Adass’s friends and
acquaintances appear to have even
heard of the group prior to the day of the
assassination. Nor have any of Lebanon’s
neighboring countries’ security authorities, which
have been asked by UNIIIC to provide
information on the assassination, have any knowledge of
this group. Moreover, Mr. Abu
Adass’s disappearance on 16 January 2005 has not been
explained in a manner that is
consistent with the notion that he would be a suicide
bomber a month later. Notably,
none of the individuals who knew him well considered it
likely that he could commit
such a crime, in light of his nature and intelligence.
Finally, although there is always the
possibility that no trace of DNA of a suicide bomber
conducting a massive blast would be
found, it is noted that there is no evidence of Mr. Abu
Adass’s DNA at the crime scene or
indeed any other evidence, such as witnesses, that he
was present at the crime scene at the
time of the crime.
182. However, one aspect of the investigation to date is
clear: much of the information
surrounding Mr. Abu Adass and his disappearance points
to Syria. Khaled Taha’s
peculiar travel records, indicating an entry into
Lebanon from Syria the day before Mr.
Abu Adass’s disappearance, as well as the attempt to
obscure his presence in Syria by
seeking to show that his emails came from Turkey when
they in fact came from Syria, are
indicative of the type of evidence pointing to Syrian
involvement in Mr. Abu Adass’s fate
which cannot be discounted as mere coincidence.
Moreover, the vague information
available about “Mohamed” indicates that he was
likely Syrian, and the sudden return to
Syria of Mr. Abu Adass’s Syrian best friend, Ziad
Ramadan, shortly after being
interviewed by the Lebanese authorities, all suggest
Syrian connections to Mr. Abu
Adass’s disappearance. Finally, much of the source
information relevant to Mr. Abu
Adass’s fate points to Syria and Syrian officials, as
well as certain Lebanese officials.
While it is true that little of this source information
has been independently corroborated,
it is significant that no information points to any
other entity as being involved in his
disappearance or that he was a suicide bomber. Although
this is not definitive, these
repeated connections to Syria bear further
investigation.
Conclusion:
There is no evidence that Mr. Abu Adass belonged to the
group al nasra wal-jihad
fee bilad Al-Sham as claimed in the Al-Jazeera
videotape, nor even that such a group
has ever existed or does exist now. There are no
indications (other than the
videotape) that he drove a truck containing the bomb
that killed Hariri. The
evidence does show that it is likely that Mr. Abu Adass
left his home on 16 January
2005 and was taken, voluntarily or not, to Syria, where
he has since disappeared.
2. Telephone Analysis
183. One of the most important aspects of this
investigation has been the analysis of
telephones. A specialized software was used to analyze
and investigate numerous
telephone calls by those figures identified as the most
important to the investigation,
permitting UNIIIC to achieve an optimal result with
limited staff members and a short
timeframe. The assistance of the Lebanese telephone
companies and authorities was
essential to making the analysis effective. For example,
the Lebanese
telecommunications companies MTC Touch and Alpha
responded quickly to requests for
cellphone subscriber information and toll records.
Similar information on landlines was
provided to the Commission through the Ministry of
Telecommunications. This prompt
assistance was invaluable as it permitted investigators
to quickly analyze specific
telephone calls of subscribers and to establish patterns
of communication between
particular groups of subscribers. In total, the
Commission requested information on
approximately 2,235 subscribers and obtained telephone
connection data for
approximately 70,195 telephone calls. The telephone
analysis, which has already been
critical in establishing leads and determining
connections between the key figures, will
continue to be a central aspect of this investigation as
it evolves.
184. According to Ghassan Ben Jeddou, the director of
Al-Jazeera, Al-Jazeera received
four calls on the afternoon of 14 February prior to
airing the Abu Adass videotape. The
records revealed only three calls to Al-Jazeera that
afternoon, however, at 1411 hrs, 1527
hrs and 1704 hrs.
185. It has not been possible to identify the time or
origin of the reported fourth call to
Al-Jazeera.
186. Leila Bassam of Reuters reported that they received
one telephone call on 14
February regarding Mr. Abu Adass’s claim of
responsibility for the bombing, which
records show occurred at 1411 hrs.
187. Telephone records reveal that the same prepaid card
was used to contact Al-
Jazeera and Reuters for all of the above telephone
calls. It was purchased in Beirut,
Najaar, on 10 February 2005. The calls to Al-Jazeera and
Reuters were made from four
different telephone booths, all located in Beirut and
one of which is near the ESCWA
Center in downtown Beirut, approximately two kilometers
from the crime scene. This
prepaid card was only used to dial Al-Jazeera and
Reuters and there is no record that it
was used to make any other telephone call.
188. The videotape of Mr. Abu Adass confessing to the
crime was placed in a tree in
front of the ESCWA building in downtown Beirut. UNIIIC
obtained and viewed the
CCTV tapes from ESCWA for the 14 February 2005 in order
to seek to identify any
individuals or vehicles that could have been connected
to the drop-off of that videotape
and the subsequent calls to Al-Jazeera. After viewing
these images, however, it was
determined that it was not possible to clearly identify
any vehicles or individuals
approaching the tree in front of ESCWA from the video.
UNIIIC investigators also
interviewed security guards from Protectron Security,
which is responsible for providing
security for the parking lots situated next to the ESCWA
and Al-Jazeera buildings in
downtown Beirut. However, none of the security guards
interviewed on duty that day
witnessed any unusual activity related to placing an
item in the tree in front of ESCWA.
Conclusion:
It has not been possible yet to identify the individual
or individuals responsible for
telephoning Al-Jazeera and Reuters on 14 February or the
individual or individuals
responsible for the videotape of Mr. Abu Adass.
3. Use of pre-paid telephone cards
189. Investigative Judge Elias Eid obtained records for
and reviewed all of the phone
calls on 14 February 2005 to Al-Jazeera. Judge Eid noted
one mobile phone call to Al-
Jazeera as particularly significant: a call made to
Al-Jazeera on a prepaid card at 2207 hrs
on 14 February 2005. This same prepaid card received a
telephone call one minute after
the blast, at 1257 hrs, from a telephone booth located
in Tripoli near a building housing
Syrian Intelligence Services. On 30 January a call was
made to the landline at the home
of Mr. Abu Adass’s from that same Tripoli phone booth.
190. UNIIIC obtained and reviewed the call records for
prepaid card number 03925152
based on this information from Judge Eid. UNIIIC’s
investigation has revealed so far
that while there is no identified subscriber, the card
bears significant connections. On 8
February 2005, for example, that prepaid card had a
contact with a mobile telephone
number belonging to Tarek Ismat Fakhreddin. Mr.
Fakhreddin, a prominent
businessman, is a close associate of then-Prime Minister
Omar Karame. Tarek
Fakhreddin also made calls hours after the blast to
General Hamdan, General Azar,
General Hajj and the Syrian intelligence officer Jamea
Jamea. In addition, he had
telephone contact with his nephew Raed Fakhreddin at
1337 hrs on the 14 February 2005.
Raed Fakhreddin is heavily suspected to have bought the
prepaid cards which were used
to organize the assassination. The prepaid card also had
contacts with another telephone
number which was in contact with Raed Fakhreddin’s
mobile phone in December 2004,
and January, February and March 2005.
191. This pre-paid card has also been connected to a
number of prominent Lebanese
and Syrian officials. For example, the card was in
contact with three different numbers
which in turn were in contact with Mustafa Hamdan’s
mobile phone in January, March,
and July 2005. Two days before the explosion, on 12
February 2005, this pre-paid card
was also in contact with a mobile phone number belonging
to ex-Minister Abel Rahim
Yussef Murad. Mr. Murad’s mobile phone in turn called
Ali Hajj after the blast. The
mobile phones of Mr. Murad and Tarek Isamt Fakhreddin
were in contact with each other
on 17 January 2005, one day after Ahmad Abu Adass’s
disappearance. This prepaid card
also had contacts with a telephone number which in turn
was in regular contact with the
mobile phone number belonging to the politician Nasser
Kandil, and the card had
contacts with two mobile phone numbers in February and
March 2005 which in turn were
in contact on 14 and 17 February 2005 with the mobile
phone number used by Syrian
intelligence officer Jamea Jamea.
192. The prepaid card had contacts with a telephone
number on 5 January 2005 which
was in contact on 26 January 2005 with the telephone
number of Younis Abdel-Al, of Al-
Ahbash, the brother of the above-mentioned Ahmed
Abdel-Al. The prepaid card was
also in contact with a different telephone number on 5
January which was in contact
twice on 10 January 2005 to a telephone number belonging
to Walid Abdel-Al, a brother
of Younis and Ahmed Abdel-Al and a member of Mustafa
Hamdan’s Republican Guard
Brigade.
Conclusion:
The user or users of this pre-paid card on 14 February
2005 is significant and
identification of that individual or individuals is a
priority for this investigation.
4. Australian Investigation
193. In an interview with UNIIIC, Adnan Addoum, Minister
of Justice at the time of
the bombing, stated that it was his belief that UNIIIC
investigators should pursue this
investigation and question the six Australian suspects
as to their purpose of traveling. He
also indicated his belief that in light of the fact that
the vehicle allegedly used in the
bombing was a right-hand drive vehicle (as used in
Australia), further suspicion should
be cast on those six suspects. He added that it was his
belief that “due to media and
religious pressures, the investigation judge did not
give this matter enough importance.”
194. UNIIIC investigators thoroughly reviewed the
results of the Lebanese and
Australian investigation into these six suspects and, as
set forth below, have concluded
that there is no basis for believing that they had any
involvement in the assassination of
Hariri. In pursuing this review, UNIIIC investigators
also were aware that there were six
sim cards used in connection with the assassination, and
that usage on the sim cards
terminated at the time of the explosion. Noting that
there were six suspicious
Australians, and six suspicious sim cards, an unusual
coincidence, UNIIIC believed that a
review of the Australian and Lebanese investigations
into this area would be prudent
195. Having closely examined the file, UNIIIC can
highlight the following points:
. The Lebanese authorities reported and requested
assistance from Interpol to locate
and interview the identified suspects in accordance with
established protocol.
. The protocol followed by Interpol was correct.
. The Australian authorities were contacted via Interpol
to follow up on this matter.
. The Australian authorities carried out a thorough
investigation into the matter and
presented a report on their findings to the Lebanese
authorities.
. The Lebanese authorities properly suspended this
present line of inquiry based on
the report presented by the Australian authorities.
Conclusion:
Based on the above, the investigation carried out by the
Australian authorities and
the findings obtained should be considered as
conclusive. Mr. Addoum’s suspicions
are unfounded and there is no evidence to support them.
The pursuit of this line of
investigation distracted the Lebanese authorities from
following other lines of
investigation.
5. Ahmad Abdel-Al
196. Sheikh Ahmad Abdel-Al, a prominent
figure in the Al-Ahbash, was responsible
for the public relations and military and intelligence
for Al-Ahbash, the Association of
Islamic Philanthopic Projects, a Lebanese group with
strong historical ties to the Syrian
authorities. Abdel-Al has proven to be a significant
figure in the light of his links to
several aspects of this investigation, especially
through his mobile phone which had
numerous contacts with all the important figures in this
investigation; indeed, it does not
appear that any other figure is as linked to all the
various aspects of this investigation as
Abdel-Al.
197. Abdel-Al was interviewed as a witness and later as
a suspect by UNIIIC. Some of
his actions, and some statements during his interview,
suggest attempts to hide
information from the investigation. For example, he
tried to hide the origin of his mobile
telephone number on giving his prepaid card on 12 March
2005 to his Al-Ahbash friend
Mohammed Halawani and requesting that the card be
registered in Halawani’s name.
During UNIIIC’s interview with Halawani, it took him
several hours to admit that the
telephone number in question was in fact used by Ahmad
Abdel-Al. Additionally,
according to Abdel-Al’s statement, on 14 February
2005, he left home and went to the
Al-Ahbash office. His telephone records reveal that at
1147 hrs, he had a telephone
contact with a number which phoned his home telephone
number a number of times
immediately before the explosion ---1226 hrs, 1246 hrs
and 1247 hrs. While Abdel-Al
told UNIIIC that he called home shortly after the
explosion at 1256 hrs, telephone records
show that the call was made at 1254 hrs, two minutes
before the explosion. Abdel-Al
stated, that he did not leave the Al-Ahbash office the
day of the blast for security reasons.
The telephone records showed four calls to Syrian
intelligence officer Jamea Jamea, at
1142 hrs, 1814 hrs, 2023 hrs and 2026 hrs. According to
a witness, Abdel-Al visited
Jamea Jamea’s office the evening of the blast at 19:30
in which the two discussed Mr.
Abu Adass. Moreover, shortly after his visit to Jamea
Jamea’s office, Abdel-Al’s mobile
phone registered a call to General Ghazali, at 1956 hrs.
Abdel-Al also sought to steer the
investigation towards Mr. Abu Adass, not only by
providing the Lebanese authorities
with extensive information on Mr. Abu Adass shortly
after the blast, but also stating to
UNIIIC that the Al-Ahbash Security Service had seen Mr.
Abu Adass before the
assassination in the Ain Al-Hilweh Palestinian camp
together with Abu Obeida the
deputy leader of the terrorist group Asbat al Ansar.
198. There are also numerous contacts between Ahmad
Abdel-Al and Lebanese State
Security on the day of the blast. For example, Abdel-Al
had almost daily telephone
contact with Brigadier General Faysal Rasheed, Chief of
State Security in Beirut and on
14 February 2005, they had telephone contact at 1035
hrs, 2008 hrs, 2113 hrs, 214 hrs
and 2216 hrs. Ahmad Abdel-Al also had contact with
suspect Raymond Azar, of the
Lebanese Army, on 14 February 2005, as well as 16 and 17
February 2005. There was a
call between the mobile phone of Albert Karam, another
member of the Lebanese Army
Intelligence, and Ahmad Abdel-Al on 14 February as well,
at 1212 hrs, about 44 minutes
before the blast.
199. Abdel-Al’s phone also had extensive telephone
contacts with Mustafa Hamdan’s
phone, as 97 calls occurred between the two between
January and April 2005. Of these,
four were made on 14 February 2005, after the explosion.
Ahmad had two telephone
contacts with his brother, Walid Abdel-Al, a member of
the Republican Guard, the day of
the blast at 16:15 and 17:29. In addition, Abdel-Al
received a call on 11 February 2005
at 2217 hrs from the same telephone booth used to call
Al-Jazeera shortly after the blast
on the 14 February. He also received a call on the 4
February 2005 at 19:34 and on 26
February 2005 at 0933 hrs from the booth used to call
Reuters shortly after the blast.
200. Abdel-Al has been in frequent contact with Mahmoud
Abdel-Al, his brother, who
is also active in Al-Ahbash. Mahmoud Abdel-Al’s
telephone calls on 14 February are
also interesting: he made a call minutes before the
blast, at 1247 hrs, to the mobile phone
of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud and at 1249 hrs had
contact with Raymond Azar’s
mobile telephone.
201. Abdel-Al also has notable connections to a
significant weapons store discovered
in southern Beirut in July 2005. This weapons store was
raided by the ISF on 26 July
2005 and five people, with close connections to the
former Mourabitoun militia, were
arrested. One of the arrestees was the driver and
bodyguard of Majed Hamdan, Mustafa
Hamdan’s brother, who runs a firm which reportedly
provided security for the St. George
Hotel. Abdel-Al reportedly arranged for another arrestee
to be employed as an
electrician in the presidential palace. Furthermore,
immediately after the arrests, another
individual fled and promptly telephoned Ahmad Abdel-Al.
Conclusion:
The evidence, including his links to other important
figures, especially Mustapha
Hamdan and the Republican Guard, his telephone calls and
his involvement in the
Lebanese investigation into Mr. Abu Adass, make Ahmad
Abdel-Al a key figure in
any ongoing investigation.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
202. It is the Commission’s view that the
assassination on 14 February 2005 was
carried out by a group with an extensive organization
and considerable resources and
capabilities. The crime had been prepared over the
course of several months. For this
purpose, the timing and location of Mr. Rafik Hariri’s
movements had been monitored
and the itineraries of his convoy recorded in detail.
203. Building on the findings of the Commission and
Lebanese investigations to date
and on the basis of the material and documentary
evidence collected, and the leads
pursued until now, there is converging evidence pointing
at both Lebanese and Syrian
involvement in this terrorist act. It is a well known
fact that Syrian Military Intelligence
had a pervasive presence in Lebanon at the least until
the withdrawal of the Syrian forces
pursuant to resolution 1559. The former senior security
officials of Lebanon were their
appointees. Given the infiltration of Lebanese
institutions and society by the Syrian and
Lebanese intelligence services working in tandem, it
would be difficult to envisage a
scenario whereby such a complex assassination plot could
have been carried out without
their knowledge.
204. It is also the Commission’s view that the context
of the assassination of Mr. Hariri
was one of extreme political polarization and tension.
Accusations and counter
accusations targeting mainly Mr. Hariri over the period
preceding his assassination
corroborate the Commission’s conclusion that the
likely motive of the assassination was
political. However, since the crime was not the work of
individuals but rather of a
sophisticated group, it very much seems that fraud,
corruption, and money-laundering
could also have been motives for individuals to
participate in the operation.
205. The Commission considers that the investigation
must continue for some time to
come. In the short time period of four months more than
400 persons have been
interviewed, 60 000 documents reviewed, several suspects
identified, and some main
leads established. Yet, the investigation is not
complete.
206. It is the Commission’s conclusion that the
continuing investigation should be
carried forward by the appropriate Lebanese judicial and
security authorities, who have
proved during the investigation that with international
assistance and support, they can
move ahead and at times take the lead in an effective
and professional manner. At the
same time, the Lebanese authorities should look into all
the case’s ramifications
including bank transactions. The 14 February explosion
needs to be assessed clearly
against the sequence of explosions which preceded and
followed it, since there could be
links between some, if not all, of them.
207. The Commission is therefore of the view that,
should the Lebanese authorities so
wish it, a sustained effort on the part of the
international community to establish an
assistance and cooperation platform together with the
Lebanese authorities in the field of
security and justice is essential. This will
considerably boost the trust of the Lebanese
people in their security system, while building
self-confidence in their capabilities.
208. The recent decision to proceed with new senior
security appointments was hailed
by all the Lebanese parties. It was an important step
towards improving the integrity and
credibility of the security apparatus. However, it took
place after months of a security
vacuum and extensive sectarian-political debate. Much
needs to be done to overcome
sectarian divisions, disentangle security from politics,
and restructure the security
apparatus to avoid parallel lines of reporting and
duplication and to enhance
accountability.
209. It is the Commission’s conclusion that, after
having interviewed witnesses and
suspects in the Syrian Arab Republic and establishing
that many leads point directly
towards Syrian security officials as being involved with
the assassination, it is incumbent
upon Syria to clarify a considerable part of the
unresolved questions. While the Syrian
authorities, after initial hesitation, have cooperated
to a limited degree with the
Commission, several interviewees tried to mislead the
investigation by giving false or
inaccurate statements. The letter addressed to the
Commission by the Foreign Minister of
the Syrian Arab Republic proved to contain false
information. The full picture of the
assassination can only be reached through an extensive
and credible investigation that
would be conducted in an open and transparent manner to
the full satisfaction of
international scrutiny.
210. As a result of the Commission’s investigation to
date, a number of people have
been arrested and charged with conspiracy to commit
murder and related crimes in
connection with the assassination of Mr. Hariri and
twenty-two others. The Commission
is of course of the view that all people, including
those charged with serious crimes
should be considered innocent until proven guilty
following a fair trial.
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